סקר
האם אתה לומד דף יומי עם רש"י?






 

Steinsaltz

And that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems a person liable if he wrote two letters over two Shabbatot, can also be explained: It is referring to a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat, and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. In such a situation he deems an individual liable despite the fact that different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, as he holds that although the intervening days are generally considered awareness of his transgression, there is no awareness for a half-measure. Since he performed only half the prohibited labor on the first Shabbat, he is not considered to have become aware of his transgression on the intervening days.

But according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva, and presumably also Rabban Gamliel, holds that separate Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, how can both baraitot be explained?

The Gemara elaborates: Granted, that which is taught in the second baraita, that Rabban Gamliel deems one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot to be liable, is understandable. You can find both a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors, as he holds that Shabbatot are considered as one single entity, and a case where he acted unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors. The reason in the second case is that he holds there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore the actions on the two Shabbatot are considered to have taken place during one lapse of awareness.

But with regard to that which is taught in the first baraita, that one who writes a letter on each of two Shabbatot is exempt, in what case can you interpret it, i.e., in what circumstances would this ever apply? This ruling does not apply in this case, where he is aware that it is Shabbat but unaware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabbi Akiva, and presumably Rabban Gamliel, maintains that each Shabbat is considered a single entity and therefore it is considered as though he wrote two letters on one Shabbat, and he is liable. And this ruling also does not apply in that case, where one is unaware that it is Shabbat and aware that his action constitutes a prohibited labor, because Rabban Gamliel maintains there is no awareness for a half-measure. Consequently, the two letters are considered to have been written in one lapse of awareness.

The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore an individual who wrote one letter on one Shabbat and another letter on a different Shabbat is exempt.

The Gemara raises an objection: But from the fact that the baraita teaches: And Rabban Gamliel concedes to the Rabbis that if he wrote one letter on one Shabbat and one more letter on a different Shabbat he is exempt, it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another halakha. Granted, if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and the opinion of the Rabbis is that of Rabbi Akiva, this is referring to the fact that they disagree in the other baraita with regard to the case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, as Rabban Gamliel holds that although the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, there is no awareness for a half-measure, and therefore he is liable.

And Rabban Gamliel concedes to Rabbi Akiva in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, that he is exempt. Evidently, Rabbi Akiva holds that Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and therefore the letters written on different Shabbatot do not combine, which is why he is exempt. But if you say Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, and from the fact that one baraita states that Rabban Gamliel concedes that he is exempt it can be derived by inference that they disagree about another similar halakha, this raises the question: About what case do they disagree?

If you suggest that they disagree with regard to a case where one acts unwittingly in that he does not know it is Shabbat and intentionally in that he knows his actions constitute prohibited labors, then that cannot be correct. After all, even Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel that there is no awareness for a half-measure, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who writes two letters on two separate Shabbatot, one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on that Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable.

But rather, you might suggest that Rabban Gamliel’s concession that he is exempt is referring to a disagreement with regard to adding one thread to a preexisting woven fabric. If one weaves three threads together he has violated the prohibited labor of weaving on Shabbat. It might be suggested that if one adds a single thread to a preexisting woven fabric, Rabban Gamliel would deem him liable whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt. And yet Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one writes one letter next to a letter written on the previous Shabbat he is exempt. This suggestion is also difficult, as Rabbi Eliezer deems one liable in the case of adding a single thread, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 105a) that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who weaves three threads at the beginning of a new fabric, or adds one thread to a preexisting woven fabric, is liable.

Rava said: When it was derived by inference that Rabban Gamliel disagrees about one other halakha, that disagreement is referring to the following case, as it is taught in a baraita: One who carried out half of a dried fig into the public domain on Shabbat and then carried out another half of a dried fig, in one lapse of awareness, is liable; if he carried them out in two lapses of awareness he is exempt. Rabbi Yosei says: Even in a case where this occurred in one lapse of awareness, if they were both carried to one public domain he is liable; but if they were carried to two public domains that are separated from each other he is exempt.

As in such a case, Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who says that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate; therefore, as he carried out a full dried fig, which is the minimum measure for the prohibited labor of carrying from one domain to another, he is liable. And Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says the separate domains cause the acts to be considered separate, and he is exempt. Another baraita then states that although Rabban Gamliel maintains that the separate domains do not cause the two acts to be considered separate, he concedes that individual Shabbatot are considered separate entities, and therefore writing two letters on two different Shabbatot is considered two separate acts and the individual is exempt.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: He is liable to bring a sin offering for violation of each and every one of the labors, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference. Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act of unwitting intercourse; in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple primary categories and subcategories of labor, is it not right that one will be liable to bring a sin offering for each prohibited labor?

Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who says that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions constitute prohibited labors, and the basis of the dilemma was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, that is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Just as in the case of a menstruating woman, in the singular; in order to indicate that just as in the case of a menstruating woman one is liable for each act of intercourse due to the intervening days, so too with regard to Shabbat.

But according to Rava, who says it was in reference to a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know his actions constituted prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the basis of the dilemma was whether Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not, let Rabbi Eliezer teach this halakha with the plural phrase: Menstruating women. This would indicate that just as a man who engages in intercourse with five different menstruating women is liable to bring a sin offering for his transgression with each woman, as they are separate entities, the same applies to Shabbatot, which are also separate entities.

The Gemara responds that Rava could say to you: Indeed, teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women. The Gemara notes that Shmuel teaches the mishna with the singular term menstruating woman, and Rav Adda bar Ahava teaches the mishna with the term menstruating woman; but Rav Natan bar Oshaya says: Teach the mishna with the plural term menstruating women.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Ḥisda, who says: It was in reference to a case where he was unwitting with regard to Shabbat and intentional with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, and the question was whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not, how could Rabbi Eliezer attempt to resolve the dilemma by a comparison to a menstruating woman? In the case of a menstruating woman, what intervening days apply to her that can be considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate the acts of intercourse into distinct transgressions?

Rava said: This is possible in a case where he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with her while she was menstruating, and then she immersed in a ritual bath and became pure, and then she saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again, and then she immersed and then saw menstrual blood and he engaged in intercourse with her again. As here the immersions which purify her are considered like intervening days.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rava from the continuation of the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Akiva: The case of one who engages in intercourse with minor menstruating girls will prove this refutation is not valid. Granted, according to Rava, who says that Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma was about whether Shabbatot are considered separate entities, this is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer teaches his resolution by using the plural term minor girls, to indicate that just as one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each girl, as she is a separate entity, the same applies to prohibited labor performed on different Shabbatot.

But according to Rav Ḥisda, who said Rabbi Akiva’s dilemma referred to whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot, what is the reason Rabbi Eliezer employed the plural term minor girls? The Gemara answers that the plural term is referring to minor girls in general, i.e., to men who engage in intercourse with minor girls, but it should not be taken to mean that one man engages in intercourse with multiple minor women.

§ The Gemara notes that the mishna, which states that Rabbi Akiva raised a dilemma with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat and Rabbi Eliezer offered a resolution based on the halakhot of a menstruating woman, is not in accordance with the opinion of this following tanna, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: That is not what Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Eliezer. Rather, this is what he asked him: In the case of one who unwittingly engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, and then again engaged in intercourse with his wife while she was menstruating, during a single lapse of awareness, what is the halakha? Is he liable to bring only one sin offering for all of the acts of intercourse, or is he liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every one?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: He is liable for each and every one, and this is derived from an a fortiori inference: And just as in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there is only one prohibition because he is prohibited to perform labor on Shabbat but Shabbat is not prohibited with regard to him, he is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every prohibited labor; in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are two prohibitions, as the man is prohibited to engage in intercourse with the menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is prohibited to engage in intercourse with him, is it not right that he should be liable to bring a separate sin offering for each and every act of intercourse?

Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings in the case of Shabbat, with regard to which there are multiple categories of labor that result in liability to bring multiple sin offerings, shall you also say the same in the case of a menstruating woman, with regard to whom there are not multiple actions that result in multiple transgressions and multiple sin offerings, as there is only the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with her?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who engages in intercourse with five minor menstruating girls will prove it, as with regard to it there are not multiple actions that result in multiple sin offerings, and yet one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for having engaged in intercourse with each and every one of the girls.

Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you said that one is liable for each one with regard to minors, who are separate entities, shall you also say that he should be liable for each act with regard to one who engages in intercourse five times with his wife while she is menstruating? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The case of one who copulates with an animal multiple times during a single lapse of awareness will prove that one should be held separately liable for each act, as there are no separate entities, and yet one is liable for each and every act. Rabbi Akiva said to him: The case of the animal is like the case of the menstruating woman, and one is liable to bring only one sin offering.

MISHNA: If there is uncertainty whether one ate forbidden fat and uncertainty whether one did not eat forbidden fat, or even if one ate forbidden fat and there is uncertainty whether there is the measure that determines liability in the piece he ate and uncertainty

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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