let the Master remain in his place, i.e., in the men’s chamber, and renounce his rights to his courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they may transfer the water from one courtyard to the other. And then, after the water has been moved, let them renounce their rights in favor of the Master, so that he may once again carry in his courtyard. As Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one person may renounce his rights in favor of the other when he needs it, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first when he needs it.

Rava replied: In this regard, I hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said: One person may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

Ravina raised a difficulty: Isn’t the reason for both halakhot one and the same? What is the reason that one may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the other renounce his rights in favor of the first? Is it not because it is assumed that since he renounced his rights to the courtyard, it is as if he has completely removed himself from here, and he is now considered like the resident of a different courtyard, and Shmuel holds that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another? If so, the Master should likewise not renounce his rights to his courtyard. If you accept Shmuel’s opinion with regard to subsequent renouncing, you should likewise accept his opinion with regard to renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another.

Rava responded: That is not Shmuel’s reason for prohibiting subsequent renunciations. There, this is the rationale for his opinion: So that the words of the Sages should not be a subject of laughter and mockery. If it is permitted for one person to renounce his rights in favor of another and then for the second person to renounce his rights in favor of the first, the Sages’ enactment will lose all meaning.

The Gemara proceeds to examine in greater detail the issue raised in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one may renounce his rights in favor of the other, and then the second person may renounce his rights in favor of the first. And Shmuel said: One may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel disagree about the same point of dispute as the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer. Elsewhere it is taught that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the halakha in a case where one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eiruv, but subsequently renounced his rights to the courtyard on Shabbat. The dispute revolves around the status of this resident’s house. Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is prohibited for him to carry in and out of his house, while the other residents of the courtyard are permitted to do so. However, the Rabbis hold that the other residents are prohibited from carrying in and out of his house as well.

The suggestion is that Rav stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that even one who renounces his rights to his courtyard does not renounce his rights to his house. As he has not completely removed himself from the courtyard, the other residents may later go back and renounce their rights in his favor. And Shmuel stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. He maintains that this resident has completely removed himself from the courtyard. Therefore, there is no possibility of others subsequently renouncing their rights in his favor, as he is no longer considered a resident of the courtyard.

The Gemara rejects this comparison: Rav could have said to you: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion there, that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard also renounces his rights to his house, only because people do not live in a house without a courtyard, and therefore it is evident that he has renounced his rights to his house as well. However, with regard to whether or not the person himself is considered entirely removed from the courtyard to the extent that the others would be unable to then renounce their rights in his favor, did he state this? According to this explanation, it is possible that Rav’s opinion concurs with Rabbi Eliezer’s statement.

And Shmuel could have said: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis stated their opinion only there, where they ruled: That which he has renounced, i.e., his rights to his courtyard, is renounced; and that which he has not renounced, i.e., his rights in his house, is not renounced. However, from that which he has renounced, he has removed himself completely. Consequently, all agree that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard is no longer considered a resident of that place.

Rav Aḥa bar Ḥana said that Rav Sheshet said: This dispute between Rav and Shmuel is like an earlier dispute between tanna’im. We learned elsewhere in a mishna: If one gave away his rights to his share of the courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard by renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with the other residents on the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard, whether he did so unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he once again renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, as his action cancels his renunciation. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for the other residents; but if he did it unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited for them.

What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a person who renounces his rights does not remove himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may renounce his rights in favor of another, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first. As a result, even an inadvertent act of carrying serves to cancel the renunciation. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. In that case, only an intentional act of carrying can cancel the renunciation.

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa said in the name of Rava: No, everyone agrees that a person who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. And here, they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? One Sage, Rabbi Meir, who states that the resident always renders carrying prohibited for the others, holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, who states that the resident renders carrying prohibited for the others only if he acted intentionally, holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender.

Rav Ashi, disagreeing with the Gemara’s refutation, said: Rav and Shmuel disagree in the same dispute as do Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.

It was stated in the mishna that Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat. The mishna then continues with a discussion about how and whether the alleyway may be used on Shabbat. The Gemara first poses a question: A Sadducee; who mentioned his name? The mishna had thus far spoken only of a gentile, so why does Rabban Gamliel invoke an incident involving a Sadducee?

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete. It is missing an important element, and this is what it is teaching: The legal status of a Sadducee is like that of a gentile, and Rabban Gamliel says: The legal status of a Sadducee is not like that of a gentile. And Rabban Gamliel further said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat, and Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession of it before he changes his mind and takes out his utensils, in which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway.

And similarly, wasn’t it taught in a baraita that the status of a Sadducee is a matter of dispute between tanna’im: If one lives with a gentile, a Sadducee, or a Boethusian in the same alleyway, they render carrying prohibited for him. Rabban Gamliel says: A Sadducee or a Boethusian do not prohibit one from carrying. There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with Rabban Gamliel in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, and he renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat. Rabban Gamliel said to his sons: Hurry and take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person retracts his renunciation and takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway, as he renounced his rights in your favor; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before night falls and he prohibits you from using the alleyway.

The Gemara proceeds to analyze this baraita. The Master said previously: Take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway. The Gemara poses a question: Is that to say that, according to Rabbi Meir, if they took out their utensils and then afterward the gentile or Sadducee took out his utensils on Shabbat, he does not render carrying prohibited for them?