§ The Gemara comments: Rav Sheshet’s explanation of the contradiction between the first clause and latter clause of the baraita is difficult. Consequently, the Gemara cites different resolutions of this contradiction. Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Ravina, in contrast, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

The Gemara elaborates: Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is his interpretation: In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires ḥalitza from one of the brothers. Who are the brothers referred to here?

Rav Ashi explains that they are the newborn brothers, i.e., those who were born only after the brother betrothed her. Consequently, although this woman was the wife of the first deceased brother before they were born, after their birth she was already the wife of a living brother. Therefore, the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist never applied, and she requires ḥalitza. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that in a case of this kind the brothers are not considered to be coexisting.

Meanwhile, the latter clause speaks of a case where one of the brothers who was born in the lifetime of the first brother arose and betrothed her, after another brother had performed ḥalitza. In this case, she has no claims of a bill of divorce on him. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that the penalty of karet applies in this case, and therefore the betrothal is entirely invalid.

The Gemara continues its explanation of the opinions. Ravina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. How so? In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her and then died, she requires ḥalitza from one of the brothers. Who are these brothers? This is referring to the brothers already born in the lifetime of the first brother. In accordance with whose opinion is this interpretation? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who held that this case constitutes a regular prohibition. Consequently, the yevama is not exempt from the obligation of ḥalitza.

If one of the newborn brothers, who were born after the death of the first brother, arose and betrothed her, she has no claim on him. Since he is considered a brother who did not coexist with his deceased brother, the yevama is prohibited to him as a brother’s wife, and as this prohibition entails karet, the betrothal is invalid. This is the halakha even if he was born after the second deceased brother betrothed her. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist applies even to a brother’s widow who entered into levirate marriage before the younger brother was born.

It was stated that there is a similar dispute between amora’im with regard to one who had relations with his yevama and thereby performed the mitzva of levirate marriage as required, and one of the other brothers had relations with her rival wife. Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: The second brother is liable to receive karet. And the other one said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva. The verse: “Who does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), is a positive mitzva, as it teaches that one house may be built up, but not two houses, i.e., no more than one wife of a deceased brother may be married by one of his brothers. Any mitzva formulated as a positive injunction has the status of a positive mitzva, even if it is violated by the performance of an action, in the manner of a prohibition.

The Gemara explains: The one who said that he is liable to receive karet holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that after the mitzva is performed with one yevama who required levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother’s wife is once again fully applicable to her rival wife. And the one who said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara further analyzes the list of women exempt from levirate marriage. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The rival wife of a sota is forbidden. In this context, sota refers to an unfaithful wife. If the husband died, the unfaithful wife and her rival wife are exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage.

What is the reason for this? The term defilement is written in that passage dealing with an unfaithful wife: “She being defiled secretly” (Numbers 5:13), just as defilement is written with regard to those with whom relations are forbidden in the verse: “Defile not yourselves in any of these things, for in all these the nations are defiled, which I cast out from before you” (Leviticus 18:24). This teaches that the halakha of an unfaithful wife is like that of a woman with whom relations are forbidden; both she and her rival wife are exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza.

Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to this from the case of a woman who heard that her husband had died and remarried, only afterward to discover that he had still been alive at that time before dying later. What is the halakha in this case? Rabbi Shimon says: Her relations with or ḥalitza from the brother of the first husband exempts her rival wife. This shows that the obligation of levirate marriage applies to this woman. Although she lived as a married woman with someone else during her husband’s lifetime, Rabbi Shimon nevertheless maintains that her sexual intercourse or ḥalitza fulfills the mitzva of levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife. This suggests that the rival wife of an unfaithful wife requires levirate marriage.

The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you in response: I spoke to you about the halakha of a sota by Torah law, i.e., a wife who was intentionally unfaithful, and you speak to me of a sota by rabbinic law? The case you mentioned is an unavoidable accident, as the wife married another man only because she received testimony that her husband was deceased. When the Sages instituted that she was forbidden to both her first and second husbands, this was a penalty designed to ensure that women would examine testimony of this kind very thoroughly. However, this is not a case of a sota by Torah law, as she was not intentionally unfaithful, and therefore the mitzva of levirate marriage certainly applies to her.

Since this response is overwhelmingly obvious, the Gemara asks: And he who asked it, why did he ask it? There are apparently no grounds for this comparison at all. The Gemara explains: He held that all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law. Consequently, if a sota by Torah law is exempt from levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife as though she were a forbidden relative, the same should apply to a sota by rabbinic law.

Rav Ashi raised an objection to Rav’s opinion from a different source: The halakha is that a wife who was warned by her husband not to be secluded with a specific man and yet entered alone with him in private, and remained with him long enough to be defiled, i.e., sufficient time to have sexual relations, she is forbidden to her house, i.e., her husband, from that moment until she undergoes the sota ritual. And likewise, if she was the wife of a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, as she was possibly disqualified by unfaithfulness. And if he dies, she performs ḥalitza