In fact, such limbs and flesh are not prohibited by Torah law, as the slaughter does not render them as though they had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and the verse cited in the baraita is not a true derivation but a mere support. Accordingly, with regard to them, there is nothing other than a rabbinic mitzva to separate oneself from consuming them.

§ Rav Yosef sat before Rav Huna, and he sat and said: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: If one ate this hanging limb he is flogged for violating the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal. One of the Sages said to him: Do not listen to his statement in the name of Rav, as this is what Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav: If one ate this hanging limb he is not flogged.

Rav Huna said to Rav Yosef: Upon whose version of Rav’s ruling shall we rely? Rav Yosef turned his face away in anger and said to him: What is the difficulty? When I said in Rav’s name that one is flogged for eating a limb that had been hanging from an animal when it died, I was referring to a case of death by means other than slaughter, which renders the limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the animal’s death. When Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav that one is not flogged, he was referring to the case of a slaughter, which does not render the limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter and therefore serves to render the limb permitted for consumption.

§ Rava said: From where is this matter that the Sages stated derived: The death of an animal by means other than slaughter renders a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, whereas the slaughter of the animal does not render a limb as though it had already fallen off? As it is written with regard to the eight species of impure creeping animals: “And anything that these fall upon, when they are dead, it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). What does the term “when they are dead” serve to exclude? If we say it serves to exclude the time when they are alive, that principle is derived from: “And everything upon which any part of their carcass falls shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:35), which explicitly states that only their carcasses impart impurity. Rather, learn from the verse that death renders a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off, and slaughter does not render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: But this verse is written with regard to creeping animals, which do not require slaughter. How then can a halakha with regard to slaughter be derived from here? Rava said to him: If, because it is superfluous, this verse is not referring to the matter of creeping animals, which are not subject to the requirement of slaughter, apply it to the matter of an animal, which is subject to slaughter.

The Gemara objects: But the phrase “when they are dead, it shall be impure” is still necessary to teach a different halakha, i.e., that they impart impurity only when they are still in a state similar to their state at the time of their death, i.e., if they are moist they impart impurity, whereas if they are dry they do not impart impurity. The Gemara explains that “when they are dead” is written twice, once in the verse cited, and once in the previous verse, which states: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:31).

§ The Gemara returns to the dispute in the mishna (72a) with regard to a fetus that extended its foreleg and then its mother was slaughtered. Rabbi Meir holds that the foreleg is regarded as a carcass with the associated impurity, while the Rabbis hold that although it is not permitted for consumption, the slaughter prevents it from having the impurity of a carcass. With regard to this dispute, Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute concerns only the limb of a fetus that was alive when the mother was slaughtered; but concerning the case of the limb of a fetus that was dead when the mother was slaughtered, everyone agrees that slaughter renders the fetus’s limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and it imparts impurity as a limb from a living animal. But Rabba said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerning this case, where the fetus was alive, so too, there is a dispute between them concerning that case, where the fetus had died.

§ The mishna states that an eight-month-old fetus that was born alive is not rendered ritually pure by slaughtering it. The reason given is that the concept of permitting an animal through slaughter is never stated with regard to that kind of animal. The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in a discussion about whether slaughter renders a tereifa pure from the impurity of a carcass: An eight-month-old fetus that was born alive will prove the point, as even though there are other animals of that kind that are permitted through slaughter, its slaughter does not render it pure from having the impurity of a carcass. This refutes the claim that the issue of slaughter rendering an animal pure from having the impurity of a carcass is a function of whether or not the concept of slaughter applies to that kind of animal.

Rav Kahana said: The tanna of the baraita holds that even with regard to an eight-month-old fetus it can be said that there are animals of that kind that are permitted through slaughter, i.e., when they are still inside the womb and the mother is slaughtered; such an animal is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. Therefore, he cites the case of an eight-month-old fetus as a refutation. But the tanna of our mishna holds that the fact that this kind of animal is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother does not define it as a kind of animal concerning which there is a concept of slaughter, and therefore he holds that this case cannot be used as a refutation.

The Gemara asks: And according to that tanna of the baraita, who does use it as a refutation, from where does he derive that the slaughter of a tereifa renders it pure from having the impurity of a carcass? The Gemara answers that he derives it from that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if some domesticated animal, of which you may eat, dies, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The word “some” teaches that only some dead animals impart impurity as a carcass, but some dead animals do not impart impurity as a carcass. And what is it that does not impart impurity? That is a tereifa that one slaughtered.

§ Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If one inserted his hand inside the womb of an animal and slaughtered a nine-month-old fetus that was alive, what is the halakha? Does the slaughter performed inside the mother render the fetus permitted? The Gemara notes: This dilemma may be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it may be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

The Gemara elaborates: It may be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. It is possible that Rabbi Meir states in the mishna below that a nine-month-old ben pekua requires slaughter, and slaughter renders the animal permitted only in that case, because that statement may apply only in a case where the animal emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., once it was born alive. But if it is still inside its mother, its slaughter does not render it permitted.

Or perhaps even the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Meir and maintain that a nine-month-old ben pekua is permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter, would concede that the slaughter of the fetus itself also permits it. Perhaps with regard to such an animal the Merciful One considers four simanim, i.e., the windpipe and the gullet of the mother and the windpipe and the gullet of the fetus, to be fit for slaughter, and the fetus is permitted by the cutting of either pair.

Rav Ḥananya said: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from the mishna (72b), as it considers an animal that was born as a tereifa from the womb as one that never had a period of potential fitness. But if it is so, that one can slaughter a fetus in its mother’s womb, you find that actually it did have a period of potential fitness, as if one wants to, he can insert his hand into the womb and slaughter it before it develops into a tereifa.

Rava said to Rav Ḥananya: Teach that mishna as referring to a case where the fetus was formed as a tereifa from its outset while inside the womb, and you find such a case where a fetus has five legs, which certainly developed from the outset. Consequently, there was never a possibility of slaughtering it.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughtered an animal and found within it an eight-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was not full term, whether it was alive or dead, or a nine-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was full term, that was dead, that fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother, as it is considered part of its mother. Therefore, its blood is considered part of its mother’s blood and is prohibited, so one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed.

If he found within it a live nine-month-old fetus, it requires its own slaughter, as it is considered an independent full-fledged animal, and if one slaughters both the mother and fetus on the same day, one is liable for violating the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring on the same day; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Even when the fetus is nine months old, it is still considered part of its mother, and the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted for consumption.