his lips should be considered an action in the case of one who blasphemes. Rava said: The case of one who blasphemes is different, since it is primarily in the heart. In other words, the transgression of blasphemy is not the actual speech but the verbalizing of a sentiment. One is not liable to bring a sin offering for such an action, as it is essentially a matter of the heart. But in general, the twisting of one’s lips is considered an action.

Rabbi Zeira raises an objection from that which is taught in a different context. It is stated in a baraita that all who unwittingly transgress prohibitions punishable by death are liable to bring sin offerings, except for conspiring witnesses, who are not obligated to bring sin offerings, as their transgression does not involve an action. But why is that so? It is written with regard to such witnesses: “At the mouth of two witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). They acted through speech, and the twisting of their lips should be considered an action, as they are liable for what they actually said, not for what was in their hearts. Rava said: The case of conspiring witnesses is different, since their transgression is primarily through sight, i.e., the important part of their testimony is what they saw, which is not an action.

§ The mishna included in its list of those liable to receive karet one who eats forbidden fat. With regard to this, the Sages taught a baraita which deals with the verse: “You shall eat no fat of ox, or sheep, or goat” (Leviticus 7:23). This verse serves to render one liable to receive lashes for each and every one, i.e., one who eats the fat of an ox, and a sheep, and a goat is liable to receive three sets of lashes. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. And the Rabbis say he is liable to receive only one set of lashes.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis disagree about this matter, that Rabbi Yishmael maintains one is flogged for violating a general prohibition and the Rabbis maintain one is not flogged for violating a general prohibition. This is referring to the violation of a prohibition that includes several different actions, such as this one, which pertains to eating the fat of an ox, sheep, and goat. The Rabbis contend that one does not receive multiple sets of lashes for transgressing each element of such a prohibition.

The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yishmael also maintains that one is not flogged for violating a general prohibition, but here it is different, as elements of the verse are superfluous. The Gemara explains: Let the verse write only: You shall eat no fat, and all the individual types of fat would be included. Why do I need the additional terms: “Ox, or sheep, or goat”? Learn from it that the verse serves to separate between them and render one liable to receive a separate set of lashes for eating each type of forbidden fat.

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, how do they respond to this reading of the verse? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis would say that no element of the verse is superfluous, since if it had not written: “Ox, or sheep, or goat,” I would say that even the fat of an undomesticated animal is included in the prohibition. For this reason the verse writes: “Ox, or sheep, or goat,” to say that it is the fat of an ox, or a sheep, or a goat that is forbidden, but all the fats of an undomesticated animal are permitted.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this interpretation of the dispute: The Rabbis spoke well to Rabbi Yishmael, i.e., their response is persuasive. The Gemara suggests an alternative explanation: Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yishmael, as he holds: If so, that the verse serves to exclude the fat of only an undomesticated animal from the prohibition, then let it write: You shall eat no fat of an ox, which would be understood as a paradigm representing every type of domesticated animal. Why do I need the phrase: “Sheep or goat”? Learn from it that the verse serves to separate between them and render one liable to receive a separate set of lashes for eating each type of forbidden fat.

And the Rabbis maintain that if the Merciful One had written only: You shall eat no fat of an ox, I would say: Let us derive a verbal analogy from the word “ox” stated here as a paradigm representing every type of domesticated animal [behema] and the word “ox,” i.e., behema, stated with regard to a mitzva given in preparation for the revelation at Sinai: “Whether it be animal [behema] or man, it shall not live” (Exodus 19:13).

The Gemara explains the meaning of this hypothetical verbal analogy: Just as with regard to the command at Sinai, undomesticated animals and birds are subject to the same prohibition as domesticated animals despite the use of the term behema, so too, with regard to eating their fat, undomesticated animals and birds are subject to the same prohibition as domesticated animals despite the verse employing the example of an ox. For this reason the Merciful One writes: “Ox, or sheep, or goat,” to say that these are forbidden, but all the fats of an undomesticated animal and birds are permitted.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this interpretation of the dispute: The Rabbis spoke well to Rabbi Yishmael, i.e., their response is persuasive. How could he say the terms in the verse are superfluous? The Gemara suggests an alternative explanation: Rather, this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yishmael, as he holds: Let the verse write: You shall eat no fat of sheep; alternatively, let it state: You shall eat no fat of goat. Why do I need the verse to state all three: “Ox, or sheep, or goat”? Learn from it that the verse serves to separate between them and render one liable to receive a separate set of lashes for eating each type of forbidden fat.

And the Rabbis maintain that if the Torah had written merely: You shall eat no fat of sheep, I would say it is only the fat of sheep that is forbidden, but the fat of an ox or a goat is permitted. And if you would say: In what way is the category of sheep stronger, i.e., more fitting to have its fats forbidden, than the categories of ox and goats, that one would think the prohibition applies only to sheep? The answer is that one might have thought so due to the fact that there is an increased obligation with regard to a sheep’s tail, as it is sacrificed upon the altar, which is not the case with an ox or a goat.

And this is as Rabbi Ḥanina taught: Why does the verse list the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions on the altar with regard to a firstborn ox, and the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions [ve’eimurim] with regard to a firstborn sheep, and the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions with regard to a firstborn goat? As it is written: “But the firstborn of a bull, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are sacred. You shall dash their blood against the altar, and shall make their fat smoke for an offering made by fire” (Numbers 18:17). The “fat” mentioned in this verse is their portions to be burned on the altar.

Rabbi Ḥanina explains: These repetitions are necessary, as, if the Torah had written this obligation only with regard to a firstborn ox I would say that we do not derive the halakha of a sheep and a goat from it, as that derivation can be refuted: What is notable about an ox? It is notable in that an ox has an increased number of wine libations, more than those poured with sheep and goat offerings. Therefore, perhaps the additional obligation to burn the sacrificial portions applies only with regard to an ox.

And likewise, if you were to suggest: Let the Merciful One write the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions only with regard to a sheep and we will derive the halakha of an ox and a goat from the halakha of a sheep, that derivation can be refuted: What is notable about a sheep? It is notable in that there is an increased obligation with regard to a sheep’s tail, as explained earlier.

And similarly, if you suggest: Let the Merciful One write the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions only with regard to a goat, and we will derive the halakha of an ox and a sheep from the halakha of a goat, this too can be refuted: What is notable about a goat? It is notable in that a goat has an increased applicability with regard to idol worship, as one who sins unwittingly in the case of idol worship is liable to bring a goat as a sin offering (see Numbers 15:27), unlike one who transgresses other prohibitions unwittingly, for which they are liable to bring a sheep.

Rabbi Ḥanina continues: We cannot derive these halakhot from the halakha of any one of the others, but let the Torah write two of them and we will derive the halakha of one of them from the halakha of the other two. Which is this animal that should not be written? If one suggests we will derive the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions of a firstborn ox from the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions of a sheep and a goat, this derivation has a refutation: What is notable about a sheep and a goat? They are notable in that that they have increased applicability, as they are suitable for the Paschal offering, whereas an ox is not suitable for this purpose.

If one suggests the verse should not write the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions of a sheep, and we will derive its halakha from the halakha of an ox and a goat, this derivation has a refutation: What is notable about an ox and a goat? They are notable in that they have increased applicability as suitable offerings to atone for an unwitting transgression of idol worship, as when a community unwittingly sins with regard to idol worship they bring an ox as a burnt offering and a goat as a sin offering (see Numbers 15:24), while an individual brings a goat but not a sheep.

If one suggests that the verse should not write the obligation to burn the sacrificial portions of a goat, and we will derive its halakha from the halakha of an ox and a sheep, this derivation has a refutation: What is notable about an ox and a sheep? They are notable in that each of them has an increased aspect of applicability with regard to the altar, as the libations for an ox are greater than those for a goat, and the tail of a sheep, but not that of a goat, is burned on the altar. Rabbi Ḥanina concludes: Therefore, all three cases are necessary, as they cannot be derived from each other.

The Rabbis have explained why all three mentions of an ox, a sheep, and a goat are necessary. Consequently, the Gemara again states: The Rabbis spoke well to Rabbi Yishmael, i.e., their response is persuasive. The Gemara suggests: Rather, the reason of Rabbi Yishmael is actually as we said at the outset, that if so, that one who eats the forbidden fats of all three animals is liable to receive only one set of lashes, let the verse write: You shall eat no fat, and be silent. What did you say in response? That this fact that the verse writes: “Ox, or sheep, or goat,” serves to permit the fat of an undomesticated animal? This is not a valid objection.

The Gemara explains: When the verse concerning forbidden fat is written it is in the context of sacrificial animals, since the subsequent verse concerning the prohibition against eating forbidden fat states: “For whoever eats the fat of the animal of which men present an offering of fire to the Lord, even the soul that eats it shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:25). The verse categorizes an animal whose fat one may not eat as an “animal of which men present an offering of fire to the Lord,” i.e., offerings. And one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles is: A matter is derived from its context, i.e., one interprets a verse according to the context in which it is written. Since offerings may be brought only from domesticated, not undomesticated, animals, the prohibition against eating forbidden fat applies only to such animals.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Can one conclude by inference that the Rabbis maintain we do not derive halakhot by employing the hermeneutical principle of: A matter is derived from its context? This cannot be correct, as it is an accepted basic principle of exegesis. The Gemara answers: No, everyone agrees that we do derive halakhot by employing the hermeneutical principle of: A matter is derived from its context, and here it is about this issue that they disagree: Rabbi Yishmael maintains that we derive the halakhot of one prohibition from the halakhot of another prohibition, and this applies whether it is from a standard prohibition, whose transgression results in the punishment of lashes, or whether from a prohibition whose transgression results in the punishment of karet.

Accordingly, the prohibition of: “You shall eat no fat of ox, or sheep, or goat,” can be derived from the prohibition of: “It shall be a perpetual statute throughout your generations in all your dwellings, that you shall eat neither fat nor blood” (Leviticus 3:17), which is written with regard to the matter of sacrificial animals. And there are no undomesticated animals in the category of sacrificial animals. So too, with regard to the prohibition of: “You shall eat no fat of ox, or sheep, or goat,” when the verse writes it without further specification, there is no reason to be uncertain whether or not it is referring also to undomesticated animals. Therefore, the phrase “ox, or sheep, or goat” comes to separate, i.e., to render one liable for eating the forbidden fat of each and every one of them.

All this teaches only that a separate prohibition applies to each type of animal. And with regard to the liability to receive lashes for eating each one we derive the prohibition of: “You shall eat no fat,” and the prohibition of: “It shall be a perpetual statute,” from the example of karet stated in the verse: “For anyone who eats the fat of the domesticated animal, of which people present an offering of fire to the Lord, the soul that eats it shall be cut off from its people” (Leviticus 7:25). Just as that verse serves to separate and teach that if one unwittingly ate the fat of an ox, a goat, and a sheep he is liable to bring a sin offering for each one, so too, this verse serves to separate and teach that one is liable to receive lashes for eating the fat of each one.

And the Rabbis maintain we derive the halakhot of one standard prohibition from the halakhot of another standard prohibition, but we do not derive the halakhot of a standard prohibition from the halakhot of a prohibition whose transgression results in the punishment of karet.

The Gemara suggests: And if you wish, say instead that this is the reason of the Rabbis: As Rav Mari said to Rav Zevid when asked about a different issue: If that is so, that a sheep tail is categorized as fat by the verses and is included in the portions of an offering for which one is liable for the misuse of consecrated property, then the tail of a non-sacred animal should be prohibited for consumption as forbidden fat. Rav Zevid said to Rav Mari: With regard to your claim, the verse states concerning forbidden fat: “You shall eat no fat of ox, or sheep, or goat” (Leviticus 7:23). This teaches that for the prohibition against eating forbidden fat to take effect we require an item that is found equally in all three types of animals, an ox, and a sheep, and a goat, and that is not the case here. Since an ox and goat do not have tails, the tail is not prohibited even in the case of a sheep.

Therefore, the same applies with regard to the issue at hand: When the verse “ox, or sheep, or goat” comes, it comes to permit consumption of the tail of a non-sacred animal, and one cannot learn from here that a separate prohibition applies to each type of forbidden fat. And Rabbi Yishmael could say to you in response: If so, let the verse state: You shall eat no fat of ox or sheep; why do I need the mention of a goat? Learn from it that the verse serves to separate between them and render one liable to receive lashes for eating each type of forbidden fat.

Rabbi Ḥanina says: Although Rabbi Yishmael maintains that one who unwittingly eats the fat of an ox, a sheep, and a goat is liable to receive a separate set of lashes for each one, he concedes with regard to bringing an offering that if he ate those types of forbidden fat in a single lapse of awareness he brings only one sin offering. What is the reason? The reason is that this prohibition is not similar to the prohibition of those with whom relations are forbidden. As derived in the Gemara on 2b, one who unwittingly engages in intercourse with many women to whom he is forbidden is liable to bring a sin offering for each act. In that context the verse states a separate prohibition for each forbidden relative, whereas in this case there is a single prohibition that applies to the forbidden fat of all domesticated animals.

§ With regard to the sin offering required of one who transgresses the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, the Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and from one of them” (Leviticus 4:2). This phrase should be interpreted as though it states: And performs one, and again states: And performs them, i.e., it serves to render one liable to bring a sin offering for each and every transgression.

The baraita continues: This teaches that if one ate forbidden fat and again ate forbidden fat, if it was from one category, i.e., the same type of forbidden fat, and he ate it in two lapses of awareness, that is, he was made aware of his sin after the first instance of consumption and then again ate unwittingly, he is liable to bring two sin offerings. If he ate forbidden fat from two categories, as the Gemara will soon explain, in one lapse of awareness, he is likewise liable to bring two sin offerings.

Rami bar Ḥama said to Rav Ḥisda: Granted, one who ate forbidden fat from one category in two lapses of awareness is liable to bring two sin offerings, as this is due to the fact that the lapses of awareness separate between his transgressions; each time he becomes aware of his transgression he is liable to bring another sin offering. But in a case where he ate forbidden fat from two categories in one lapse of awareness, why is he liable to bring two sin offerings? We require separate lapses of awareness and that is not the case here.

Rav Ḥisda said to him: Here we are dealing with a case where he ate forbidden fat left over from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption [notar], as he is liable due to eating notar and is also liable due to eating forbidden fat. These are the two categories mentioned in the baraita. Rami bar Ḥama said to him: If so, that the case involves more than one prohibition, let him be liable due to eating sacrificial food as well, and he should be liable to bring a guilt offering for the unwitting misuse of consecrated property (see Leviticus 5:14–16).

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: Here we are dealing with a case where he ate forbidden fat of sacrificial animals, and this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who renders one liable to bring two sin offerings for eating forbidden fat of sacrificial food. As it is taught in a baraita: If one ate forbidden fat of an animal carcass, or if he ate forbidden fat of sacrificial animals, he is liable to receive two sets of lashes, either for transgressing the prohibitions of eating forbidden fat and eating an animal carcass, or for both eating forbidden fat and transgressing the prohibition forbidding a non-priest to partake of sacrificial animals. Rabbi Yehuda says: If one ate forbidden fat of sacrificial animals he is flogged with three sets of lashes, because there are two separate prohibitions of forbidden fat in the case of sacrificial animals, as the Gemara will soon explain, in addition to the prohibition forbidding a non-priest to partake of sacrificial animals.

The Gemara comments: They laughed at this suggestion in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael: And let us interpret this baraita as referring to a case where he ate the forbidden fat of an ox, and of a sheep, and of a goat, and explain that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that he is flogged with three sets of lashes for the different types of fat, if he did so intentionally and was forewarned.