that one may not contend with them, but it is permitted to harass them. While concerning the offspring of the younger daughter, who called her son ben Ami, son of my people, avoiding any direct mention of the baby’s father, God said to Moses: “Neither harass them, nor contend with them” (Deuteronomy 2:19), at all. Even to harass them is not permitted.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: A person should always be first to perform a matter of a mitzva, as in reward for one night that the elder daughter preceded the younger daughter, she merited and preceded her to royalty by four generations. Ruth the Moabite, ancestor of King David, descended from her son Moab, and she preceded Naamah the Ammonite, who was married to King Solomon, by four generations.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if one soul from among the common people sins unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of God that may not be done and he is guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). The phrase “from among the common people” serves to exclude the anointed priest; the phrase “from among the common people” also serves to exclude the king.

The baraita continues: But weren’t these individuals already excluded from bringing a ewe or a female goat as a sin-offering, as an anointed priest is subject to atonement with a bull, and a king is subject to atonement with a male goat? Why then is an additional exclusionary derivation necessary? The baraita answers: The derivation is necessary, as one might have thought that an anointed priest brings a bull for absence of awareness of the matter together with the unwitting performance of an action, but that he brings a ewe or a female goat, as does a non-priest, for the unwitting performance of an action alone. Therefore, the verse states: “From among the common people,” which serves to exclude the anointed priest, who is completely exempt from bringing a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression unless it was committed on the basis of his own erroneous ruling. The baraita concludes: The phrase “from among the common people” serves to exclude the king.

The Gemara challenges: Granted, in the case of an anointed priest it is clear why an additional exclusionary derivation is necessary. But in the case of a king, it is for the unwitting performance of an action that he brings a goat as his offering. Why then is the additional derivation necessary?

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat when he was a commoner, and he was then appointed king, and thereafter his transgression became known to him. It could enter your mind to say: Let him bring a ewe or a female goat because he performed the transgression before he became king. Therefore, the verse teaches us that he brings a male goat as he is now a king. The Gemara challenges: This works out well according to Rabbi Shimon, who follows the time of knowledge, and holds that one brings the offering on the basis of his status at the time when his transgression became known to him. But according to the Rabbis, who follow the time of the performance of the sin, what can be said?

Rather, Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where one unwittingly ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat when he was a commoner, and he was then appointed king, and he then finished eating the olive-bulk of forbidden fat, and thereafter it became known to him that he had eaten forbidden fat. It could enter your mind to say: Let the two halves combine and let him bring a ewe or a female goat. Therefore, the verse teaches us that the status of a king is not like that of a commoner. Since a king brings a special offering, the half olive-bulk that he ate before becoming king does not combine with the half olive-bulk that he ate as a king.

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: With regard to kingship, what is the halakha? Does it interpose between two parts of a transgression and prevent them from combining? What are the circumstances? It is a case where one unwittingly ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat when he was a commoner, and he was then appointed king, and then was removed from his position, and then finished eating the olive-bulk of forbidden fat. Perhaps it is there, in the previous case, that the two actions do not combine, as he ate half when he was a commoner and half when he was king. But here, where he ate both this half and that half when he was a commoner, they combine. Or perhaps it is no different, and once he was appointed king and his status changed, the two actions do not combine. What is the halakha?

The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one ate forbidden fat and designated an offering for his unwitting sin, and he became an apostate, and then retracted his apostasy, since he was disqualified from bringing the offering as an apostate he shall remain disqualified from bringing an offering for that sin. The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? An apostate is ineligible as far as bringing an offering of any kind is concerned; this king is eligible with regard to bringing an offering, albeit of a different type.

Rabbi Zeira raised a dilemma before Rav Sheshet: If one ate meat when he was a commoner, and there was uncertainty as to whether or not it was forbidden fat, and subsequently he was appointed king and his uncertainty became known to him, what is the halakha? According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who follow the time of the actual transgression, do not raise the dilemma, as in their opinion, he is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering. Rather, when you raise the dilemma it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows the time of awareness of the transgression.

Is the halakha that from the fact that his status changed with regard to a definite transgression, as, if he was liable to bring a sin-offering and his sin became known to him after his coronation, he is completely exempt, it may be derived that his status changed with regard to an uncertain transgression as well, and he is exempt from bringing a provisional guilt-offering? Or perhaps when his status changed, it was with regard to a definite transgression only, as in that case his offering changed, since a king brings a goat as a sin-offering instead of a ewe or a female goat. But here, in the case of an uncertain transgression, as his offering does not change, say: Let him bring a provisional guilt-offering. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ The Sages taught: The verse states: “And if one soul from among the common people sins unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of God that may not be done and he is guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). This serves to exclude an apostate. When an apostate sins unwittingly, he is exempt from liability to bring a sin-offering even if he repents for that sin, as even his unwitting action is considered intentional.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon bar Yosei says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: It is unnecessary to derive this halakha from that phrase, as it says in the same verse: “If any one of the common people sins unwittingly in performing one of the mitzvot of God that may not be done and he is guilty; or if his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him” (Leviticus 4:27–28). From the words “be known to him” it is inferred that only one who repents due to his awareness, i.e., who would not have sinned had he known that the act was forbidden, brings an offering for his unwitting transgression and achieves atonement in this way. But one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., an apostate, who would sin even after becoming aware that the act is forbidden, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinions of the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon concerning whether the halakha is derived from the earlier or later verse? Rav Hamnuna said: The difference between them is in the case of an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat; they disagree as to whether or not he brings an offering for unwittingly consuming blood. One Sage, the Rabbis, holds: Since he is an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat, he is also considered an apostate with regard to consuming blood. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds: With regard to consuming blood, in any event, he is one who repents due to his awareness, as he is not considered an apostate with regard to blood.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava say that everyone agrees that an apostate with regard to eating forbidden fat is not considered an apostate with regard to consuming blood? The Gemara answers: Rather, here it is with regard to a person who eats forbidden fat and an animal carcass due to appetite, e.g., only when he does not have access to kosher meat. And forbidden fat became confused for that person with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat. It is in that case that the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree. One Sage, the Rabbis, holds: Since he intentionally eats forbidden fat due to appetite, he is an apostate. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds: Since if he finds food that is permitted he does not eat food that is prohibited, as he merely seeks to satiate his appetite, he is not an apostate.

The Sages taught: One who ate forbidden fat is an apostate. And who is an apostate? It is one who ate animal carcasses or animals with wounds that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot], repugnant creatures or creeping animals, and one who drank wine used for a libation in idol worship. Rabbi Yehuda says: This applies even to one who wears garments fashioned of diverse kinds, containing wool and linen. The Gemara analyzes this baraita. The Master said: One who ate forbidden fat is an apostate. And who is an apostate? It is one who ate animal carcasses, etc. The Gemara asks: What is he saying? Why, after answering the question, does the tanna ask who is an apostate and then provide a different answer?

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is what he is saying: If one ate forbidden fat due to appetite, he is an apostate. If he ate it to express insolence, this person is a heretic. And which is the apostate who is a presumptive heretic merely on the basis of his actions? You must say that it is one who eats an animal carcass or a tereifa, repugnant creatures or creeping animals, and one who drank wine used for a libation in idol worship. Based on the fact that he violates serious transgressions for which one has no appetite such as repugnant creatures or creeping animals, it is clear that he is a heretic who denies the Torah in its entirety. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: This applies even to one who wears garments fashioned of diverse kinds, containing wool and linen.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the opinion of the Rabbis and that of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: The difference between them is in the case of one who wears a garment of diverse kinds, containing wool and linen prohibited by rabbinic law. One Sage, the Rabbis, holds: One who violates a prohibition by Torah law is an apostate; one who violates a prohibition by rabbinic law is not an apostate. And one Sage, Rabbi Yosei, holds: With regard to diverse kinds, since his violation of the prohibition is well known, as people see that he is wearing that garment, even though he violates a prohibition by rabbinic law, he is an apostate.

Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: If one violated a prohibition due to appetite or convenience he is an apostate, while one who eats to express insolence is a heretic. And one said: One who violates a prohibition to express insolence is also an apostate. Rather, who is a heretic? It is anyone who engages in idol worship. The Gemara raises an objection to the first opinion from a baraita: If a person ate one flea or one mosquito, this person is an apostate. But here, isn’t it a case where it is a violation performed to express insolence, as one has no desire to eat these insects, and yet the tanna calls him an apostate? The Gemara answers: The reference there, in that baraita, is to the case of one who eats the flea due to appetite, as he says: I shall taste the flavor of prohibition. He seeks to eat a food that he has never eaten before.

§ The mishna teaches: Who is the nasi? This is a king, as it is stated: “When a nasi sins, and performs any one of all the mitzvot of the Lord his God that shall not be performed, unwittingly, and he is guilty” (Leviticus 4:22), referring to one who has only the Lord his God over him and no other authority. The Sages taught: The verse states: “nasi.” One might have thought that the reference is to the prince of a tribe, like Naḥshon, son of Amminadab. Therefore, the verse states: “And performed any one of all the mitzvot of the Lord his God.” Later, in the passage with regard to the king, the verse states: “That he may learn to fear the Lord his God” (Deuteronomy 17:19).