This proves by inference that generally, giving against the recipient’s will is not considered valid giving, as if it were, then Hillel would not have needed to institute this ordinance.

Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi who raises this objection: And perhaps when it was necessary for Hillel to institute an ordinance allowing the seller to repay the money against the will of the purchaser it was specifically in a case where he gives the money not in the presence of the purchaser. But when he repays him in his presence, whether the recipient was willing or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving. Accordingly, one cannot apply Hillel’s ordinance to the case of conditional bills of divorce.

And there are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel it can be inferred that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave it to him, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is valid giving. And the case where it was necessary for Hillel to institute his ordinance was when the giving of the money was not in his presence. But if the repayment was in his presence, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving.

Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi who raises this objection: And perhaps even in a case where she gives him the money in his presence, if she gives it with his consent, yes, it is valid. If she gives it against his will, no, it is not considered to be valid giving. And Hillel specifically instituted what was necessary, because in the case of a house in a walled city the purchaser would hide, and therefore that ordinance was necessary there.

§ Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught a halakha in our body of Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion, even though it is cited as an individual opinion, except for three cases. With regard to the halakha of a guarantor (Bava Batra 173b), if the creditor stipulated that he can collect his debt from either the debtor or the guarantor, according to the Rabbis he can collect from the guarantor’s property even if the debtor has available property. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the creditor can collect the debt only from the debtor. And likewise the halakha is not like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the case mentioned here concerning the incident that occurred in Tzaidan.

And similarly, the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning the dispute with regard to evidence in the final disagreement (Sanhedrin 31a), where the Rabbis hold that if one claims that he has no evidence or witnesses, but subsequently brings evidence to court, the judges do not accept it. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel they can accept it.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: If the husband said to his wife: Behold this is your bill of divorce, but the paper on which it is written is still mine, then she is not divorced, as he must give her the actual bill of divorce in order for the divorce to take effect. Since the paper still belongs to him, it is as if he had given her only the writing. But if he said to her: Behold this is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me, then she is divorced. The bill of divorce belongs entirely to her, and the returning of the paper is only a stipulation that must be fulfilled later.

The Gemara asks: What is different in the first clause of the baraita and what is different in the latter clause? In neither case does she have ownership of the bill of divorce. Rav Ḥisda said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says with regard to his coat that she can give him its value and does not need to give the item itself in order to fulfill the condition. Here also, since it is possible for her to appease him with money and she may give him the value of the paper, therefore it is considered as though she received the paper.

Abaye objects to this answer: Say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it is acceptable to give the value instead of the item itself when the item is not extant, because it is lost. But in a case where it is extant, such as the paper in this case, did Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel actually say that giving the value of the item is sufficient?

Rather, Abaye said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: We require any stipulated condition to be structured as a compound condition describing both outcomes, meaning that the condition must mention what will happen both if the condition is fulfilled and if it is not fulfilled. And here he did not compound his condition. The husband said only: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me. He did not specify that it will not be a valid bill of divorce if she does not return it.

Rava objects to this explanation: According to Abaye the reason the bill of divorce is valid is that the husband did not compound his condition, but if the husband did compound his condition then it would not be a valid bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn the halakhot of all conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Moses stipulated with them that if they fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will inherit the land of Gilead in the Transjordan, as they requested; but if they do not fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will not inherit that land (see Numbers, chapter 32).

Just as there, in the conditions that Moses made, the language of the condition precedes the consequent action, for he first stated the condition and afterward he described the result if they fulfill the condition: “And you shall give them the land of Gilead as an inheritance” (Numbers 32:29), so too, any condition is valid only when it is stated before the resultant action. And this serves to exclude the case mentioned here, where the resultant action of the giving of the bill of divorce precedes the condition. Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir this bill of divorce would not be valid, even if the husband had compounded the condition.

Rather, Rava said: The condition does not apply and the woman is divorced because the action of giving the bill of divorce precedes the condition.

Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this explanation: The reason that the bill of divorce is valid is that the action precedes the condition, and the condition does not take effect. But if the condition were to precede the action then it would not be a valid bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn all the halakhot of conditions? They are derived from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there it is a condition with regard to one matter, i.e., that they should fight along with the rest of the Jewish people, and a resultant action with regard to another matter, i.e., that they would receive the land of Gilead, so too, every other condition must follow this pattern. This serves to exclude the case mentioned here,