as it teaches by skipping one by one. The examples given relate to one witness missing, e.g., seven ties and six witnesses, and so on. They do not include a case in which two witnesses are missing, e.g., seven ties and five witnesses. This indicates that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Azzai is only with regard to the signature of one witness. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

Abaye said: Learn from it that this relative, who is allowed to sign a folded and tied bill of divorce, can sign if he wants to sign, either at the beginning, as the first signature, in the middle, or at the end.

From where does Abaye infer this? From the fact that it did not designate a place for him to sign. And learn from it, as well, that from any three of the witnesses who signed on a folded and tied bill of divorce, we can ratify the bill of divorce, i.e., it can be ratified based on their signatures. And we do not need to confirm the signatures specifically of three consecutive witnesses.

As if it enters your mind that we need consecutive witnesses, then they should designate a place for this relative to sign, in the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, and they should then validate the use of many disqualified witnesses. It could have been instituted that every third witness may be disqualified. Since in any group of three witnesses, two of them would be valid, more than one disqualified witness could be allowed. Since it is possible to ratify a bill of divorce by confirming signatures that are not consecutive, and therefore there is concern that the court will rely on two disqualified witnesses, the Sages consequently allowed the use of only one disqualified witness.

With regard to the halakha concerning the dispute in the mishna, it is related that when they came before Rabbi Ami with a question pertaining to a bare bill of divorce that needed more witnesses, he said to the person overseeing: Go out and complete it even with a slave from the general public, in accordance with the opinion of ben Nannas.

MISHNA: With regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except [ella] for so-and-so, Rabbi Eliezer permits her to remarry based on this divorce. And the Rabbis prohibit her from remarrying, as their bond is not entirely severed by this divorce, and she is therefore still considered his wife. What should he do so the divorce may take effect? He should take it from her and hand it to her again, and he should say to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man. If he wrote his qualification inside the bill of divorce, even if he then erased it, the bill is invalid since it was not written in a valid manner.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of this word ella in the husband’s statement? Does it mean except, i.e., the husband intended to divorce his wife in a manner that would render her permitted to marry only a limited group of men? Or does it mean: On the condition, i.e., the husband intended to grant her full divorce on the condition that she would not marry so-and-so?

The Gemara elaborates on how this dilemma affects the understanding of the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis: Does ella mean except, and therefore it is specifically with regard to the exception of a certain man from the intended divorce that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and hold that the divorce is invalid? This would be because in a case where the husband noted an exception, it is as if he left out part of her bill of divorce; since she is not permitted to remarry anyone she wishes it does not entirely sever the bond between them. But with regard to divorce on the condition that she will not marry a certain man the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Eliezer that it is valid, just as is the case with regard to any typical condition which the husband attaches to the divorce of his wife.

Or perhaps this is the meaning of ella: On the condition? Accordingly, it is specifically with regard to divorce on the condition that the wife will not marry a certain man that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis and allows her to remarry based on this divorce; but with regard to the exception of a certain man from the woman’s right to remarry he concedes that the divorce is invalid as the husband left out part of her bill of divorce.

Ravina said: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following mishna (Nega’im 12:1): All houses become ritually impure through leprous sores of the house except [ella] for those belonging to gentiles. Granted, if you say that the meaning of the word ella is except, this mishna is well understood. But if you say that its meaning is on the condition, the resulting interpretation of this mishna is that the houses of Jews become impure only on the condition that the houses of gentiles do not become impure; consequently, if the houses of gentiles become impure, the houses of Jews do not become impure. Does this interpretation make any sense?

Moreover, an objection against this interpretation may be raised as follows: Do the houses of gentiles become ritually impure at all? But isn’t it taught in a baraita that from the verse: “And I put the plague of leprosy in a house of the land of your possession” (Leviticus 14:34), it is derived that only the land of your possession, i.e., the houses of Jews, becomes impure through leprous sores of the house, but the houses of gentiles do not become impure through leprosy? Rather, conclude from the mishna that the meaning of ella is except. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that ella means except.

According to this conclusion, our mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis did not disagree with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for so-and-so; rather, they were in agreement that in that case she is not divorced. With regard to what case did they disagree? It was with regard to one who divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man on the condition that you will not marry so-and-so,