One may infer that here, since this verse specifies that it is referring to a kid of the goats, consequently, anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe. Accordingly, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk applies to all kosher domesticated animals.

The Gemara asks: But why not derive from that verse that in general, every instance of the word “kid” is referring to a goat, including the prohibition of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: This cannot be, as another verse is written: “And the skins of the kids of the goats” (Genesis 27:16). This indicates that only here they are kids of the goats, but anywhere the word “kid” is stated without specification, it means even a cow or a ewe.

The Gemara objects: But let us derive from this verse as well that on the contrary, the word “kid” is always referring to a goat. The Gemara explains: These two examples are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, and as a rule, any two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says this principle that two verses that come as one do not teach their common element to other cases, but according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach their common element to other cases, what is there to say? The Gemara answers: Two exclusions are written, as both of the verses cited use the term “the goats.” The verses could have stated simply: Goats, but state “the goats,” with the definite article, teaching that it is only in these cases that the reference is specifically to a goat.

§ Shmuel says: Each of the Torah’s three mentions of the prohibition of not cooking a kid in its mother’s milk serves to include a different case. The first mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating forbidden fats, beyond the liability for eating forbidden fat per se. The second mention of the word “kid” likewise serves to include additional liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a dead animal carcass. Finally, the third mention of the word “kid” serves to include liability for cooking in milk and eating an animal fetus.

Each mention excludes a case as well: The first mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and consuming blood. The second mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the placenta of an animal. The third mention of the word “kid” serves to exclude liability for cooking in milk and eating the meat of a non-kosher animal.

Furthermore, the first instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a male animal, in the rare case that a male might produce milk. The second instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of an already slaughtered animal, since it is considered milk only if given while the animal is alive. The third instance of the phrase “in its mother’s milk” indicates that one is not liable for cooking meat in the milk of a non-kosher animal.

The Gemara challenges: The word “kid” is written only three times, and yet we expound it to teach six different halakhot. The Gemara responds: Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect even where another prohibition already exists, and therefore the prohibition of forbidden fat in milk and the prohibition of a dead animal carcass in milk are both derived from one verse, as both are applications of the prohibition to an already prohibited item. The exclusion of blood from the prohibition also does not require its own verse, as blood is not considered a kid at all, and likewise there is no need for a verse to exclude a placenta from the prohibition, as it is merely a secretion of the animal, rather than a kind of meat. Therefore, two mentions of “kid” are left; one serves to include a fetus, and one serves to exclude a non-kosher animal.

The Gemara asks: And does Shmuel really maintain that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists? But didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Elazar: From where is it derived that an impure priest who partakes of impure teruma, i.e., the portion of produce designated for the priest, is not punished with death at the hand of Heaven as he would had the teruma been ritually pure? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated, with regard to the prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma: “And die therein if they desecrate it” (Leviticus 22:9), to the exclusion of this case of teruma that is impure, which was already desecrated before the priest ate it. Here, it seems, since impure teruma is already prohibited for consumption, the added prohibition of an impure priest partaking of teruma does not take effect.

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and it is different there, with regard to teruma, as the Merciful One expressly excludes impure teruma by the phrase “and die therein if they desecrate it,” and in this case the teruma is already desecrated. And if you wish, say that in general Shmuel maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and here, the case of meat cooked in milk, is different, as the Merciful One expressly includes the meat of an animal carcass and forbidden fat by the repetition of the word “kid.”

And if you wish, say that this statement of Shmuel with regard to meat cooked in milk is his own opinion, as he maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and that statement with regard to teruma is his teacher’s, i.e., Rabbi Elazar’s, opinion, as he holds that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.

§ Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a dilemma to Rav: If one cooks meat in milk of a goat that has not yet nursed, but that is about to give birth and already has milk, what is the halakha? Rav said to him: From the fact that it was necessary for Shmuel to say that the phrase “in its mother’s milk” teaches: And not in the milk of a male animal, one can infer that it is only the milk of a male that is excluded, as the male cannot attain the status of a mother. But in this case, since the goat will attain the status of a mother, it is prohibited to cook meat in its milk.

It was stated: With regard to one who cooks forbidden fat in milk, Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi disagree as to the halakha. One says that he is flogged for violating the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, and one says that he is not flogged. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That the one who says he is flogged maintains that a prohibition takes effect where another prohibition already exists, and the one who says he is not flogged maintains that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.

The Gemara responds: No; everyone agrees that a prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists, and therefore everyone agrees that one is not flogged for eating the mixture. When they disagree, it is with regard to cooking. The one who says he is flogged holds that one who cooks violates only one prohibition, that of cooking meat in milk, since it is permitted to cook forbidden fat without eating it. Consequently, this is not a case of a prohibition taking effect where another prohibition already exists. And the one who says he is not flogged holds that it was for this reason that the Merciful One expressed the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk in the Torah using the language of cooking: “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.”