which is cited unattributed, i.e., it is one of his many opinions that are cited in the Mishna and baraitot without attribution. But the Rabbis say: Two people may slaughter one offering. According to the Rabbis, Rava’s difficulty remains: Let the mishna teach a case where they slaughtered it with two men, as the heifer does not render the first man who slaughters impure, as the slaughter did not yet begin, and the heifer renders the latter man impure.

And according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who holds that two people may not slaughter one offering, let the tanna of the mishna also distinguish and teach a case where one man slaughtered with two cloths on his head, starting the slaughter with one and replacing it with the other midway through the slaughter, as in that case, since halakhic slaughter is accomplished only at its conclusion, the first cloth is not rendered impure but the latter cloth is rendered impure. Rather, one must say that the tanna is speaking only in reference to cases involving the disqualification of the red heifer itself, but he is not speaking in reference to cases involving a fit red heifer, and no proof may be cited from here.

Rav Idi bar Avin raises an objection from a mishna (Pesaḥim 63a) to the opinion that halakhic slaughter is accomplished only at its conclusion. If one slaughters an animal for the sake of the Paschal offering on the fourteenth of Nisan after noon while he has leaven in his possession, he is flogged for violating the prohibition: “You shall not slaughter the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread” (Exodus 23:18). If he slaughtered the animal not for the sake of the Paschal offering, he is exempt from receiving lashes. And if he slaughtered the animal during the festival of Passover for the sake of the Paschal offering with leaven in his possession, he is exempt, because it is a disqualified Paschal offering, as it was slaughtered beyond its appointed time. But if he slaughtered the animal during the Festival not for the sake of the Paschal offering, but rather as a peace offering, he is liable for slaughtering the animal with leaven in his possession.

And we discussed this matter: The reason he is liable is due to the fact that his intent was to slaughter it not for the sake of the Paschal offering, but had he slaughtered it with unspecified intent he would be exempt, because the offering would be disqualified. Unless he specifically intends otherwise, the animal retains its status as a Paschal offering and is disqualified when sacrificed beyond its appointed time.

The Gemara asks: And why is he exempt? Doesn’t a Paschal offering sacrificed during the rest of the days of the year assume the status of a peace offering, and doesn’t one who slaughters a peace offering during the time when it is prohibited to possess leaven with leaven in his possession also violate the prohibition? Conclude from it that a Paschal offering sacrificed during the rest of the days of the year requires explicit revocation of its status; otherwise, it does not assume the status of a peace offering and it remains a disqualified Paschal offering.

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said: A response emerged from the group of scholars that discussed this matter, and they said: What are we dealing with here? It is with a case where the owners of the Paschal offering were ritually impure on the fourteenth of Nisan with impurity imparted by a corpse. In that case, the Torah commands (Numbers 9:10–11) that since they were unable to sacrifice the Paschal offering at the appointed time, the fourteenth of Nisan, they were deferred to the second Pesaḥ, the fourteenth of Iyyar. Since presumably the owner plans to use his Paschal offering on the second Pesaḥ, its unspecified slaughter in the interim stands to be offered for the sake of the Paschal offering, and it is that Paschal offering that requires revocation of its status. But other situations of a Paschal offering that is slaughtered beyond its designated time do not require revocation of the animal’s status, and it assumes the status of a peace offering.

Returning to the matter at hand, if a Paschal offering that is designated for use on the second Pesaḥ is slaughtered on Passover while one has leaven in his possession, he is exempt from receiving lashes because it is a disqualified Paschal offering. Granted, if you say that halakhic slaughter is accomplished from the beginning to the end of the act, the offering is disqualified from the beginning of the slaughter as a Paschal offering slaughtered beyond its appointed time. Therefore, one is exempt from receiving lashes. But if you say that halakhic slaughter is accomplished only at its conclusion, why is one exempt if he slaughtered the animal with leaven in his possession? Once he began and cut a bit of the siman, it is rejected from its status as a Paschal offering and can no longer be offered on the second Pesaḥ. Therefore, when he slaughters the other, remaining, portion of the simanim without specification, it is a peace offering that he is slaughtering.

Abaye said to Rav Idi bar Avin: Even if you say that halakhic slaughter is accomplished only at its conclusion, although it was rejected from the possibility of being sacrificed on the second Pesaḥ, was it rejected from the possibility of being redeemed and from the possibility of the monetary value of a Paschal offering being used to purchase an animal to be sacrificed on the second Pesaḥ? As long as the slaughter is not yet complete, redemption of the animal remains possible. Therefore, unspecified slaughter at that time is for the sake of a Paschal offering and one should be exempt from receiving lashes.

And if you would say that in order to redeem a consecrated item one requires that the animal be placed standing before the priest and it requires valuation (see Leviticus 27:11–12), and once it is slaughtered it is unable to stand, but didn’t we learn in a baraita: If one slaughtered, i.e., cut, two simanim in the animal or a majority of two simanim, and the animal is still convulsing, its halakhic status is like a living animal in every respect, and it may be redeemed until the convulsing ceases?

§ Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: One who cuts a siman in two or three places on the neck, and together the cuts constitute the requisite measure of slaughter, his slaughter is valid. Rav Yehuda adds: When I stated this halakha before Shmuel he said to me: We require a clear and obvious slaughter and in the case of cuts in two or three places there is no obvious slaughter.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish also holds that we require a clear and obvious slaughter, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: From where is it derived that slaughter must be clear and obvious? As it is stated: “Their tongue is a sharpened [shaḥut] arrow, it speaks deceit; one speaks peaceably to his neighbor with his mouth, but in his heart he lays wait for him” (Jeremiah 9:7). Just as an arrow clearly enters one part of the body, so too, the slaughter [sheḥita] must be clear and obvious.

Rabbi Elazar raises an objection from a mishna (30b): If two people are grasping a knife and slaughtering one animal, even if each is holding a knife and slaughtering one above and one below, with each one slaughtering at a different point in the neck, their slaughter is valid. But why is the slaughter valid according to the opinions of Shmuel and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? There is no clear and obvious slaughter, as each is cutting a different part of the neck.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Elazar: The mishna is referring to a case with one knife and two people, each holding one end of the knife, resulting in a single diagonal incision from above to below.

Rabbi Abba said to Rabbi Yirmeya: If so, is this what is taught in that regard in a baraita commenting on that mishna: One need not be concerned that perhaps each will render the animal a tereifa due to the other? Granted, if you say that the mishna is referring to a case of two knives and two people it works out well, lest you say: Let us be concerned that perhaps each will rely on the other that he will perform the slaughter properly, and neither will this one come to execute the cut on the majority of the simanim, nor will that one come to execute the cut on the majority of the simanim. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that one need not be concerned.

But if you say that the mishna is referring to a case of one knife and two people, that statement in the baraita should not have said: One need not be concerned that perhaps each will render the animal a tereifa due to the other; it should have said: One need not be concerned that because one is pulling in one direction and one is pulling in the other, perhaps each will cause the other to press the knife and thereby invalidate the slaughter.

Rabbi Avin said to him: Teach: One need not be concerned