I will likewise exclude the blood of creeping animals, which do not have a severe form of ritual impurity. Impurity transmitted to a person by the carcass of a creeping animal does not render clothing impure, whereas impurity transmitted by the carcass of an animal or bird does render one’s clothing impure. I will also exclude the blood of eggs, as they are not a type of meat, and finally I will exclude the blood of fish and the blood of grasshoppers, as they are entirely permitted, as explained on 21b.

The baraita continues: The verse states: “And you shall consume no manner of blood, whether it is of bird or of animal, in any of your dwellings” (Leviticus 7:26). The verse mentions both “bird” and “animal,” because if the verse had stated only “bird,” one might have said that just as a bird is a creature concerning which the prohibition of diverse kinds does not apply, as will be explained, so too, the prohibition against consuming blood applies only to an animal concerning which the prohibition of diverse kinds does not apply, whereas the blood of other animals is not forbidden. Therefore, the verse states: “Or of animal.”

And if the verse had mentioned only “animal,” one might have said that just as an animal is not included in the prohibition against taking the mother bird with her young (see Deuteronomy 22:6–7), so too, a bird whose blood is forbidden is that which is not included in the prohibition against taking the mother bird with the young, i.e., non-kosher birds, whereas the blood of kosher birds is permitted. Therefore, the verse states: “Whether it is of bird or of animal.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But say that the verse should be interpreted as follows: The phrase “no manner of blood” is a generalization, and the mention of “bird or animal” is a detail. This is a generalization and a detail, and the hermeneutical principle in such cases is that the generalization includes only what is mentioned in the detail. Consequently, with regard to a bird and an animal, yes, it is prohibited to consume their blood, but with regard to anything else, the prohibition does not apply.

The Gemara explains that when the next verse states: “Whoever consumes any blood, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:27), it then generalized again. Therefore, this is a case of a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, in which case the relevant hermeneutical principle dictates that you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Accordingly, the verse includes everything that has the following three components, as stated above: The capacity for both a light form of ritual impurity and a severe form of ritual impurity; the possibility of being forbidden or permitted; and categorization as a type of meat.

The Gemara objects: But the last generalization is not similar to the first generalization. The first generalization, where it states: “You shall consume no manner of blood,” indicates a regular prohibition, punishable by lashes, whereas the last generalization, where it states: “That soul shall be cut off from his people,” indicates that the prohibition is punishable by karet. Consequently, the hermeneutical principle for cases of a generalization, a detail, and a generalization should not apply.

The Gemara responds: This tanna, whose opinion is recorded in this baraita, is of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, who maintains that we expound generalizations and details even in a case like this, even though the last generalization is not similar to the first generalization.

The Gemara further analyzes the baraita. The Master said that there is a generalization, and a detail, and a generalization, and therefore you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the detail is explicit in that it is referring to an item that has the capacity for both a light form of impurity and a severe form of impurity, and it has the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and it is a type of meat, so too, every item that has the capacity for both a light form of ritual impurity and a severe form of ritual impurity, and has the possibility of being forbidden or permitted, and is a type of meat, is included in the prohibition against consuming blood.

The Gemara asks: What does this phrase: So too every item, which the baraita teaches, serve to include beyond birds and animals, which are mentioned explicitly in the verse? After all, the blood of human beings, creeping animals, fish, and grasshoppers have already been excluded from the prohibition.

Rav Adda bar Avin said: It serves to include the blood of a koy, an animal that is not definitively categorized as either a domesticated animal or an undomesticated animal. The Gemara asks: What does Rav Adda bar Avin maintain in this regard? If he maintains that a koy is an uncertain case, is a verse necessary to teach the halakha in a case of uncertainty? Rather, Rav Adda bar Avin maintains that the koy is a distinct entity, i.e., it is not in the category of domesticated animals or undomesticated animals, and therefore its halakha must be taught.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for the prohibition against consuming the blood of a koy. From where do we derive that its fat is also forbidden? The Gemara answers that this is derived from the verse: “You shall not eat any [kol] fat” (Leviticus 7:23). The additional word “kol” serves to include the fat of a koy as being forbidden. The Gemara inquires further: From where do we derive that its carcass is prohibited? The Gemara answers that this is derived from the verse: “You shall not eat any [kol] animal carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21). Here too, the additional word “kol” serves to include the carcass of a koy as being prohibited.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the sciatic nerve of a koy is prohibited? The Gemara answers that the Merciful One rendered the prohibition of the sciatic nerve dependent on the presence of the spoon of the thigh, as it is stated: “Therefore the children of Israel shall not eat the sciatic nerve which is upon the spoon of the thigh” (Genesis 32:33), and this koy has a spoon [kaf ] of the thigh, i.e., a round protrusion of flesh in its thigh that is shaped like a spoon.

The Gemara further asks: From where do we derive the impurity status of the carcass of a koy, and that ritual slaughter renders its meat permitted for consumption? The Gemara answers that these halakhot are derived by logical reasoning: From the fact that in all the matters mentioned above the Merciful One included the koy and rendered it like a domesticated animal, it is logical that the halakhot concerning its impurity and its slaughter are also like those concerning a domesticated animal.

§ The Gemara continues to analyze the baraita. The Master said in the baraita: I will therefore exclude the blood of bipeds, as they have the capacity for a severe form of impurity, the impurity of a corpse, but they do not have the capacity for a light form of impurity, since the halakhot of the impurity of food do not apply to human flesh. But one can raise a contradiction from a mishna (Okatzin 3:2): With regard to one who cuts flesh from a living person for food, there are two conditions under which it becomes impure with the impurity of food: First, the flesh requires intent to eat it or feed it to others, and second, it must be rendered susceptible to impurity by coming into contact with water or one of the other six liquids that render food items susceptible to impurity.

Before explaining the contradiction between this mishna and the baraita cited above, the Gemara seeks to clarify the mishna itself: And the following was difficult for us: Why do I need intent? Let his act of cutting serve as intent to eat the flesh. And Reish Lakish said: This is referring to one who cuts the flesh in order to feed it to a dog, and intent to feed it to a dog is not considered intent to use the flesh as food.

The Gemara asks: And is intent to feed a dog not considered intent to use the flesh as food? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Teharot 8:6): The Sages stated a principle with regard to ritual impurity: With regard to any food that is assumed to be food designated for a person, once it becomes impure with the impurity of food, it remains impure until it is rendered unfit to be consumed by a dog?

The Gemara answers: That mishna is referring to removing impurity from it. Since the food was initially fit to be eaten by a person, its status of impurity cannot be removed from it until it is rendered unfit to be consumed by a dog. By contrast, here, with regard to one who cuts flesh, the mishna is referring to granting it susceptibility to impurity. In this case, if it is fit for a person then it is fit for a dog, i.e., it is susceptible to the impurity of food; if it is not fit for a person, it is not fit for a dog, i.e., it is not susceptible to ritual impurity.

The Gemara addresses the contradiction between the mishna in Teharot and the baraita cited above: In any case, that mishna teaches that human flesh requires intent, and intent is for a light form of ritual impurity, i.e., this requirement of intent is necessary only for the flesh to become susceptible to ritual impurity as a food item. This apparently contradicts the claim of the baraita that the impurity of food items does not apply to human flesh. The Gemara answers: This statement of the mishna that human flesh is susceptible to impurity as a food item applies while the person is alive. But after death his corpse is impure by a severe form of impurity and is no longer susceptible to impurity as a food item, and that is the meaning of the baraita.

The Gemara objects: The baraita contrasts animals, which are susceptible to both light and more severe forms of impurity, and people, who are susceptible only to severe ritual impurity, and the Gemara has explained the baraita as referring to a human being after death. But in the corresponding situation with regard to an animal after death, if one is referring to its meat, then it transmits impurity by a severe form of impurity, the impurity of a carcass, and if one is referring to its blood, it likewise transmits impurity by a severe form of ritual impurity, and not a light form of ritual impurity.

As we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 5:1): With regard to the blood of animal carcasses, Beit Shammai deem it pure, and Beit Hillel deem it impure just like the carcass itself, which transmits severe ritual impurity. Why, then, does the baraita differentiate between people and animals and indicate that dead animals are susceptible to a light form of ritual impurity?

The Gemara answers: The statement of the baraita that animals are susceptible to a light form of impurity after death while people are not is necessary only for that which we learned in a mishna with regard to the impurity of food (Okatzin 3:3): A carcass of a non-kosher animal, e.g., a horse or donkey, found in any location, and likewise an unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird found in villages, where there are not many people and it is unlikely to be eaten, require express intent to be eaten in order for them to be considered food and susceptible to impurity of food. But they are not required to come into contact with a liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity.

By contrast, the carcass of a kosher animal anywhere, and the unslaughtered carcass of a kosher bird or forbidden fat found in marketplaces, will presumably be eaten, and therefore they require neither intent to be eaten nor contact with liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity.

And Rav said to Rabbi Ḥiyya: Why do I need intent for a carcass to be eaten so that it will be considered food and therefore susceptible to the impurity of food, which is a light form of ritual impurity? After all, the carcass itself is already impure with a severe form of impurity. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: It is necessary for a case where there is less than an olive-bulk of the carcass, which is not susceptible to the impurity of a carcass, and one combined it with less than an egg-bulk of food, so that this and that together are an egg-bulk, which is the minimum amount of food that is susceptible to food impurity.

Rav raised a difficulty to Rabbi Ḥiyya: If so, that less than an olive-bulk of an animal carcass does not transmit impurity, it should also require contact with a liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity as a food. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught that with regard to the impurity of foods, the verse states: “Upon any sowing seed which is to be sown” (Leviticus 11:37), which teaches: Just as seeds are unique in that they will not ultimately become impure with a severe form of ritual impurity and they require contact with liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity, so too, anything that will not ultimately become impure with a severe form of ritual impurity requires contact with liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity.

Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rav: This statement applies to foods in general, which do not contain less than an olive-bulk of an animal carcass. But here, where the food does contain less than an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, the halakha is different: Since it would be impure with a severe form of ritual impurity if one were to add to the amount of animal carcass so that there would be a full olive-bulk, it does not require contact with a liquid in order to be rendered susceptible to impurity. In any case, this halakha that less than an olive-bulk of a carcass combines with less than an egg-bulk of food to equal a full egg-bulk that is susceptible to food impurity, applies only to the flesh of an animal,