that the baraita is referring to a case of old impurity, where the witnesses said to him: You became impure yesterday, what is different about the cases of eating forbidden fat and entering the Temple while impure, where the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda that one is not liable to bring a sin offering even though his denial is contradicted by two witnesses? He is exempt since if he wished, he could say: I did so intentionally. Therefore, his denial can be interpreted to mean: My eating the forbidden fat or entering the Temple was not unwitting but intentional. If so, if he denies that he is in a state of old impurity, he can also explain his statement, since if he wished, he could say that he meant: I did not remain in my state of ritual impurity, but rather I immersed in a ritual bath.

Ravina said: Actually, the baraita can be referring to a case of old impurity, and nevertheless the Rabbis distinguish between one’s denial that he is impure and one’s denial that he ate or entered the Temple. The case is one where the witnesses say to him: You ate sacrificial meat while in a state of physical impurity, and he says to them: I did not become impure. The reason he is liable to bring an offering is that here he cannot explain his statement, as one cannot say that the phrase: I did not become impure, can be explained to mean: I did not remain in a state of impurity but rather I immersed.

Ravina elaborates: What would he say to them to explain his statement that he did not become impure? If he says: I immersed and I ate, then when he says this to them, his initial statement has been contradicted in any event with regard to his impurity imparted by contact. His initial claim that he did not become impure has not been adjusted with regard to this matter, and that claim was contradicted by the two witnesses.

Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that even if two witnesses testify that a person became impure, and he claims that he did not become impure, he is deemed credible about himself more than the testimony of one hundred people. Rav Yosef says: Rabbi Yehuda said that he is deemed credible when he states that he is pure against the testimony of witnesses only when the person is by himself and only with regard to himself, but as far as others are concerned, he is regarded as impure.

Reish Lakish says: Although according to Rabbi Meir one is liable to bring an offering based on the testimony of two witnesses that he ate forbidden fat even if he denied it, Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that if two witnesses said to him: You engaged in sexual intercourse with an espoused maidservant, and he says: I did not engage in sexual intercourse, he is deemed credible, since if he wishes, he can say to them: I did not complete my act of intercourse, in which case, as stated earlier (10b), he is not liable to bring a guilt offering.

Likewise, Rav Sheshet says: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis in the case of an impure nazirite, i.e., one to whom two witnesses said: You became impure and are therefore liable to bring a sin offering, and he says: I did not become impure, that he is exempt, since if he wishes, he can say: I requested from a halakhic authority to dissolve my nazirite vow, and he dissolved it. Therefore, it was permitted for me to become impure. Nazirites are prohibited from becoming impure with the impurity imparted by a corpse, whereas non-nazirites may come into contact with a corpse.

Likewise, Abaye says: Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis that if two witnesses said to a person: You know testimony about so-and-so, and he says: I do not know, and he takes an oath to this effect, he is exempt from bringing an offering for taking a false oath of testimony. The reason is that if he wishes, he can say: I did witness the event, but I had not intended to offer testimony, in which case he is exempt from bringing an offering for taking a false oath of testimony.

§ The mishna teaches that if one unwittingly ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat and then ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat during one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. Rabbi Zeira objects to this: Why is he liable to bring only one sin offering? But didn’t he eat two olive-bulks of forbidden fat?

Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: One is liable to bring two sin offerings only when he ate the olive-bulks of forbidden fat during separate lapses of awareness, e.g., he ate forbidden fat when he was unaware that it was prohibited, and subsequently became aware of the prohibition and then forgot about it and ate another olive-bulk of forbidden fat. This is derived from the verse: “If his sin, which he has sinned, is known to him, then he shall bring for his offering a goat, a female without blemish, for his sin which he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:28). But here there is only one lapse of awareness.

The Gemara cites a different version of the discussion between Rabbi Zeira and Abaye. There are those who claim that Rabbi Zeira raised his difficulty to Abaye in this manner: The reason that one is liable to bring only one sin offering for his two transgressions of eating forbidden fat is that both acts took place during one lapse of awareness; but if he ate forbidden fat in two lapses of awareness, he is liable to bring two sin offerings. But why? It is one category of prohibition of forbidden fat that he has violated, and therefore he should bring only one sin offering. Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: With regard to bringing sin offerings, separate lapses of awareness render him liable to bring multiple offerings.

§ The mishna teaches: If one ate forbidden fat, and blood, and piggul, and notar in one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one of them. In a case where one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, if the two half olive-bulks were both from one type of forbidden food, he is liable to bring a sin offering. If they were from two types, he is exempt.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: The ruling that if one ate two halves of an olive-bulk of one type of food he is liable to bring a sin offering is obvious, as he ate an olive-bulk of a forbidden food. Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutini: This is referring to a case where he ate them from two dishes, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that eating food from distinct dishes differentiates his acts of consumption and renders them separate transgressions.

This ruling was necessary lest you say that when Rabbi Yehoshua says that separate dishes render his acts separate transgressions, it is no different if this principle results in a leniency and it is no different if it results in a stringency. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that if he ate two half olive-bulks from two dishes, he is liable to bring a sin offering. Evidently, Rabbi Yehoshua says that eating food from separate dishes renders his acts of consumption separate transgressions only when this principle produces a stringency, but he did not say it as a leniency.

There are those who say that this discussion referred to the latter clause of the mishna: In a case where one ate half an olive-bulk and then ate another half olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness, if they were from two types of food, he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, as he did not eat an entire olive-bulk of one type? Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Tutini: The mishna is referring to a case where he ate an olive-bulk of one type, but he ate it in two dishes, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that eating food from separate dishes differentiates his acts of consumption and renders them separate transgressions.

This ruling was necessary lest you say that when Rabbi Yehoshua says that separate dishes render his acts separate transgressions, he says it only when it results in a stringency, but he does not say it when it results in a leniency. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that if he ate an olive-bulk from two types of food, he is exempt.

The Gemara explains: What does the mishna mean when it states the case of eating from two types of food? It is actually a case of two half olive-bulks from one type of food; and why does the tanna call it two types? It is because he ate it in two dishes, half an olive-bulk in each dish, and the mishna teaches that he is exempt. Evidently, it is no different if it results in a leniency and it is no different if it results in a stringency; in both cases Rabbi Yehoshua says that separate dishes render one’s acts of consumption separate transgressions.

The Gemara objects: From the fact that in the latter clause, when the mishna refers to two types of food it actually means one type of food but the case is where one ate it from two dishes, one can infer that when the former clause states that if one ate two half olive-bulks of one type of food he is liable to bring a sin offering, it must mean that it is one type of food and one ate it from one dish. But if so, why is it necessary to state this halakha; isn’t it obvious?

Ravina said: The mishna is referring to a case where he ate the two half olive-bulks but he had a period of awareness in the interim, e.g., he unwittingly ate half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, then he became aware that he had done so, and subsequently he unwittingly ate another half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, who says: There is no awareness for a half-measure. If one unwittingly performed a half-measure of a prohibited act and then became aware of his transgression, and then again unwittingly performed another half-measure of the prohibited act, his awareness in the interim does not prevent the two acts from combining. Accordingly, in the case here, it is as though he ate a full olive-bulk during one lapse of awareness.

As we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 105a): With regard to one who writes two letters on Shabbat, which is the minimum that one must write in order to be rendered liable for this prohibited labor, and he did so unwittingly in two separate lapses of awareness, one letter in the morning and one letter in the afternoon, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin offering for writing on Shabbat, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

The basis of this dispute is that Rabban Gamliel holds that there is no awareness for a half-measure. Therefore, the fact that he became aware of his transgression after writing the first letter is of no significance. His awareness does not divide between the first act of writing a letter and the second act of writing a letter. And the Rabbis hold: There is awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two half-measures are considered to have been performed during separate lapses of awareness, and they do not combine to render him liable to bring a sin offering.

MISHNA: How much time can one expend while eating an olive-bulk of forbidden food and still be liable for violating the prohibition? The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which one eats one kernel at a time. If he eats the olive-bulk of forbidden food within the amount of time it would take to eat an olive-bulk of toasted grain, he is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf [peras] of bread, he is liable.

Likewise, one who ate a quarter-loaf of ritually impure foods or drank a quarter-log of ritually impure liquids within the amount of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is rendered unfit to partake of teruma, the portion of the produce designated for priests, until he becomes pure. Similarly, if one drank a quarter-log of wine and entered the Temple, and he remained there for the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable. Rabbi Elazar says: If he interrupted his drinking of the quarter-log of wine or if he placed any amount of water into the wine, he is exempt.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does Rabbi Meir state his opinion, that the duration of time is calculated as though one were eating toasted grain, as a stringency or does he state it as a leniency? The Gemara elaborates: Does he state it as a stringency, and this is what he is teaching: The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain a little at a time, and therefore even if it takes him the entire day to consume an olive-bulk of the forbiden food, and even though from beginning to end he expends more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, since he consumed a full olive-bulk in one extended act of eating, he is liable; and the Rabbis said to him that unless he expends less than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable, but if he expends more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is exempt?

Or perhaps Rabbi Meir says his opinion as a leniency, as this is what he is teaching: The duration is calculated as though he were eating toasted grain, which is eaten continuously one kernel after another, and therefore he is liable only if he did not interrupt at all in between his bites. But if he interrupted in between them, then although the duration from beginning to end was less than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is exempt; and the Rabbis said to him: Since the amount of time from beginning to end is less than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, he is liable, despite the interruptions.

The Gemara suggests a resolution: Come and hear the mishna: And the Rabbis say: Unless the amount of time he expends from beginning to end is the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread.