We reviewed all angles of the opinion of Rabbi Meir, i.e., we have examined all of Rabbi Meir’s statements with regard to consecrated property, and we did not find that he holds that consecrated property is not desacralized if it is misused unwittingly but it is desacralized if misused intentionally.

And as for our mishna, which indicates that this is Rabbi Meir’s opinion, it should not be understood as Rabbi Meir’s opinion with regard to consecrated property in general, but with regard to a case where a priest betrothed a woman using priestly tunics that have not worn out and that can still be worn during the Temple service. If a priest betrothed a woman with such garments, Rabbi Meir holds that if he did so unwittingly she is not betrothed, since clothes of this kind are not desacralized, and do not become hers. This is because they were initially given on the condition that the priests may benefit from them even when not performing the Temple service, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels. It is impossible for a priest to wear the garments only at the moment he is performing the service and at no other time. Therefore, these garments are desacralized only if he intended to desacralize them.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with Rav’s statement. Come and hear: With regard to priestly tunics that have worn out, one misuses property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. What, is it not so that this halakha would apply even if they had not worn out, and the tanna wanted to teach the additional halakha that it is still a transgression even after they are no longer fit for use? The Gemara rejects this: No, this halakha applies specifically to garments that have worn out. Since these cannot be used by priests, the permission to use them for non-sacred purposes lapses, and they are like other consecrated property that is subject to the halakhot of misuse.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the explanation of Rabbi Meir’s statement. Come and hear: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using new shekels, i.e., those given this year, which are used to purchase animals for this year’s offerings, but one is not liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using old shekels, given by those who failed to give the previous year’s half-shekel, since these old shekels are used not to purchase offerings but for Temple maintenance; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple even by using old shekels, as Rabbi Meir would say: One is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple not only by using money designated to purchase offerings, but even with the remainder of the chamber, i.e., the money that remained in the chamber after money was taken to purchase the animals used in communal offerings.

The Gemara continues the question: But why should one be liable for using the old shekels? Let us say the same logic: One is not liable, because they were initially given on the condition that people may benefit from them, since the Torah was not given to the ministering angels and people could not help but benefit from them. This is as the money to repair the wall of the city and its towers comes from the remainder of the chamber, as we learned in a mishna (Shekalim 4:2): The wall of the city, its towers, and all of the requirements of the city of Jerusalem come from the remainder of the chamber. It is not possible for passersby to avoid benefiting from the shade provided by the walls of the city. The Gemara answers: Do not say that the opinion that one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using money from the remainder of the chamber is that of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the mishna and say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Come and hear another proof: As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael bar Rabbi Yitzḥak said: With regard to stones of the walls and towers of Jerusalem that fell, one is liable for misuse of property consecrated to the Temple by using them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir, the use of even such stones renders one liable, despite the fact that it is not possible for people to avoid benefiting from them. The Gemara again answers: Do not say that this baraita is recording the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rather, emend the baraita and say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, is Jerusalem consecrated at all? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 10b): If one says that an item shall be considered like the lamb of the daily offering, like the animals designated as offerings and kept in special enclosures, like the wood of the altar, like the fires on the altar, like the Sanctuary, like the altar, or like Jerusalem, it is a vow and he is prohibited to derive benefit from the item, as he has compared it to something consecrated. The essence of a vow creating a prohibition is the statement that a certain item shall be like a consecrated item. Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered Jerusalem has not said anything, indicating that Rabbi Yehuda holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated.

And if you would say that Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is not that he holds that Jerusalem is not consecrated, but because the one stating the vow did not say: Like Jerusalem, but stated only that the item shall be considered Jerusalem, which is not a clear expression of a vow, but isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nedarim 1:6) that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who says that an item shall be considered like Jerusalem has not said anything, until he vows by comparing the item to an item that is sacrificed in Jerusalem. This indicates that he holds that Jerusalem itself is not consecrated.