and what is different there, in the previous chapter (50a), that the tanna teaches: With regard to one who says to his agent, go and betroth a certain woman for me in such and such a place, and he went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed? Why does the mishna there label him an agent, and here it labels him simply another?

The Gemara answers: Here the mishna teaches us a novel element and there it teaches us a novel element, through its use of these terms. The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: His agent, I would say that it is his agent who is considered a scoundrel in that case, as one who sends an agent relies upon him, thinking: He will perform my agency for me, since he was sent for that purpose. But with regard to the use of the term: Another, who was not appointed and upon whom he does not rely, as he is not his agent, you might say that he should not be considered a scoundrel.

Similarly, the mishna there teaches us a novel element, as had it taught: One who says to another, I would say that it is in the case of another that she is not betrothed if he betrothed her in a different place, as he thinks that this person would not go to the trouble of looking for her elsewhere, and therefore he authorized him to betroth the woman only in that particular place. But with regard to his agent, who is assumed to take special trouble to fulfill his agency, you might say he is merely showing him the place where she is likely to be found, and she is betrothed in any case. The mishna therefore teaches us that even when he appointed an agent she is not betrothed if he does not find her in the place the putative husband specified.

The Gemara relates: Ravin the Pious was appointed an agent and went to betroth a woman to his son, but in the end he betrothed her to himself. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught in the aforementioned baraita: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? How could a pious individual act in this fashion? The Gemara answers: The woman’s family would not give her to the son, and agreed only to let her marry the father. The Gemara further asks: Even so, before betrothing her he should have first informed his son that they refuse to let her marry him. The Gemara explains that Ravin thought: In the meantime, while I am busy reporting back to my son, someone else will come and betroth her.

The Gemara relates a similar story: Rabba bar bar Ḥana gave money to Rav and said: Purchase this land for me. Rav went and purchased it for himself. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in the baraita with regard to an agent who acts in this manner: What he did is done, but he has treated him in a deceitful manner? The Gemara answers: The land was located in a valley inhabited by violent men, who treated Rav with respect and were prepared to sell the land to him, but who did not treat Rabba bar bar Ḥana with respect. As in the case of Ravin, the Gemara questions this behavior: Nevertheless, Rav should have informed him. The Gemara responds that Rav thought: In the meantime someone else will come and purchase the land.

The Gemara further relates: Rav Giddel was engaging in the acquisition of a certain plot of land. In the meantime Rabbi Abba went and purchased it. Rav Giddel went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira went and complained about Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa. Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to him: Wait until Rabbi Abba ascends to visit us for the pilgrimage Festival, when all come to hear the Festival sermon, on which occasion we can discuss this matter with him. When Rabbi Abba ascended Rav Yitzḥak Nappaḥa found him and said to him: If a pauper is engaging in the acquisition of a loaf of bread that he found, and another came and took it from him, what is the halakha?

Rabbi Abba said to him: The one who took it away is called wicked. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa replied: But if so, what is the reason that the Master acted this way? Rav Giddel was negotiating the purchase of this land and you purchased it. Rabbi Abba said to him: I did not know that Rav Giddel was trying to acquire the land. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa retorted: Now too, the Master should give it to him, since you have been made aware that he submitted the first offer. Rabbi Abba said to him: As for selling, I will not sell it, as it is the first land I have ever purchased, and this matter of selling one’s first acquisition is not a good omen. If he wants to accept it as a gift, let him take it.

Rav Giddel did not descend to claim this plot of land, as it is written: “But he who hates gifts shall live” (Proverbs 15:27), and therefore he did not wish to accept the land as a gift. Rabbi Abba also did not descend to it, because Rav Giddel was already engaging in the acquisition of it when he acquired the land. In this manner, this Sage did not descend to take the plot of land, and that Sage did not descend to take care of it, and it was called the land of the Sages.

§ The mishna teaches: And similarly, with regard to one who says to a woman: Be betrothed to me after thirty days, and another came and betrothed her within this period, she is betrothed to the second man. The Gemara asks: In a case where another did not come and betroth her within the thirty days, what is the halakha? Rav and Shmuel both say: She is betrothed after thirty days, even if the money he gave for her betrothal has been used before the end of this period, as the betrothal takes effect from when the money is given.

The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason that she is betrothed despite the lack of money at the end of the thirty days? The Gemara explains that these dinars given for her betrothal are not comparable to a loan, nor are they comparable to a deposit that was transferred into her possession and subsequently lost. In both of these cases she would not be betrothed.

The Gemara elaborates: They are not comparable to a deposit, as a deposit is used in its owner’s possession, i.e., any loss is incurred by the owner, whereas these are used in her own possession, as he gave her the money to keep. These dinars are also not comparable to a loan; a loan is given for spending and therefore no money remains at the time of the betrothal, whereas these dinars were given to her from the outset for the purpose of betrothal.

The Gemara asks: If another did not come and betroth her, and she retracted her consent to the betrothal within thirty days, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She can retract her consent. Why? This statement, by which she changes her mind, comes and nullifies her previous statement when she agreed to the betrothal. Reish Lakish said: She cannot retract her consent, as her second statement does not come and nullify her previous statement.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a mishna (Terumot 3:4): In a case where someone appointed an agent to separate teruma from his produce on his behalf, and he subsequently canceled the agency, the halakha depends on the following: If he canceled the appointment before the agent separated the teruma, his teruma is not teruma. And here it is a case involving one statement and a second statement, as the owner of the produce appointed the agent and rescinded his appointment by speech. This shows that a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement. Reish Lakish replied: Giving money to a woman is different, as it is considered like an action, and a mere statement does not come and nullify the action of the transfer of money.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a further objection to Reish Lakish: With regard to one who sends a bill of divorce to his wife, and later the husband encountered the agent or sent another agent after him and in this manner said to him: The bill of divorce that I gave you is nullified, it is thereby nullified. And giving a bill of divorce to an agent is considered to be like giving money to a woman, and yet this baraita teaches that it is nullified, which indicates that speech can override even an action.

Reish Lakish answered: There too, as long as the bill of divorce has not reached the woman’s hand it is considered a case of one statement and a second statement. There is no halakhic significance to the transmitting of a bill of divorce to an agent, as only its delivery to the wife is considered an action. Therefore, the act of transferring the bill of divorce to the agent is of no consequence and in this particular case a statement comes and nullifies a previous statement.

Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: All vessels descend into their state of contracting ritual impurity by means of thought. Although an unfinished vessel cannot become ritually impure, if the craftsman decided not to work on it any further, it immediately assumes the status of a completed vessel and can become ritually impure. But they ascend from their state of ritual impurity only by means of a change resulting from an action. A ritually impure vessel, once it undergoes physical change, is no longer ritually impure.