but it is not subject to an intermediate stage of consecration resulting from redemption? Ravina said to him: It is due to the fact that it is not subject to ultimate consecration. A non-kosher animal does not ultimately remain consecrated, as it is used neither as an offering nor in the upkeep of the Temple. Instead, it is redeemed and its value is consecrated.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: It is subject, at least, to an intermediate stage of consecration; and in that case, let one add one-fifth as well. Ravina said to him: Its legal status is like that of ultimate consecration: Just as one does not add one-fifth with regard to a non-kosher animal in ultimate consecration, as that category does not exist in a non-kosher animal, so too, one does not add one-fifth in a case of intermediate consecration.

Rav Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: What did you see that led you to liken the intermediate stage of consecration to ultimate consecration? Let us liken it to initial consecration. Ravina said to him: It stands to reason that he should liken it to ultimate consecration, as he thereby derives the halakha of an item consecrated by association with the sanctity of an item consecrated by association. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, he should have likened it to initial consecration, as he thereby derives the halakha of an item after which there is another stage of sanctity, the intermediate stage of consecration, from an item after which there is another stage of sanctity.

The Gemara answers: It is as Rava says: “The burnt-offering” (Leviticus 6:2), employing the definite article, indicates that the reference is to the first burnt-offering. So too, when it is written: The non-kosher animal, the reference is to the initial consecration of the non-kosher animal, not the intermediate stage of consecration.

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: If one said that this cow is in place of that cow, which belongs to the Temple treasury, or this garment is in place of that garment, which belongs to the Temple treasury, his consecrated property is redeemed, and the treasurer of consecrated property is at an advantage. If the replacement item is equal to or more valuable than the original item, it belongs to the treasurer, and if it is less valuable, the one who consecrated it must pay the difference.

If he said: This cow valued at five sela is in place of this cow, which belongs to the Temple treasury, or: This garment valued at five sela is instead of this garment, which belongs to the Temple treasury, his consecrated property is redeemed. Even if the second consecrated item is more valuable, it is not considered a consecration done in error. He will have to pay the difference. He adds one-fifth when redeeming the item that was the initial consecration, but when redeeming the item for which the initial consecration was redeemed, the second consecration, he does not add one-fifth.

MISHNA: The measure of exploitation is four silver ma’a from the twenty-four silver ma’a of a sela. And the smallest monetary claim in court for which a plaintiff can obligate a respondent to take an oath is two silver ma’a. And the smallest monetary admission for which that respondent takes the oath is an admission that one owes at least the value of one peruta.

On a related note, the tanna adds that there are five halakhic situations involving perutot: The admission to part of a claim must be that one owes at least the value of one peruta, and a woman is betrothed with the value of one peruta. And one who derives benefit of the value of one peruta from consecrated property has misused consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, and one who finds an item that has the value of one peruta is obligated to proclaim that he found it. And with regard to one who robs from another an item that has the value of one peruta and took an oath to him that he robbed nothing, when he repents and seeks to return the stolen item he must take it and follow its owner even to Medea. In that case, he may not return the item by means of a messenger; he must give it directly to its owner.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: We already learned this on another occasion in an earlier mishna (49b): The measure of exploitation for which one can claim that he was exploited is four silver ma’a from the twenty-four silver ma’a in a sela, which is one-sixth of the transaction. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the tanna to mention two halakhot: The smallest monetary claim in court for which a plaintiff can obligate a respondent to take an oath is two silver ma’a, and the smallest monetary admission for which that respondent takes the oath is an admission that one owes at least the value of one peruta. Therefore, the tanna cited the halakha of exploitation as well.

The Gemara asks: That too we already learned in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): The oath for admission to part of a claim imposed by the judges is in a case where the claim is two silver ma’a, and the admission is the value of one peruta. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the tanna to teach the latter clause of the mishna, as it teaches: There are five halakhic situations involving perutot, which is not taught elsewhere.

§ The mishna teaches: There are five halakhic situations involving perutot. The Gemara asks: And let the tanna also teach that the measure of exploitation is one peruta. Rav Kahana said: That is to say that there is no exploitation concerning perutot. Any disparity between value and price that is less than the value of the smallest silver coin, an issar, which is worth eight perutot, is not considered exploitation.

And Levi says: There is exploitation even for perutot. And likewise, Levi taught in his version of the Mishna, which parallels the Mishna redacted by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that there are five halakhic situations involving perutot: The measure of exploitation is one peruta, the admission is the value of one peruta, and the betrothal of a woman is with one peruta, and the halakha of one who takes an oath denying a robbery applies in the case where he denies having robbed another of at least one peruta, and the convening of judges to adjudicate a case of monetary law is in the case where the claim is at least one peruta.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the tanna of our mishna, what is the reason he does not teach the case of the convening of judges in his list of cases involving perutot? The Gemara answers: He taught the case of robbery, which includes all monetary claims one has against another.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the tanna teach the case of robbery and teach the case of lost property? Apparently, he lists monetary cases that are included under the rubric of robbery. The Gemara answers: With regard to these two cases, it was necessary for the tanna to teach them separately, as there is a novel element in each. The novel element in the case of robbery is not only that a robbery of one peruta is considered robbery, but also in the case of one who robs an item from another worth at least one peruta and then took an oath to him that he robbed nothing, he must carry the stolen item and follow its owner even to Medea. The novel element in the case of lost property is that one who finds lost property the value of at least one peruta is obligated to proclaim that he found it, even though the lost article depreciated and is no longer worth one peruta.

The Gemara asks: And as for Levi, what is the reason he does not teach that one is obligated to proclaim that he found lost property only if it is worth at least one peruta? The Gemara answers: He taught the case of robbery, which includes all monetary claims one has against another.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t he teach robbery and also teach the convening of judges? Apparently, he lists monetary cases that are included under the rubric of robbery. The Gemara explains: With regard to the convening of judges it was necessary for the tanna to specify the halakha to exclude the opinion of Rav Ketina, as Rav Ketina says: The court attends to monetary claims of even less than the value of one peruta. Anyone wronged by another is entitled to have his case adjudicated in court.

The Gemara asks: And as for Levi, what is the reason he does not teach the peruta of misuse of consecrated property? The Gemara answers: He is speaking with regard to non-sacred property; he is not speaking with regard to consecrated property.

The Gemara asks: But in the case of the tanna of our mishna, who is speaking with regard to consecrated property, let him teach the halakha that second tithe may be redeemed only if the produce is worth at least one peruta. The Gemara answers: This tanna holds in accordance with the one who says: Second tithe is redeemed only if its one-fifth, which one adds when redeeming his own produce, is worth at least one peruta. In other words, second tithe is redeemed only if it is worth at least four perutot. The Gemara asks: And let him teach that second tithe is redeemed only if its one-fifth, which one adds when redeeming his own produce, is worth at least one peruta. The Gemara responds: The tanna is speaking with regard to the principal; the tanna is not speaking with regard to the one-fifth.

§ With regard to the matter itself raised in the previous discussion, the Gemara elaborates. Rav Ketina says: The court attends to monetary claims of even less than the value of one peruta. Rava raises an objection from a baraita. It is written: “And he shall make restitution for that which he has done amiss in the sacred matter” (Leviticus 5:16).