The Gemara further states that the matter of consecration applies neither to the mitzva of the first sheared wool nor to the firstborn animal. The firstborn is consecrated from the womb, while the first sheared wool is non-sacred. By contrast, the animal tithe is consecrated by the owner when passed under the rod. And finally, the option of sale by the priest applies to the first sheared wool and the firstborn animal after the priest receives them, whereas the animal tithe may not be sold. The Gemara adds: And these halakhot common to the first sheared wool and the firstborn are more numerous than the halakhot shared by the first sheared wool and the animal tithe. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon should derive the verbal analogy between the first sheared wool and the firstborn.

The Gemara answers: Even so, Rabbi Shimon prefers to derive the halakhot of the first sheared wool, which apply to an ordinary non-firstborn animal, from those of animal tithe, which also apply to an ordinary animal. Rabbi Shimon maintains that the shared factor that the first sheared wool and the animal tithe apply to all animals, not only the first to emerge from the womb, is decisive and overrides the other shared halakhot.

§ The mishna states: The first sheared wool is in effect only with regard to sheep. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Ḥisda said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy between shearing mentioned in this context and shearing mentioned elsewhere. It is written here: “The first sheared wool of your flock [tzonekha], shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), and it is written there that Job says concerning the needy: “And he was warmed with the shearing of my sheep [kevasai]” (Job 31:20). Just as there, the verse is referring specifically to the shearing of sheep, as the term keves is used only with regard to a sheep, so too here, with regard to the first sheared wool, the verse is referring to sheep, despite the fact that the term tzon can be interpreted as referring also to goats.

The Gemara objects: But derive instead a verbal analogy concerning shearing mentioned in this context from shearing mentioned in the case of the firstborn animal: Just as the prohibition against shearing the firstborn also applies to a firstborn ox, so too, the halakhot of the first sheared wool should also apply to oxen. It is prohibited to shear a firstborn ox, as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “You shall do no work with the firstborn of your ox, and you shall not shear the firstborn of your flock” (Deuteronomy 15:19). From a straightforward reading of the verse, I have derived only that a firstborn ox may not be used for labor and that a firstborn of an animal from the flock may not be used for shearing.

The baraita continues: From where is it derived to apply the prohibition that was stated about that animal to this one, and the prohibition that was stated about this animal to that one? The verse states: “You shall do no work…and you shall not shear.” The conjunction “and” indicates that the two parts of the verse apply to both animals.

The Gemara explains: One cannot say that oxen are subject to the mitzva of first sheared wool, as the verse states with regard to this mitzva: “Shall you give him,” which indicates that the shearing is given to the priest himself, i.e., for him to wear, and not for use as his sack. The shearing of oxen is fit for use only as sackcloth, not as clothing.

The Gemara objects: If that is so, let one be obligated in the mitzva of the first sheared wool in the case of goats’ hair, as it too can be used for clothing. The Gemara explains: To be obligated in the first sheared wool we require an act of shearing, and goats’ hair is plucked, not sheared.

The Gemara asks: Who did you hear who accepts this reasoning that only an act of shearing renders one obligated in the mitzva of the first sheared wool? This is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, which the Gemara will soon cite. But Rabbi Yosei concedes that the obligation does exist without the act of shearing in a case where the usual manner of removing the wool is not by shearing. Since goats’ hair is not commonly shorn, the obligation of the first sheared wool should apply.

Rather, the Gemara provides a different source for the mishna’s statement. The reason that the mitzva of first sheared wool applies only to sheep is as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is stated in the verse following the source for the mitzva of first sheared wool: “For the Lord your God has chosen him out of all your tribes, to stand to serve in the name of the Lord, he and his sons forever” (Deuteronomy 18:5). The term “to serve” indicates that the first sheared wool that is given to the priest must consist of a matter fit for the Temple service, i.e., its size must be large enough for use for the priestly garments. Here too, the first sheared wool must be of a matter fit for Temple service, i.e., sheep’s wool, from which the priestly garments are woven.

The Gemara asks: But if so, for what purpose does the verbal analogy between shearing mentioned with regard to the first sheared wool and shearing mentioned with regard to the flock come? The Gemara answers: It is necessary for that which was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: In the case of sheep whose wool is hard, the owner is exempt from the first sheared wool, as it is stated: “And he was warmed with the shearing of my sheep” (Job 31:20). Since hard wool does not provide warmth, the mitzva of the first sheared wool does not apply to this wool.

§ It is taught in one baraita: If one shears goats, or washes sheep, which causes some of their wool to be detached, he is exempt from the obligation of first sheared wool with regard to this wool. And it is taught in another baraita: One who shears goats is exempt but one who washes the sheep is obligated to separate the first sheared wool from the wool that was washed off. The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction: It is not difficult, as this baraita, which requires one to separate the first sheared wool from the washed-off wool, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and that baraita, which exempts the washed off wool, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara cites the source of this dispute. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not completely remove the corner of your field when you reap, and you shall not gather the gleaning of your harvest; you shall leave them for the poor” (Leviticus 23:22). The phrase “the gleaning of your harvest” indicates that only such a gleaning is included, and not gleaning from picking. If one picks the crop by hand rather than harvesting it using agricultural tools, he is exempt from the mitzva to leave the gleanings for the poor. Rabbi Yosei says: Gleanings are only those that come due to harvesting using agricultural tools.

The Gemara expresses puzzlement at this baraita: The opinion of Rabbi Yosei is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. The Gemara explains: The entire baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and this is what the baraita is teaching: The phrase “the gleaning of your harvest” teaches that crops picked by hand are exempt from the mitzva, as Rabbi Yosei says: Gleanings are only those that come due to harvesting. The Gemara infers that just as Rabbi Yosei interprets the term “harvest” as exempting crops that were picked by hand, so too he derives from the term “shearing” that the mitzva of the first sheared wool does not apply to fleece that was washed off. The Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei with regard to the gleanings, likewise disagree with regard to the first sheared wool.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Rabbi Yosei concedes that the mitzva of gleanings applies to a case where the usual manner of harvesting is by picking, as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse cited above that Rabbi Yosei says: From the term “harvest” I have derived only the obligation of gleanings with regard to harvest. From where do I derive the obligation of gleanings with regard to one who uproots the crop?

The verse states: “And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not completely remove the corner of your field by reaping, and you shall not gather the gleaning of your harvest” (Leviticus 19:9). The superfluous term “by reaping” includes uprooting the crop. From where is it derived that the obligation extends to one who picked the crop by hand? The verse states: “When you reap” (Leviticus 23:22), which is also superfluous. It is derived from here that the mitzva applies to all ways of gathering the crop, provided they are the usual manner of harvesting that particular crop.

Ravina said to Ravi Ashi: We learn as well in a mishna (Pe’a 3:4) that discusses the mitzva to leave produce in the corner of the field for the poor [pe’a]: If one has garden beds of onions that are among the vegetables, Rabbi Yosei says that one leaves separate pe’a from each and every one of the beds. And the Rabbis say that one leaves pe’a from one garden bed for all of them. This indicates that Rabbi Yosei concedes that one is obligated to leave pe’a and gleanings from onions, despite the fact that they are picked by hand rather than harvested with tools. The reason is that this is the usual manner of gathering onions.

§ The mishna states: And how many is numerous? Beit Shammai say: It is at least two sheep, and Beit Hillel say: It is at least five sheep. The Gemara objects: Granted, according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, two sheep are also called tzon, as in the verse cited by Beit Shammai: “That a man shall rear a young cow and two sheep [tzon]” (Isaiah 7:21). Since the mitzva of the first sheared wool is written with regard to tzon, it is logical that it applies to two sheep. But what is the reasoning of Beit Hillel, who hold that the mitzva applies only to five sheep, due to the verse: “And five sheep [tzon] made” (I Samuel 25:18)? Why do they not apply the obligation using the broader criterion of two sheep, as the verse quoted by Beit Shammai clearly indicates that two sheep are also called tzon?

Rav Kahana said: The verse states: “Five sheep made [asuyot],” in plural. The plural form indicates that two mitzvot have been made, i.e., performed, with them. The two mitzvot are the first sheared wool and the gifts of the priesthood, a mitzva that applies to a single animal. If the two mitzvot have been performed only when there are five sheep, evidently the mitzva of the first sheared wool applies only to five sheep. The Gemara asks: Why can’t one say that the two mitzvot are the firstborn animal and the gifts of the priesthood?

The Gemara answers: The other mitzva cannot be the firstborn animal, as with regard to the firstborn, isn’t one animal obligated, i.e., doesn’t one animal render its owner obligated? Yet the verse states that one performs the two mitzvot only with five sheep. The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, with regard to the gifts of the priesthood, isn’t one animal obligated, i.e., doesn’t one animal render its owner obligated?Rather, Rav Ashi says: The term “made” should be understood as meaning that five sheep make their owner perform the first sheared wool and figuratively say to him: Stand and fulfill a mitzva, whereas less than five sheep do not obligate their owner in the mitzva of first sheared wool.

It was taught in a baraita of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, that he says in the name of his father: The obligation of the first sheared wool applies to one who owns four sheep, since a verse calls four sheep tzon, as it is stated: “If a man steals an ox or a sheep, and kills it or sells it, he shall pay five oxen for the ox, and four sheep [tzon] for a sheep” (Exodus 21:37).

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Had their statements, i.e., the opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, been based on statements of the Torah, and the statement of the Distinguished One [Beribbi], Rabbi Yosei, based on the texts of the tradition [kabbala], the Prophets and Writings, even so we would listen to the statement of the Distinguished One, Rabbi Yosei. All the more so now that their statements are based on texts of the tradition, as both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel derived their rulings from verses from the Prophets, while the statement of the Distinguished One, Rabbi Yosei, is based on the statements of the Torah.

The Gemara objects: But didn’t the Master say: The decision of a third opinion that compromises between the first two opinions is not considered decisive if it is based on considerations that were not mentioned by the other two opinions. Although Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is a compromise between the opinions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, it is based on a different source.