Or perhaps the mishna meant to teach a case of two rites. During the first rite, one had a particular intent, and during the second rite he had a different intent. Then, even according to Rabbi Meir, who said that in general we hold one accountable for the first expression, this rule applies only in one rite, but in two rites even he concedes that it disqualifies. Since the second statement was made during a different rite, it too is significant.

They said: To which part of the mishna does this discussion refer? If we say that the discussion pertains to the case in the mishna of slaughtering an offering first for a different purpose and then for its own purpose, then whether these intentions are verbalized during one rite or during two rites, whether according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir or according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, the offering is disqualified from the first statement, as also Rabbi Yosei holds that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement. That does not mean that the final statement is primary but that it too has value and complements the previous one. Therefore, since one initially intended to offer the Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it was immediately disqualified. Rather, the question is concerning the case of slaughtering an animal first for its own purpose and then for a different purpose; what exactly are the parameters of that case?

The Gemara cites a series of sources in order to resolve this question. Come and hear a resolution to the question from what is taught in the mishna: A Paschal lamb that one sacrificed for a different purpose, and he received the blood, and carried it to the altar, and sprinkled it for a different purpose, is disqualified. This needs clarification: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that the case is exactly as it was taught, that these four rites are all performed for a different purpose, why do I need to say that he intended to perform all of them, i.e., the slaughter, receiving of the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it upon the altar, for a different purpose? The offering has been disqualified from the first improper intention during slaughter.

Rather, is this not what the mishna is teaching: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered for a different purpose, or alternatively, he slaughtered it for its own purpose, but received the blood, and carried the blood, and sprinkled the blood for a different purpose, or alternatively, he slaughtered it, and received the blood, and carried the blood for its own purpose, but sprinkled the blood for a different purpose, in all these situations the offering is disqualified? If so, it is a case of different intentions in two rites, and the mishna can also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: For its own purpose and for a different purpose. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that one had these two intentions during two different rites, that is precisely the meaning of the first clause and there is no need to repeat it. Rather, must we not say that in this part of the mishna, one had both intentions during one rite, and the mishna is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement?

This proof is refuted: No, actually it is possible to explain that even the latter clause of the mishna is referring to a case in which one has conflicting intentions during two different rites, and the difference between the first clause and the latter clause of the mishna is as follows: The first clause is referring to a case in which one is standing at the time of the slaughter and thinking about slaughtering the animal as a different offering; alternatively, he is standing at the time of the sprinkling of the blood and thinking about sprinkling for a different purpose.

The latter clause of the mishna, on the other hand, is referring to a case in which one is standing at the time of the slaughter and thinking about sprinkling for a different purpose. For example, where he said: I am hereby slaughtering the Paschal lamb for its own purpose, but my intent is to sprinkle its blood for a different purpose. And the mishna teaches us a new halakha, that one can intend from one rite to another rite, meaning that one can disqualify an offering through an improper intention about an upcoming rite while performing an earlier rite. And this was the question raised by Rav Pappa on a different occasion. He asked if intent during one rite concerning the performance of a different rite can disqualify an offering.

Since our question has not been resolved, it is necessary to bring another proof: Come and hear that which is taught in the last clause of the mishna: Or for a different purpose and for its own purpose, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara analyzes this statement: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that it speaks about two rites, there is a difficulty: Now that you have already said that if the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be for its own purpose, and then performed a rite with the intention that it be for a different purpose, the Paschal lamb is disqualified, is it necessary to say that it is disqualified when the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be for a different purpose, and then performed a rite with the intention that it be for its own purpose? It is obvious that the offering is disqualified immediately with the first expression of intent.

Rather, isn’t the mishna addressing a case in which the priest has two intentions during one rite? And since the last clause of the mishna talks about one rite, the earlier clause of the mishna must also speak about one rite, and the mishna is according to Rabbi Yosei.

The Gemara refutes this proof: No, actually it is possible to explain that the last clause speaks about two rites, and by right it was not necessary to include this case, as it could have been inferred from the previous case. It was included for stylistic considerations: Since the mishna taught the case in which the rites are performed for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it also taught the case in which the rites are performed for a different purpose and for its own purpose.

The Gemara again attempts to bring a proof: Come and hear that which is taught in a different mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be for those who cannot eat it, i.e., for people who physically cannot consume it; or for those who were not registered for it, i.e., for people who did not register in advance for this particular offering; or for uncircumcised or ritually impure people, whom the Torah forbids from consuming the Paschal lamb, it is disqualified. Here, in the mishna cited, it is obvious that one had this intent during one rite, as the mishna explicitly states that he had this intent during the slaughtering. And since the latter clause, which is the next mishna, speaks about one rite, the first clause, which is the current mishna, must also speak about one rite, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara refutes this proof. Are the two cases comparable? Need they be exactly parallel? Perhaps this case is as it is, and that case is as it is. The latter clause, the next mishna, speaks about one rite, whereas the first clause, the current mishna, speaks either about one rite and is not according to Rabbi Meir or about two rites and is even according to Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara further proposes: Come and hear a solution based on what was taught later in that other mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid. This ruling must be clarified: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that one had two intentions during two different rites, e.g., he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and sprinkled the blood for those who cannot eat it, then the reason that the sacrifice is valid is that he had the disqualifying intention at the time of the sprinkling, which does not invalidate the offering because there is no intent concerning those who can eat it during the sprinkling. That is, intent to feed the Paschal lamb to those who are unable to eat it invalidates the offering only during the slaughter but not during the sprinkling.

But if one had both intentions during one rite, such as the slaughter, during which intent with regard to those who will eat the offering is effective, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, this conclusion is difficult, for we maintain that if only some of those who are to eat the Paschal lamb are unable to do so, such as in this case, the offering is not disqualified.