sharpness of the fruit remains present in the vinegar in its pure, unadulterated form, despite the fact that the vinegar itself is not sharp. Here, the sharpness of the fruit does not remain present in the vinegar in its pure, unadulterated form because it has already been used with the meat. Therefore, the vinegar is no longer potent enough to keep the blood in the meat.

It was taught in the mishna that one may not roast the Paschal lamb on a grill. Subsequently, the mishna quotes an incident in which Rabban Gamliel instructed his servant to roast the Paschal lamb for him on a grill. The Gemara expresses surprise: Was an incident cited to contradict what was previously stated? The Gemara responds: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching the following: And if it is a perforated grill, so that the fire reaches each part of the meat and the animal will not be roasted from the heat of the grill itself, it is permitted. And with regard to this Rabbi Tzadok said that there was an incident with Rabban Gamliel, who said to his slave Tavi: Go and roast the Paschal lamb for us on the perforated grill.

The Gemara cites a discussion related to the subject of roasting the Paschal lamb. Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi raised a dilemma before Rav Adda bar Ahava: In the case of an oven that one fired with peels of fruit that are orla, i.e., fruit that grows on a tree the first three years after it was planted, from which one may not receive any benefit, if, after the oven became very hot, he swept it and removed the fuel and the ashes, and he baked bread in it, according to the opinion that prohibits bread baked directly with heat from orla fuel, what is the halakha with regard to this bread? It was baked with the heat trapped in the oven only after the fuel was removed. He said to him: The bread is permitted.

Rav Ḥinnana said to him: But didn’t Rav Ḥinnana the Elder say that Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If there is an oven that one fired and swept so that the heat remains but there is no longer any fire in the oven, and one then roasted the Paschal lamb in it, this is not a fulfillment of the Torah’s command that the Paschal lamb must be roasted in fire, as it is stated in the Torah: “And they shall eat the meat on that night, roasted in fire, and matzot; with bitter herbs they shall eat it. Do not eat of it raw, nor boiled in water, but roasted in fire; its head with its legs and with its inner parts” (Exodus 12:8–9), and since it says the phrase: Roasted in fire, two times, the verse emphasizes that the Paschal lamb must literally be roasted on the fire?

The following can now be inferred: The reason is specifically because the Merciful One reveals this halakha with regard to the Paschal lamb in the Torah by repeating: Roasted in fire, roasted in fire, twice. But if the Merciful One had not revealed this halakha by emphasizing the need to roast it directly on the fire, I would have said a Paschal lamb roasted in an oven that has already been swept is nonetheless considered roasted in fire. Therefore, in other situations in which something is roasted in an oven, even if it is not roasted directly from the heat of a fire, its status should be comparable to something that was roasted directly from the fuel. If the fuel is forbidden, the food should be forbidden.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rav Ḥinnana bar Idi: The Merciful One reveals it there, with regard to the Paschal lamb, and we learn from it that even in other areas of halakha, only something that is roasted directly by a fire is considered roasted in fire.

And if you wish, say a different answer instead: There, in the case of the Paschal lamb, the reason one may not roast the lamb if one has already swept out the oven is that the Merciful One writes “roasted in fire” twice. But if the Merciful One had not written “roasted in fire” twice, I would have said that the Merciful One is particular about fire, meaning that the source of the heat in the oven should be fire, and even if one swept it, it is still considered roasted in fire. It was therefore necessary to repeat the phrase “roasted in fire.” But here, in the case of orla, the Merciful One is particular about the prohibited fuel, and it is not here in the oven. Therefore, there is no reason to prohibit the bread.

The Sages taught: If one cuts the Paschal lamb superficially in several places and places it on coals, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that this is considered roasted in fire, as coals have the status of real fire. Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a contradiction to Rav Ḥisda: Did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi actually say that coals are considered like fire?

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised a contradiction based on the Torah’s statement with regard to the laws of leprosy: “Or flesh that shall have on its skin a burn from fire” (Leviticus 13:24). From the fact that it says a burn from fire, I have derived nothing other than a case in which it is burned by fire itself; if it is burned by a coal, by burning ash, by burning lime, by burning plaster [gipsis], or by anything else that is burning and whose source of heat comes from fire, to include also water heated by fire, from where is it derived that these are also considered a burn from fire? The verse states: A burn, a burn, twice. By repeating the term, it includes all these types of burns.

The following can now be inferred: The reason is that the Merciful One includes these types of burns in the Torah through the words: A burn, a burn. But if the Merciful One had not included them through the repetitive expression a burn, a burn, one would have assumed that coals are not considered fire, which contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that any usage of the term fire includes coals as well.

He said to him: With regard to a red-hot wood coal, it is not necessary for the verse to include it. As long as it is burning, it is certainly considered a fire. Where a verse is necessary is with regard to a red-hot piece of metal that was heated by a fire. Without the verse, it would have been possible to think a person burned by hot metal it is not considered burned by fire.

The Gemara expresses surprise at the previous answer: And are red-hot pieces of metal not considered fire? But with regard to a daughter of a priest who committed adultery after betrothal, it is written: “And the daughter of a priest, if she profanes herself through adultery, she profanes her father; in fire she shall be burned” (Leviticus 21:9), and Rav Mattana said: They would not literally burn her in fire; rather, they would prepare for her a molten bar of lead. They would execute her by pouring molten lead down her throat. This proves that burning metal is considered fire.

The Gemara responds: It is different there, as the verse states not simply fire, but “in fire she shall be burned.” The expression “she shall be burned” comes to include all burnings that come from fire.

The Gemara suggests: If so, all the more so fire itself fulfills the requirement of burning. Let us surround her with bundles of branches and burn her with them. The Gemara responds: It comes from a verbal analogy between the word “burning” stated here and the word “burning” stated and in the context of the death of the sons of Aaron: Just as below, with regard to the sons of Aaron, the verse states that they were burned with fire (see Leviticus 10:2), and it was a burning of the soul and the body remained, as even their clothes were not burned, so too, here, with regard to the daughter of a priest, it means the burning of the soul and the body remains.

The Gemara challenges: Let us execute her with boiling water heated by fire. The Gemara answers: It is due to the statement of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said that the verse states: “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18). When executing someone, select for him a kind death. Even when someone must be executed, his dignity should be protected. He should be executed in the most comfortable way possible.

The Gemara asks: Once there is the reason of Rav Naḥman, why do I need the verbal analogy derived from the sons of Aaron? Even without it, Rav Naḥman’s ruling requires the court to carry out the execution with molten lead, which provides an easier death. Say in answer to this question: If not for the verbal analogy, I would have said that burning the soul while the body remains is not considered burning. And if it were only due to the statement of Rav Naḥman that one must select a kind death, we should add many bundles of branches so that she would die quickly. Therefore, the verbal analogy teaches us that executing with molten lead is considered burning.

But if it so that the verse says “she shall be burned” to include all methods of burning, for what do I need the expression “in fire”? The Gemara answers: To exclude lead from its source.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: Is it true that anywhere that it is written: “In fire she shall be burned” it comes to include all methods of burning that come from fire? But what of bulls that are burned, about which it is written: “And he shall burn it on wood in fire, where the ash is poured it shall be burned” (Leviticus 4:12), and it was taught in a baraita: In fire, and not in burning lime and not in burning plaster? Why aren’t all methods of burning permitted in this case as well?

He said to him: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the daughter of a priest, it is written: “In fire,” and the verse subsequently states that she shall be burned, which comes to include all methods of burning that come from fire. Here, in the case of a bull, it is written: “And he shall burn it on wood in fire.” At the end it says fire, to say that with regard to fire, yes, it may be used, but with regard to something else, no, it may not be used.

The Gemara objects: There, too, with regard to bulls that are burned, burning is written at the end, as it is written at the end of that verse: