gentile thugs took the field from the robber by force due to previous dealings between them. In that case, when the robbery victim comes to collect the principal, he collects it from liened property, and when the robbery victim comes to collect payment for the produce, he can collect only from unsold property.

The Gemara explains: Rava did not state his explanation of the baraita in accordance with the explanation of Rabba bar Rav Huna, because the phrase: It is appropriated from his possession, indicates that the field was taken from him legally and not by thugs. And Rabba bar Rav Huna did not state his explanation of the baraita in accordance with the explanation of Rava, because the phrase: It is appropriated from his possession, indicates that the field is appropriated in its unadulterated form, and was not damaged.

Rav Ashi stated that the baraita teaches its rulings disjunctively. According to Rav Ashi, the baraita is referring to a case where one robbed another of a field while it was full of produce, and he consumed the produce and sold the field. When, after the true owner recovers the field from purchaser, the purchaser comes to collect the principal from the robber, i.e., the amount that he paid for the field, he collects it from the robber’s liened property. When the robbery victim comes to collect payment for the produce, he collects only from unsold property.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: According to both Rava and Rabba bar Rav Huna, the money that the robber owes the robbery victim has the status of a loan by oral agreement, as it is not accompanied by documentation, and one who is owed a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from liened property.

The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the robber stood trial for his robbery and was found guilty, and he subsequently sold the land. Since he sold it after his liability was well known, the debt is equivalent to one that is written in a promissory note, and can be collected from liened property.

The Gemara asks: If so, the owner should collect payment for the produce as well from liened property. The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case when the robber stood trial for the principal, but did not yet stand trial for the produce. The Gemara asks: And why was it stated without qualification? According to this explanation, the distinction is not between the principal and the produce but rather between debts for which the robber stood trial and those for which he did not stand trial. The Gemara answers: The normal way of things is that when a person files a claim, he first claims the principal and only afterward does he file claims with regard to other property, such as produce.

§ The Gemara questions the statement that Rav Naḥman cited in Shmuel’s name: But does Shmuel hold that one who buys land from a robber does not have the right to the value of the enhancement of the land?

But didn’t Shmuel say to Rav Ḥinnana bar Sheilat, who was a scribe: When you write a deed of sale, consult with the parties, and if they agree, write that the seller commits to compensate the buyer, in the event that the land is appropriated from him, with superior-quality land, and for the value of the enhancement of the land and the produce as well? That was the standard formula for deeds of sale.

The Gemara clarifies: To what case is this statement referring? If it is a case where the seller’s creditor repossesses the land, does a creditor have rights to the produce? But doesn’t Shmuel say that a creditor collects the value of the enhancement of the field, indicating that he does collect the value of the enhancement, but he does not collect the produce? Rather, is it not referring to a case of one who buys land from a robber, and the owner subsequently repossesses it? This contradicts Shmuel’s earlier statement that one who buys land from a robber does not have the right to the value of the enhancement.

Rav Yosef said: Here we are dealing with a case where the robber owns land, which he can return to the buyer instead of paying him money. In that case, the transaction appears to be a sale and not payment of interest for a loan.

Abaye said to him: But is it permitted for one to borrow a se’a of grain for return of a se’a in a case where he owns land? The Sages render prohibited executing a loan of produce for return of the same amount of produce, lest the price rise in the interim, causing the debtor to return a higher value than he borrowed, which appears to be interest. This is the halakha even in a case where the borrower owns land. Similarly, in the case where the robber owns land, the payment of the value of the enhancement resembles the payment of interest.

Rav Yosef said to him: The distinction between the two cases is that there, with regard to borrowing a se’a and returning a se’a, the case in question involves a loan, whereas here, it is a case involving a sale. Since the field was bought from the robber, the additional value that the robber pays does not appear to be interest.

There are those who say that this is what Rav Yosef said: Here we are dealing with a case where the buyer performed an act of acquisition at the time he purchased the land from the robber’s possession, thereby formalizing a condition that should the field be appropriated from him, he will be reimbursed for any enhancement in its value. Since he acquired this right at the time of the purchase, it does not appear as though he is receiving interest.

Abaye said to him: But is it permitted for one to borrow a se’a for a se’a in a case where he performed an act of acquisition formalizing such a condition at the time he purchased the land from the lender’s possession? Isn’t it still considered to be interest and therefore prohibited?

Rav Yosef said to him: There, with regard to borrowing a se’a and returning a se’a, it is a case involving a loan, whereas here it is a case involving a sale. Buying at a low price and selling for a higher price is not considered to be interest.

The Gemara returns to discuss Shmuel’s statement itself that was mentioned above. Shmuel says: A creditor collects the value of the enhancement of the land. Rava says: Know that this is true, as this is the standard formulation that the seller writes to the buyer in a deed of sale: I will stand and silence and purify and cleanse this sale, i.e., I accept responsibility if the land is repossessed by my creditor. The text of the document continues: This applies to this property itself, and the labor invested in it, and its enhancement; and I will present its value before you. The witnesses then sign the document and attest: And this seller consented and accepted upon himself all of the commitments enumerated in the document. Evidently, a creditor can collect the value of the enhancement.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to Rava: If that is so, in the case of a gift, where the owner does not write this formulation to the recipient in the deed of gift, would you indeed say that the creditor does not repossess the value of the enhancement of the land from the recipient of the gift? Rava said to him: Indeed.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to Rava: But is the legal power of a gift stronger than that of a sale, as in the case of a sale the buyer loses the value of the enhancement if the land is repossessed? Rava said to him: Yes, it is indeed stronger. Since in a case of repossession, the recipient of the gift does not receive the value of the enhancement back from the one who gave him the gift, he is under no obligation to relinquish this value to the creditor.

Rav Naḥman said: This following baraita supports the opinion of Mar Shmuel; but our colleague, Rav Huna, interprets it as referring to other matters, so it does not support Shmuel’s opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a case of one who sells a field to another, and it is appropriated from the buyer’s possession, as it was liened to the seller’s debt, when the buyer then collects compensation from the seller, he collects the principal from liened property, and he collects the enhancement from unsold property. Evidently, the value of the enhancement is also repossessed by the creditor.

But our colleague, Rav Huna, interprets it as referring to other matters, i.e., to the case of one who buys a field from a robber. In that case, the robbery victim is certainly entitled to the value of the enhancement of the land.

It is taught in another baraita: In a case of one who sells a field to another, and the buyer enhances it, and then a creditor comes and repossesses the field, in this case when the buyer collects compensation, the halakha is as follows: If the value of the enhancement of the field is greater than the buyer’s expenses in generating that enhancement, he takes the difference in value between the enhancement and the expenses from the owner of the land, i.e., the seller, and he is compensated for the expenses by the creditor. And if the expenses were greater than the enhancement of the field, he receives compensation for his expenses, only up to the value of the enhancement, from the creditor.

The Gemara asks: But how does Shmuel interpret the baraita? If it is referring to one who buys a field from a robber, the first clause in the baraita poses a difficulty to Shmuel’s opinion, as Shmuel says that one who buys a field from a robber does not have the right to compensation for the enhancement of the field, and the baraita states that the buyer is entitled to compensation for the enhancement. If it is referring to a creditor, then both the first clause and the latter clause in the baraita pose a difficulty to Shmuel’s opinion, as Shmuel says that a creditor collects the enhancement of the field and needs to pay nothing.

The Gemara suggests two answers: If you wish, say that the baraita is referring to one who buys a field from a robber, in a case where the robber owns land with which he can compensate the buyer instead of paying him money. In that case, the compensation does not appear to be interest. Alternatively, it is referring to a case where the buyer performed an act of acquisition at the time he purchased the land from the robber’s possession, thereby formalizing a condition that should the field be appropriated from him, he will be reimbursed for any enhancement in its value. Since the buyer acquired the enhancement at the time he paid for the field, it does not appear as if he is receiving interest.

If you wish, say instead that it is referring to a creditor, but nevertheless it is not difficult according to the opinion of Shmuel. Here, in the baraita, the reference is to enhancement