CHAVRUTA SHABBAT - DAF KUF LAMED ALEF

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(And Rav is going according to his rationale, because Rav said: An alley only

becomes permitted to carry in it through a side-post and a beam if) there are at least

two houses opening into each courtyard, and at least two courtyards open into it (the

alley). Because this makes it into a public place.²

And here, once the courtyards have an eiruv that connects them to the houses, there are

houses and **no courtyards**, because the courtyards are nullified to the houses.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: If that is the reason, even if they did not make

an eiruv, we should regard these houses as if they are closed off because without an

eiruv one cannot carry from them into the courtyards.

And if so, it is as if there are only courtyards and no houses. So how can one carry in

this alley if there is no eiruv?

The Gemara answers: It is **possible that they** (the residents of all the houses) **all nullify**

their jurisdiction in the courtyard to one of the house owners, and then it is as if the

courtyard belongs to that person's house alone, and he will be able to carry from his

house to the courtyard (see Shulchan Aruch 380). Thus without an eiruv the alley will

have courtyards and houses.

¹ Because an alley opens to the public domain, to carry in an alley one has to make a symbolic partition from the public domain by placing a side-post next to one side of the alley where it meets the public

domain, or placing a beam over the opening.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in the end, there is one house, but not two houses. And Rav said that the alley requires two houses.

The Gemara answers: It is possible that from morning until midday, everyone nullifies their jurisdiction to one person, and from midday until evening they nullify it to another person. Thus two houses were connected to the courtyards in the course of Shabbat.

The Gemara argues that this is insufficient: But **in the end, at the time that there is this house** from where one may carry in the morning, **there is not that** house from which one may carry in the afternoon. So at no time are there two houses from which one may carry.

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Thus the Gemara is forced to give a different explanation of Rav's statement, that if the houses and courtyards did not make an *eiruv*, one can carry in the alley:³

Rather, said Rav Ashi: What causes the courtyards to be forbidden, that one cannot carry from them to the alley, and that one cannot carry things in the alley? The houses.

And there are no houses.

In explanation: Rav holds like Rabbi Shimon, that one is allowed to carry from a courtyard to an alley, and one is certainly allowed to carry in the alley itself. But this is

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² But if it does not have houses and courtyards open to it and it is more like a private courtyard, it needs more: not just one thin pole, but two thin poles - one on each side of the entrance, or one pole that is four *tefachim* wide. Mishnah Berurah 366:102.

³ And the Gemara retracts from its attempt to say that if there is an *eiruv* it is as if there are no courtyards.

only so if there is no *eiruv* between the houses and courtyards. But if there is an *eiruv*, this is forbidden. Why?

Because in an alley (for which one did not make *shitufei mavu'ot*)⁴ one is allowed to carry only utensils that were in the courtyard or alley when Shabbat came in,⁵ but one may not carry utensils that were in a house when Shabbat came in. Therefore, if there is an *eiruv* which allows the utensils of the house to be carried into the courtyard, the Sages were concerned that one may end up carrying those utensils from the courtyard to the alley.

Therefore they decreed that when there is an *eiruv*, and utensils from the houses might end up in the courtyard, one may not carry *anything* from the courtyard to the alley, or even carry anything four *ammot* in the alley itself.

Said Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said Rabbi Yochanan: Not for every case did Rabbi Eliezer say that preparations of a mitzvah supersede the Shabbat.

Proof for this is as follows: **Because the two breads** brought as an offering on Shavuot are an obligation of the day, and Rabbi Eliezer only derived the law that baking them supersedes Shabbat from a special *gezeirah shavah*. And if he held that preparations *always* supersede Shabbat, why did he need the *gezeirah shavah* in this case?

⁴ Shituei Mavu'ot is when the people of the courtyards make a joint partnership of the alley and is similar to making an *eiruv*.

⁵ Because such objects do not generally belong to any one house, so the rabbinical laws restricting carrying objects from place to place apply to them to a lesser extent.

⁶ I.e. when different verses have a similar wording, they are often connected. This is *gezeirah shavah*, one of the means by which Scriptural verses are interpreted. There are many verses with similar wording, and a *gezeirah shavah* interpretation is only made when there is a tradition of the Oral Torah (as handed down from Mt. Sinai) that these two verses are indeed linked.

Because it was taught in a Baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: From where do we know that the preparatory stages (baking) of the two loaves supersede Shabbat?

Because **it says "bringing" concerning the** *Omer* barley offering, brought on the second day of Pesach. For it says, "You shall *bring* the *Omer*, the first of your harvest to the cohen. And you shall count for you from the morrow of the Shabbat, from the day that you bring the *Omer* that is waved" (*Vayikra* 23:10).

And it says "bringing" concerning the two breads as it says: "From your dwellings, you shall *bring* bread of waving" (ibid verse 17).

Shabbat as the Gemara learns in Tractate *Menachot*, because it says, "Six days you shall work and on the seventh day you shall rest, in plowing and reaping you shall rest" (*Shmot* 34:21). Just as plowing (spoken of here) is regular plowing (because there is no plowing which is a mitzvah), so the reaping (here) is regular reaping, to exclude the reaping of the *Omer* which is a mitzvah. Thus we derive that reaping of the *Omer* supersedes Shabbat.

So concerning the "bringing" said concerning the two breads, preparations also supersede the Shabbat.

The Gemara now explains that the *gezeirah shavah* is *mufneh*, "open", i.e. it is based on superfluous words in both verses involved.

Because if is not *mufneh* but the words teach some other law, **one could refute** the *gezeirah shavah* by showing that there is a logical reason not to compare the two cases.

This would be the reason not to compare them: **what is** special **about the** *Omer* that its preparations supersede Shabbat? **That if one found** already **reaped** barley, but it was not reaped for the purpose of the mitzvah, **one cuts** some more, specially for the mitzvah. Because it says, "You shall cut—and bring."

But can you say the same concerning the two breads, that if one found wheat that was

reaped not for the mitzvah, one should reap more? Certainly not: one may not reap

more wheat for the mitzvah, rather one uses what one found.

The Gemara declares: In truth, as you said, it is indeed mufneh.

The Gemara explains why it is *mufneh*: Because **indeed**, it is written, "You shall *bring*

the Omer, the first of your harvest to the cohen" (Vayikra 23:10). Why do I need it to

also say, "From the day that you bring the Omer that is waved" (ibid)?

Rather, hear from this a proof that the superfluous phrase is to make the verse *mufneh*

so that we can have an irrefutable *gezeirah shavah* from "bringing" to "bringing."

The Gemara suggests that this is not sufficient: But still, it is mufneh from one side of

the gezeirah shavah because Omer has an extra phrase. But the other side of the gezeirah

shavah (the two breads) has no superfluous phrase and is not *mufneh*.

And we heard him (Rabbi Eliezer) **that he said:** If a gezeirah shavah is **mufneh** only

from one side, we learn from it, but also challenge its logic. And we saw that there is a

possible refutation to this *gezeirah shavah*.

The Gemara answers: The verse of the two breads that says, "From your dwellings you

shall bring bread of waving" (ibid verse 17), which is the other side of the *gezeirah*

shavah, is also superfluous. Because it said just before: "You shall offer a new flour

offering to Hashem," so why repeat that one must bring it? Therefore we see that the

gezeirah shavah is mufneh on both sides.

Before we said: "Not for everything did Rabbi Eliezer say that preparations for a mitzvah

supersede the Shabbat."

What does this come to exclude?

If you say to exclude lulay, that one cannot cut it from a tree on Shabbat—

But it was taught in a Baraita: Lulav and all its preparations supersede the Shabbat according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Rather you must say that it comes **to exclude** preparations (such as cutting branches off trees to make the roofing) of a **succah**.

This too is impossible, because it was taught in a Baraita: Succah and all its preparations supersede the Shabbat, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

But perhaps to exclude matzah.

That is impossible because it was taught in a Baraita: Matzah and all its preparations

(cutting wheat) supersede the Shabbat, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

But perhaps to exclude a shofar.

That is impossible because it was taught in a Baraita: Shofar and all its preparations supersede the Shabbat, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara finally answers: **Said Rav Adda bar Ahavah: To exclude** making **tzitzit for one's garment, and** writing **a mezuzah** to put **on one's doorway** (which are preparatory to the mitzvah of actually wearing the tzitzit, and having the mezuzah on the door). Here, Rabbi Eliezer agrees that preparations do not supersede Shabbat.

We also learnt so in a Baraita: They agree (Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages) that if one

put tzitzit on one's garment or made a mezuzah for one's doorway, that one is

liable⁷ for transgressing a Torah prohibition.

What is the reason Rabbi Eliezer agrees in these cases?

Said Rav Yosef: Because there is no set time for doing them.

Abaye said to him: On the contrary, because they have no set time...

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...every time of the day is their time. If one wears a four-cornered garment without

tzitzit or has no mezuzah on the doorway, one is neglecting a positive mitzvah every

moment.

Therefore the Gemara gives another reason why the mitzvah of tzitzit and mezuzah is

lighter, and its preparations do not supersede Shabbat:

But said Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, and it you want to say, Rav Huna the son of

Ray Yehoshua: Because it is in one's ability to make them (the garment or house)

ownerless. And once they are out of one's jurisdiction, they no longer need tzitzit or a

mezuzah.

⁷ I.e. obligated to bring a sin-offering.

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The Gemara now explains Rabbi Eliezer's sources in Scriptural verses for saying that

preparations of mitzvot supersede the Shabbat. The following few sections of Gemara are

almost identical to each other.

The master (in the Baraita) said earlier: Lulav and all its preparations supersede the

Shabbat according to Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara inquires: From where does Rabbi Eliezer know this?

If he learns it through a meh matzinu (by plain comparison) from the Omer and the two

breads, whose preparation suersede Shabbat, as we learned earlier—

There is no comparison: Those are different because they are the requirements of the

most High (i.e. they are sacrifices), and that is why their preparations supersede Shabbat.

The Gemara answers that lulav too is learned from a special verse: The verse says: "And

you shall take for you on the first day. Because the verse does not write "on the first,"

but adds the extra word "on the day" (bayom), it teaches that one can do preparations

even on Shabbat.

The Gemara proves that this extra word comes to specifically allow preparations: And

for what halachah do we allow preparation on Shabbat?

If you say to allow moving the lulay, that we are not concerned that it is muktzeh—

That cannot be, because we **do we need a verse to allow moving** *muktzeh*, which is only forbidden Rabbinically?

Rather, the word "on the day" must come **to** include the **preparations** of the lulav. That one can cut it off a tree on Yom Tov.

And the Rabbis, who say that preparations are forbidden, say that this phrase "on the day" is needed for something else: To teach that we take the lulav by day and not by night.

And Rabbi Eliezer, this law of by day and not by night, from where does he derive it?

The Gemara answers: He learns it from the verse, "And you shall rejoice before Hashem your G-d seven 'days." "Days" and not nights.

And the Rabbis reply that we cannot learn from the word "days" that lulav is only taken by day.

Because **you may have thought to derive** a *gezeirah shavah* from the words "**seven days**" of lulav to the words "seven days" of the **succah. Just as there**, the mitzvah of sukkah is seven **days and even** the **nights**, **so here** with lulav one may have thought that it is taken seven **days and even** the **nights**.

So it, the phrase "on the day", **tells us** that this is not so. Lulav is only taken by day, and thus there is no Scriptural source to teach us that preparations are permitted.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: And according to Rabbi Eliezer, let the Torah (lit.

Merciful One) write concerning lulav that preparations supersede Shabbat, and learn

from it (from lulay) that the preparation of *Omer* and the two breads supersede Shabbat?

Why is there a separate verse for *Omer* and the two breads?

The Gemara answers: **Because one could make a refutation** of such a comparison: One

could argue that what is special about lulay, that its preparations supersede Shabbat?

That it requires four species, all of which are necessary to fulfill the mitzvah. But Omer

and the two breads do not have that special quality, and therefore they require their own

verse.

A Baraita said earlier: Succah and all its preparations supersede the Shabbat,

according to Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara inquires: From where does Rabbi Eliezer know this?

If he learns it with a meh matzinu (by plain comparison) from the Omer and the two

breads whose preparation pushes away Shabbat—

There is no comparison: Those are different because they are the requirements of the

most High (sacrifices).

If you want to learn succah from lulay, that comparison too can be rejected, because it

(lulav) requires four species.

The Gemara answers that succah too is learned from a special verse: But he (Rabbi

Eliezer) learns a gezeirah shavah. He learns the words "seven days" written concerning

succah from the words "seven days" written concerning the lulav. Just as there (with

lulav) its preparations supersede the Shabbat, so too here in succah, its preparations

supersede the Shabbat.8

The Gemara raises a difficulty: And according to Rabbi Eliezer, let the Torah (lit.

Merciful One) write regarding succah that its preparations supersede Shabbat, and

learn that all the other things supersede Shabbat **from it** (from succah)?

The Gemara answers: Because one can make a refutation of such a comparison: One

can argue that what is special about succah that its preparations supersede Shabbat?

That it is a mitzvah that is done at night as by day.

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A Baraita wrote earlier: Matzah and all its preparations supersede the Shabbat,

according to Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara inquires: From where does Rabbi Eliezer know this?

If he learns it from the *Omer* and the two breads whose preparation supersedes

Shabbat—

There is no comparison: Those are different because they are the requirements of the

most High (sacrifices).

⁸ Even though this *gezeirah shavah* is not *mufneh*, because we already find that preparations push aside

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If you wish to learn matzah from lulav, that comparison too can be rejected, because it (lulav) requires four species.

If you wish to learn matzah from succah, that comparison too can be rejected, because it (succah) is used by day as by night.

The Gemara answers that matzah too is learned from a *gezeirah shavah*: **But he** (Rabbi Eliezer) **learns** the words "fifteenth" written concerning matzah from the words "fifteenth" written concerning the Yom Tov of Succot. Just as there (with succah) its preparations supersede the Shabbat, so here in matzah, its preparations supersede the Shabbat.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: **And** according to Rabbi Eliezer, **let the Torah** (lit. Merciful One) **write regarding matzah** that its preparations supersede Shabbat, **and learn from it** that all the other things supersede Shabbat?

The Gemara answers: **Because one can refute** such a comparison: One can argue that **what** is special **about matzah** that its preparations supersede Shabbat? **That it** the mitzvah of eating matzah is **kept by woman as by men.**⁹

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A Baraita wrote earlier: Shofar and all its preparations supersede the Shabbat, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

Shabbat in the *Omer* and two breads, over here the *gezeirah shavah* is merely revealing that the same applies to succah and does not have to be so powerful. Rashi.

⁹ Even though matzah is a positive, time-bound mitzvah from which women are generally exempt, the Sages learn from a certain verse that "whoever is bound by the restriction to not eat chametz, is bound by the obligation to eat matzah."

The Gemara inquires: From where does Rabbi Eliezer know this?

If he learns it from the *Omer* and the two breads whose preparation supersedes Shabbat—

There is no comparison: Those are different because they are the requirements of the most High (sacrifices).

If you want to learn shofar from lulav, that comparison too can be rejected, because it (lulav) requires four species.

If you want to learn shofar from succah, that comparison too can be rejected, because it (succah) is used at day and at night.

If you want to learn shofar from matzah, that comparison too can be rejected, because it (succah) is kept by woman as by men.

The Gemara answers that shofar too is learned from a special verse: **But the verse says:** "It shall be a 'day' of blowing (*teru'ah*) for you," and we learn from this, on that "day" and even if it is on Shabbat.

And the Gemara proves that this verse must be coming to allow preparations on Shabbat. Because **for what** do we learn that shofar supersedes Shabbat?

If you say for allowing the actual blowing—

That is impossible. But it was taught by the House of Shmuel: It is written: "You shall

do not laborious work" (Bamidbar 29:1), which means work that involves effort. This

excludes the blowing of a shofar and removing bread from an oven, which is a skill

and not an act of work. Therefore we do not need a verse to permit blowing the shofar

on Shabbat, since it is not a Torah prohibition.

Rather, the word "day" must be coming to tell us that the shofar's preparations

supersede Shabbat.

And the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer will tell you: That word "day" is

needed to teach that the shofar is blown by day and not by night.

And Rabbi Eliezer, from where does he know that the shofar is blown by day and not

by night?

The Gemara answers: Because it is written, "On the 'day' of atonement [in the Yovel l0]

year] you shall pass [i.e. blow] the shofar in all your land." And we learn the shofar

laws of Rosh Hashanah, and of Yom Kippur of Yovel, from each other. Because it is

written concerning Yom Kippur, "in the seventh month", and this is superfluous because

the Torah writes many times that Yom Kippur is in the seventh month. Therefore it is

coming to tell us that all the shofar blasts of the seventh month have the same halachot.

(Rashi quoting Rosh Hashana 33b). Therefore the shofar of Rosh Hashanah, too, is only

blown by day.

The Gemara asks: **And learn** all **those** other cases **from it** (from shofar)?

¹⁰ Jubilee

The Gemara answers: We cannot learn from the shofar blowing of Rosh Hashanah

because it is specially important. Because this shofar blowing brings the remembrances

of Israel to their Father in Heaven.

And we cannot learn from the shofar blowing of Yom Kippur of Yovel because it is

especially important: Because the master said: The Rabbinical Court blew the shofar,

and then slaves departed to their homes, and fields returned to their owners. Thus

this shofar blast has additional Halachic ramifications.

(The master said earlier in a Baraita): Milah and all its preparations (such as making a

knife) supersedes the Shabbat, according to Rabbi Eliezer.

The Gemara inquires: From where does Rabbi Eliezer learn that?

If he learnt from all of them (the cases we learnt until now), one can refute the

comparison as we said above.

And furthermore, what is special about them...