And if it is referring to the substitute of a guilt offering, it is learned as a tradition that this offering goes out to graze, as in any case where a sin offering is left to die, in the parallel case involving a guilt offering, the animal is left to graze until it develops a blemish, after which it is redeemed and the money is used to purchase a burnt offering. Therefore, there is no need for a verse to exclude the substitute of a guilt offering. The Gemara explains: Actually, the baraita is referring to the offspring and substitute of a sin offering, and a verse is required to exclude them, despite the halakha that was learned as a tradition in their regard, for this halakha was learned only with regard to letting the animal die, and the verse serves to exclude them from being sacrificed on the altar.

The Gemara objects: But this, the halakha of sacrificing the animal upon the altar, depends on that, the halakha of letting it die. Since it goes to its death, it is clearly self-evident that it is not sacrificed. The Gemara offers a different resolution: Rather, the halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai is referring to a sin offering, and the verse serves to exclude the case of a substitute of a guilt offering.

The Gemara asks: But this halakha with regard to the substitute of a guilt offering was also learned by the Sages as a tradition transmitted to Moses from Sinai, as they said that in any case where a sin offering is left to die, in the parallel case involving a guilt offering, the animal is left to graze. Rather, the verse is necessary to teach an additional halakha, that if one transgressed and sacrificed the offspring of a sin offering or a guilt offering, or the substitute of a sin offering or a guilt offering, he stands in violation of a prohibition inferred from a positive mitzva. Since the verse teaches that only the offspring of a burnt offering or a peace offering may be offered, it may be inferred that the offspring of a guilt offering or a sin offering may not be offered, and the violation of a prohibition stemming from a command formulated as a positive mitzva is considered the violation of a positive mitzva.

§ The baraita stated that in contrast to Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Akiva says that the word “only” is unnecessary to exclude the offspring and substitutes of other sacrificial animals from being sacrificed upon the altar, as the verse that discusses guilt offerings: “It is a guilt offering” (Leviticus 5:19), teaches that only it, the guilt offering itself, is sacrificed, but its substitute is not offered. The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to teach this? Didn’t the Sages learn this halakha, that the substitute of a guilt offering is left to graze, as a tradition transmitted to Moses from Sinai, since they said that in any case where a sin offering is left to die, in the parallel case involving a guilt offering, the animal is not sacrificed but rather left to graze?

The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so, that the verse is unnecessary for that purpose. Rather, why do I need the verse? It is necessary to teach the halakha that Rav Huna stated, as Rav Huna said: With regard to a guilt offering that was consigned to grazing, i.e., it had been ruled that the animal may not be sacrificed as a guilt offering, it must be left to graze until it develops a blemish, at which point it is sold and the proceeds used for voluntary burnt offerings. An example of this is where the owner had already fulfilled his obligation with the sacrifice of a different animal. If the owner nevertheless transgressed and slaughtered it before it developed a blemish as an unspecified offering, it is valid and sacrificed for the sake of a burnt offering.

The Gemara infers: If the animal was consigned to grazing, yes, it is valid as a burnt offering, but if it was not consigned to grazing, no, it is disqualified as a burnt offering. What is the reason? It is that the verse states with regard to a guilt offering: “It is a guilt offering,” meaning that it shall remain in its present state of a guilt offering.

§ The Gemara previously (17b) cited two baraitot that stated that the offspring of a peace offering has the status of a peace offering. According to one, this is derived from the phrase in the verse in Leviticus “if male if female,” while according to the other it is derived from the phrase in the verse in Deuteronomy “You shall take and go.” The Gemara objects: And according to this tanna of the second baraita, who derives this halakha from these verses: “You shall take and go,” and: “And you shall offer your burnt offerings, the flesh and the blood,” let him derive it from the words “male” and “female.” The Gemara explains: He requires that verse to teach the halakha of the offspring of a blemished animal and to teach the halakha of the substitute of a blemished animal.

The Gemara asks: And let him derive all of the halakhot, that of the offspring and the substitute of an unblemished peace offering as well as that of the offspring and the substitute of a blemished offering, from this verse: “If male if female,” in the same manner that the tanna of the first baraita derived them from that verse. The Gemara answers: He does not learn anything from the word “if,” which is a common term and is not considered superfluous.

The Gemara asks: And according to this tanna of the first baraita, who derives all of the halakhot from the words “if male if female,” what does he do with the phrase in the verse “You shall take and go”? The Gemara answers: That verse is necessary to teach that one must bring his offerings to the Temple when he ascends to Jerusalem for the Festival even if he must take them from their place of grazing, and he should not delay bringing them until the following Festival. Another version of this answer is that the verse is necessary to teach that one must bring the animals he intends to consecrate even if he must take them from their place of threshing, i.e., even if they are currently being used to thresh, rather than delay bringing the animals to Jerusalem until a later stage.

MISHNA: Although the previous mishna stated plainly that the offspring of a peace offering is itself sacrificed as a peace offering, its status is actually subject to a dispute between the tanna’im. Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of a peace offering is not sacrificed on the altar as a peace offering; rather it is sequestered and left to die. And the Rabbis say: It is sacrificed as a peace offering.

Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis do not disagree with regard to the status of the offspring of the offspring of a peace offering or with regard to the status of the offspring of the offspring of the substitute of a peace offering. In those cases, they all agree that the animal is not sacrificed on the altar as a peace offering. With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree about the case of the offspring of a peace offering itself. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is not sacrificed as a peace offering, whereas the Rabbis say: It is sacrificed.

Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Pappeyas testified about the offspring of a peace offering that it is sacrificed as a peace offering. Rabbi Pappeyas said: I testify that we ourselves had a cow that was a peace offering, and we ate it on Passover, and we ate its offspring as a peace offering on a different Festival.

GEMARA: Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer, that the offspring of a peace offering does not have the status of a peace offering? It is that the verse states with regard to a peace offering: “And if his offering be a sacrifice of peace offerings for the Lord” (Leviticus 3:1). The term “and if [ve’im],” can be read as: And a mother [ve’em], which teaches that the mother may be offered as a peace offering, but not the offspring.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Ami: If that is so, then with regard to the verse: “If [im] he offer it for a thanksgiving” (Leviticus 7:12), so too one should interpret it to mean that one may sacrifice the mother [em] but not the offspring as a thanks offering. And if you would say that Rabbi Eliezer indeed holds that the offspring of a thanks offering is not sacrificed as a thanks offering, isn’t it taught in a baraita the following halakha with regard to the offspring of a thanks offering and its substitute and its replacement, if the original animal was lost and then found again, rendering both animals suitable for an offering: From where is it derived that all these are sacrificed as thanks offerings? The verse states: “If for a thanksgiving,” which indicates that they may be offered as a thanks offering in any case.

Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer, that the offspring of a peace offering is not sacrificed as a peace offering: It is a rabbinic decree that it may not be sacrificed, lest the owner delay sacrificing the peace offerings that he is obligated to bring so that he may raise entire herds from them in order to sell the animals to people who need peace offerings.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis do not disgree with regard to the status of the offspring of the offspring of a peace offering, or with regard to the status of the offspring of the offspring of the substitute of a peace offering. In those cases, they all agree that the animal is not sacrificed on the altar as a peace offering. With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree only about the offspring of a peace offering itself.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: How precisely is the mishna taught? Is it saying that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis do not disagree whether the offspring of the offspring are sacrificed or they are not sacrificed, but rather they all agree, even Rabbi Eliezer, that they are sacrificed? Or perhaps it is saying that they do not disagree whether the offspring of the offspring are sacrificed or they are not sacrificed, but rather they all agree, even the Sages, that they are not sacrificed.

Rabba said: It stands to reason that the mishna is saying that they do not disagree whether the offspring of the offspring are not sacrificed, but rather all agree that they are sacrificed. What is the reason? It is that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with the Rabbis only with regard to the offspring, but with regard to the offspring of the offspring, Rabbi Eliezer does not render it prohibited to sacrifice them, as it is merely a chance, i.e., an uncommon occurrence, that one delays sacrificing an offering to the point that the offspring of its offspring have already been born.

And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that the correct reading of the mishna is: They do not disagree whether the offspring of the offspring are sacrificed, but rather all agree that they are not sacrificed. What is the reason? It is that the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to the offspring, but with regard to the offspring of the offspring, from the result of his actions with regard to it, i.e., that he delayed sacrificing the original offering for such a long period of time, his intention is evident that he wants to raise herds from it. Therefore, the halakha is that the offspring of the offspring may not be sacrificed, in order to deter him from the outset from raising herds.