in this case, since the purchaser already died, the owner is not present to call the seller a robber, so he presumably did not intend to retroactively validate the sale. And conversely, according to the one who says that he bought the land because it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability with regard to the purchaser’s children too.

The Gemara challenges this distinction: Ultimately, the purchaser’s children will also call the seller a robber if the field is appropriated from them. Therefore, there is no difference between the two explanations of Rav’s ruling in a case where the purchaser has died.

Rather, the practical difference between them is in a case where the robber himself died, and his children subsequently bought the field from its owner. According to the one who says that the motivation is that it is preferable for a person not to be called a robber, he already died and this motive is not applicable. While according to the one who says that his motivation is that it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, in this case also, even though the robber died, it is still preferable for him to maintain his reliability, i.e., one is concerned about the reputation he will have after his death, not only while he is alive.

The Gemara rejects this distinction as well: Ultimately, if the sale is revoked after his death, people will call his children the children of a robber. Just as one does not want to be called a robber during his lifetime, one presumably does not want his children to be called the children of a robber after his death.

Rather, the practical difference between them is in a case where the robber gave the land to the recipient as a gift rather than selling it. According to the one who says that it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability, in the case of a gift also, it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability. While according to the one who says that the motivation is that it is preferable for him not to be called a robber, in this case the robber could say to the recipient of the gift: What did I rob you of? You incurred no loss.

§ The Gemara discusses various scenarios relating to the halakha of one who sold stolen land and then acquired it from the robbery victim. It is obvious that if, after selling the stolen land, the robber sold it again to another person, or bequeathed it, or gave it as a gift, it is clear that the robber does not want to establish it before, i.e., transfer ownership of it to, the original buyer. Therefore, the robber’s purchase of the land from the robbery victim is not assumed to be for the purpose of validating the original sale. The buyer can demand compensation from the robber for the invalid sale, but the land remains in the possession of the second buyer or the recipient of the gift or the inheritance.

Likewise, it is clear that if the land that he stole and then sold later came into his possession not by purchase but as an inheritance, the buyer does not have the rights to it, as an inheritance is acquired passively, and the robber did not make an effort to acquire it. Here too, the buyer can claim only compensation and not the land itself.

If the robber collected the land that he had sold as payment for a debt owed to him by the robbery victim, we need to see the circumstances. If the robbery victim has other land from which the robber could have collected the debt, and nevertheless the robber said: I want to collect this land, apparently the robber wanted to establish it before the buyer and validate the sale.

And if the robbery victim does not have other land, and the robber had no choice as to which land to collect, there is no reason to assume that the robber was attempting to validate the sale. He merely wanted to be paid money for his debt, and not to secure the land for the buyer.

With regard to a case where the robbery victim gave the land as a gift to the robber, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree. One says that a gift has the same status as an inheritance, as it is also acquired passively, and one says that a gift has the same status as a sale. This is because were it not for the fact that the robber took the trouble to ingratiate himself with the owner, he would not have given it to him as a gift. It is clearly for this reason that the robber took the trouble to ingratiate himself with him, i.e., in order to validate the sale and thereby maintain his reliability.

The Gemara asks: And until when can it be assumed that the robber bought the land because it is preferable for him to maintain his reliability? Rav Huna says: Until the time of standing trial. Once the purchaser takes the robber to court, it is too late for the robber to protect his reputation, as the purchaser has demonstrated that he does not consider the robber to be trustworthy.

Ḥiyya bar Rav says that the robber would still buy the land from the owner in order to maintain his reliability up until the time that a document of authorization by the court to locate and seize property from the robber comes into the purchaser’s possession. It is only once the robber avoids immediately reimbursing the purchaser and the court is compelled to authorize the purchaser to appropriate the robber’s property that the robber’s reliability is no longer a factor. Rav Pappa says that the robber’s reliability remains a motive to acquire the field until the days of announcement begin. During the days of announcement the court assesses the value of the robber’s property in order to compensate the purchaser.

§ Rami bar Ḥama objects to Rav’s statement, the focal point of this discussion, that the robber transfers to the buyer any rights to the land that he might acquire; after all, by means of what mode of acquisition does this purchaser acquire this land? It is by means of this deed of sale that the robber gave him. The purchase is invalid, as this document is merely a shard, since the robber did not own, at the time of the sale, the land he purported to sell.

Rava said to him in response: Let Rav’s statement be understood as applying to a case where the buyer said to the robber that he trusts him to resolve the legal issue. By virtue of that satisfaction that the robber received from the buyer’s not having said anything to him to question his rights to the land, but rather having relied on him, the robber therefore takes the trouble and brings to him the opportunity to purchase the land and resolves to transfer the land’s ownership to him.

Rav Sheshet raises an objection to Rav’s statement from a baraita that states that if one says: That which I will inherit from my father is hereby sold to you, or: That which my net will catch is sold to you, he has said nothing, as one cannot sell that which he does not yet own. But if one says: That which I will inherit from my father today is hereby sold to you, or: That which my net will catch today is sold to you, his statement stands. The first halakha of the baraita indicates that one cannot sell that which he does not yet own, which contradicts Rav’s ruling.

Rami bar Ḥama said about this objection: This is the great man and this is his refutation of Rav’s opinion; i.e., this refutation is compelling.

Rava said in response: I see that he is a great man, but I do not see the conclusive refutation. Here, in the case of validating a sale, the purchaser relies on the seller and is confident he will acquire the land; but there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller. The Gemara explains: Here, in the case of validating the sale, the purchaser relies on the seller to go take the trouble and provide him with the land so that he will not be called a robber. Whereas there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller, as it is uncertain whether the seller will actually inherit his father’s property or catch anything with his net.

The Gemara relates that the Sages sent Rav Sheshet’s objection and presented it before Rabbi Abba bar Zavda for his evaluation. Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said to them: This objection need not be introduced inside the study hall for further clarification, as it is clear and compelling. Rava disagreed and said: This objection needs to be brought inside the study hall and inside the innermost area of the study hall. In other words, it should be examined carefully, as it is not compelling. This is because here, the purchaser relies on the seller, whereas there, in the case of the baraita, the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller.

There was an incident in Pumbedita where the court ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and the Sages refuted the ruling based on the baraita cited earlier. Rav Yosef said to them: This objection need not be introduced inside the study hall for further clarification, as the objection is clear and compelling. And Abaye said to him: It needs to be brought inside the study hall and inside the innermost area of the study hall, as here the purchaser relies on the seller, whereas there the purchaser does not fully rely on the seller.

The Gemara asks concerning the baraita cited earlier: And what is different in the first clause, where the sale is not valid, and what is different in the latter clause, where the sale is valid? In both cases, the seller does not yet own the merchandise. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the latter clause, when the seller states: I am selling that which I will inherit from my father today, he does so for the honor of his father. He believes that his father will die that day, and his intention is to raise money for the burial. Consequently, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the sale is valid. Similarly, in the case of a person who says: That which my net will catch today is sold to you,