how could it be free to rest on its eggs? It is subject to being killed and should have been executed. Rather, it must be a case where its verdict was not yet issued, and one is required to bring it to the court to fulfill through it the verse: “And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst” (Deuteronomy 13:6).

§ With regard to the statement of the mishna that sacrificial birds are not included in the mitzva of sending away the mother bird from the nest, the Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of these sacrificial birds discussed in the mishna? If we say that the mishna is referring to a case where one had a nest in his house and consecrated it, is one obligated to send away even a non-sacred bird in such a case? The verse states: “If a bird’s nest happens before you on the way” (Deuteronomy 22:6), which excludes a nest readily available in one’s home.

Rather, perhaps the mishna is referring to a case where one merely saw a nest that did not belong to him, and he consecrated it. But this, too, is problematic: Is the nest consecrated in such a case? But the Merciful One states: “When a man shall sanctify his house to be holy” (Leviticus 27:14), indicating that just as his house is in his possession when he consecrates it, so too, any item that one wishes to consecrate must be in his possession when consecrating it. If so, one cannot consecrate a nest that does not belong to him.

Rather, say that the mishna is referring to a case where one lifted the chicks, taking possession of them, and then consecrated them, and then returned them to the nest. But this too cannot be, as even with regard to non-sacred birds one is not obligated to send the mother away in such a case, as is taught in a mishna (141a): If one sent the mother away and took the offspring and then returned them to the nest, and thereafter, the mother returned and rested upon them, one is exempt from sending the mother bird away, because he has acquired the offspring and they are now considered readily available.

The Gemara suggests: Rather, say that the mishna is referring to a case where one lifted the mother, taking possession of her, and then consecrated her, and thereafter returned her to the nest. The Gemara responds that this too cannot be, because he was initially obligated in the sending away of the mother bird before he consecrated her. Consequently, the consecration of the bird afterward cannot abrogate the requirement to send it away, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Yosef says: If one consecrated an undomesticated animal and then slaughtered it, he is exempt from covering its blood, because a consecrated animal is not subject to the obligation of covering the blood. But if he slaughtered it and then consecrated it, he is obligated to cover its blood, as he was already obligated in the mitzva of covering of the blood before it came into the possession of the Temple treasury.

Rather, Rav says: The mishna is referring to a case of one who consecrates the fruit, i.e., the chicks, of his dovecote for sacrifice on the altar, and they later rebelled and fled from the dovecote and nested elsewhere. The mishna teaches that although such birds are not considered readily available, one is exempt from sending away the mother because they are sacrificial birds. If they were non-sacred, one who finds them would be obligated to do so. And Shmuel says: The mishna is referring to a case of one who consecrates his chicken for Temple maintenance, and the chicken later rebelled and fled its owner’s home and established a nest elsewhere.

The Gemara objects: Granted, Shmuel did not state his explanation of the mishna in accordance with that of Rav, since he interprets it as referring even to birds consecrated for Temple maintenance, which do not have inherent sanctity. Accordingly, the mishna teaches that all consecrated birds are not included in the mitzva of sending away the mother bird. But what is the reason that Rav did not state his explanation in accordance with that of Shmuel?

The Gemara responds: Rav could have said to you: I specifically exempted one from sending the mother bird away in a case where the birds are the fruit of his dovecote, as they are consecrated for the altar. Since they are consecrated with inherent sanctity, their sanctity is not abrogated from them even when they flee from the dovecote. But in a case where one consecrates his chicken for Temple maintenance, where the chicken is not consecrated for the altar but merely has sanctity that inheres in its value, once it rebels its sanctity is abrogated, and it is obligated in, i.e., subject to, the mitzva of sending away the mother bird.

And Shmuel could have said: Though it has rebelled, the chicken retains its sanctity, since wherever it is, it is in the treasury [bei gazza] of the Merciful One, as it is written: “The earth is the Lord’s, and its fullness thereof” (Psalms 24:1). And so Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the mishna is referring to a case where one consecrated his chicken for Temple maintenance, and the chicken then rebelled. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to him: But once it rebels, its sanctity is abrogated. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One, as it is written: “The earth is the Lord’s, and its fullness thereof.”

And the Gemara raises a contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan here and that of Rabbi Yoḥanan elsewhere, and the Gemara raises a contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish here and that of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish elsewhere.

As it was stated: If one declares that these one hundred dinars are consecrated for Temple maintenance, and they were stolen or lost, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He bears responsibility for them until they come into the physical possession of the Temple treasurer [gizbar]. Consequently, he must pay one hundred dinars to the treasury. And Reish Lakish says: One is not required to replace the lost money, since wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One, as it is written: “The earth is the Lord’s, and its fullness.” Accordingly, the money is considered to have entered the possession of the treasury. If so, this statement of Reish Lakish poses a difficulty for the other statement of Reish Lakish, and this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan poses a difficulty for the other statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara responds: The apparent contradiction between this statement of Reish Lakish and that statement of Reish Lakish is not difficult. This statement, that the sanctity of a consecrated chicken that rebelled is abrogated, was made before he heard the statement from Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher, that wherever it is, it is in God’s treasury. That statement, that one is not liable to replace the missing consecrated funds, was made after he heard that statement from Rabbi Yoḥanan his teacher.

The Gemara objects: But still, this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan poses a difficulty for that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara responds: The apparent contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is also not difficult. This statement, that one bears responsibility for the missing consecrated funds, is referring to a case where the consecrator said: It is incumbent upon me to bring one hundred dinars to the Temple treasury. In such a case, one bears responsibility for the money until it reaches the Temple treasurer. That statement, that a consecrated chicken that rebelled remains consecrated, is referring to a case where the consecrator said: This chicken is consecrated for Temple maintenance. In such a case, the sanctity is not abrogated even after the chicken flees, because wherever it is, it is in God’s treasury.

The Gemara objects: If it is so that when Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one bears financial responsibility for the missing consecrated funds, he is referring to a case where one said: It is incumbent upon me, by inference one may conclude that according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says that one does not bear responsibility for the money, one does not bear financial responsibility even though one said: It is incumbent upon me.

But isn’t it taught in a mishna (Kinnim 1:1): Which is the case of a vow offering, and which is the case of a gift offering? A vow offering is where one says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a burnt offering. A gift offering is where one says: This animal is a burnt offering. And what is the difference between a vow offering and a gift offering? With regard to a vow offering, if it died or was stolen or lost, one bears financial responsibility for it. With regard to a gift offering, if it died or was stolen or lost, one does not bear financial responsibility for it.

The Gemara responds that Reish Lakish could have said to you: This statement, that one who says: It is incumbent upon me, bears financial responsibility, applies only to an item consecrated for the altar, since one vowed to sacrifice it as an offering and it has not yet been sacrificed. But with regard to an item consecrated for Temple maintenance, which is not lacking sacrifice on the altar, even though one said: It is incumbent upon me, one does not bear financial responsibility for it.

The Gemara objects: But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Arakhin 20b) that in the case of one who says: This bull is consecrated as a burnt offering, or: This house is consecrated as an offering, and the bull died or the house collapsed, he does not bear financial responsibility for them; but in the case of one who says: It is incumbent upon me to give this bull as a burnt offering, or: It is incumbent upon me to give this house as an offering, if the bull died or the house collapsed, he is obligated to pay its value? Evidently, even with regard to items consecrated for Temple maintenance, if one says: It is incumbent upon me, one bears financial responsibility for them.

The Gemara responds: With regard to this statement, that if one says: It is incumbent upon me to give an item for Temple maintenance, he bears financial responsibility, that applies only where the bull died or the house collapsed. In such a case he is obligated to pay, since they no longer exist. But where they still exist, e.g., in the case of an item or sum of money that was lost or stolen, one applies the principle: Wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One, as it is written: “The earth is the Lord’s, and its fullness thereof.”

§ The Gemara above cited a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish as to the halakha about one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring an item for Temple maintenance. With regard to this dispute, Rav Hamnuna says: Everyone concedes with regard to valuations that even if one said: It is incumbent upon me to donate my own valuation, and one set aside money that was then lost or stolen, one does not bear financial responsibility for it. What is the reason for this? It is because it cannot be stated by him without stating: Upon me. In other words, one cannot say: This is my valuation, since he has yet to accept upon himself any such obligation.

Therefore, although one says: It is incumbent upon me to donate my valuation, this is not considered an acceptance of financial responsibility. After all, how shall he say it without stating: It is incumbent upon me? Shall he say only: My own valuation, without: Is incumbent upon me? If so, upon whom is the obligation placed to pay the money? Or shall he say only: The valuation of so-and-so? Still, upon whom is the obligation placed to pay the money?

Rava objects to this: Let him say: I am encumbered with my own valuation, or: I am encumbered with the valuation of so-and-so. One need not say: Is incumbent upon me. Additionally, it is taught in a baraita with regard to the redemption of a purchased field that was consecrated that Rabbi Natan says about the verse: “Then the priest shall reckon for him the worth of your valuation until the Jubilee Year, and he shall give your valuation on that day, as a consecrated thing to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:23): Why must the verse state: “And he shall give your valuation”? It could have stated simply: And he shall give it. It is necessary because we have found with regard to consecrated property and tithes that they can be desacralized by transferring their sanctity onto non-sacred money, and that if that money was stolen or lost, the owners do not bear financial responsibility for it.