that he must divorce his yevama with a bill of divorce and she does not also require ḥalitza. And he may remarry her, if he wishes, after the divorce; as the halakha is not ruled in accordance with the opinion that after he performs the mitzva she is once more forbidden to him as his brother’s wife. Why? There, too, let the halakha say that the verse states: “And consummate the levirate marriage [veyibbema],” as explained above, meaning that the first levirate bond is still upon her and she should also require ḥalitza.

The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse states: “And take her to him to be his wife” (Deuteronomy 25:5) to teach that once he has taken her, her legal status is that of his wife in every sense. The Gemara objects: If so, here too, in the case of a brother born after the levirate marriage, according to the opinion of the Rabbis this same principle should apply. The Gemara answers that The Merciful One states: “And consummate the levirate marriage [veyibbema],” that is, even after the marriage she is still considered to be the wife of the deceased brother [yevama] with respect to any brothers who are born later.

The Gemara asks: What did you see to distinguish in this way and say that once she is married the levirate obligation is totally abrogated with regard to ḥalitza, but that she remains prohibited as the wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist with respect to any brothers born in the future? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason to say: Toss that which is permitted on that which is permitted, and toss that which is prohibited on that which is prohibited. In other words, in cases where the woman becomes permitted to her yavam through levirate marriage, it stands to reason that this permitted state is absolute, but with regard to the prohibition against taking the wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist, it stands to reason that the verse comes to teach that she retains her prohibited status with respect to any brothers born in the future.

The Gemara suggests: But according to Rabbi Shimon, who said that since he came and found her in a permitted state a brother born subsequently may perform levirate marriage since she was never for a single moment prohibited to him; however, if that is so, consider the case of one’s maternal half sister, who married his paternal half brother; their marriage was fully permissible since the husband and wife were in no way related to each other. And then his brother was born and the married brother died; in that case, let the sister enter into levirate marriage with her newly born half brother for the same reason, i.e., since he came and found her in a permitted state, as when he was born she was already his brother’s wife.

The Gemara challenges this suggestion: How can you say that? What happened to the prohibition against marrying his sister, to where did it go? This widow is the maternal sister of the newly born brother and is therefore forbidden to him. The Gemara objects: If so, here too, one could have said: What happened to the prohibition against marrying the wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist, to where did it go? In this case as well, the prohibition against marrying the wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist already applied from the first brother, so why does Rabbi Shimon see this as abrogated by marriage? The Gemara answers that the comparison is unsound. This prohibition against marrying one’s sister has no case where it is permitted and so in this case is also not canceled, whereas that prohibition against marrying a brother’s wife has a case where it is permitted, when the mitzva of levirate marriage applies to a second brother and is therefore removed completely before the third brother is born.

MISHNA: The Sages stated a principle about a yevama: Whoever is forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations to her yavam neither performs ḥalitza nor enters into levirate marriage and is completely exempt. If she is forbidden by a prohibition resulting from a mitzva or by a prohibition stemming from sanctity, as will be explained later, then since in these cases the obligation of levirate marriage is not fundamentally nullified she performs ḥalitza in order to become free of the levirate bond, and due to her prohibition she does not enter into levirate marriage.

The Sages stated another principle: If two sisters who had been married to two brothers who subsequently died happened before the third brother for levirate marriage, and one of those sisters is a close relation to this third brother and is therefore forbidden to him, she is exempt from levirate marriage. But the other, her sister who is her yevama, i.e., her sister-in-law, performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. In this case, they are not ruled to be two sisters who happened before him simultaneously for levirate marriage, since one of them is prohibited to him as a forbidden relation, and therefore she never actually happened before him at all.

The mishna explains: A prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to secondary forbidden relationships, which are prohibited by rabbinic law. The Sages prohibited marriage to certain women who were not forbidden by the Torah but were nevertheless deemed forbidden incestuous relations. A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to marriage of a widow to a High Priest, a divorcée or a woman who has performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] to a common priest, a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzeret] or a Gibeonite woman to an Israelite, and also an Israelite woman to a Gibeonite or to a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer].

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: This principle stated in the mishna about yevamot, what other cases does it add? Since the entire list of cases involving a forbidden relation was already detailed in the first chapter, what is this mishna adding? Rafram bar Pappa said: It comes to include the case of a rival wife of a sexually underdeveloped woman [aylonit], who is incapable of bearing children. Not only does an aylonit herself not enter into levirate marriage, since she is unable to give birth, but her rival wife is exempt as well. And this is like the principle of Rav Asi, who said that the rival wife of an aylonit is forbidden because the aylonit herself remains prohibited to the yavam as the wife of his brother, as she was never rendered permitted by the obligation of levirate marriage. Therefore, her rival wife is the rival wife of someone prohibited as a forbidden relation.

And there are those who say that Rafram bar Pappa’s statement was made in a different context. It was taught in the mishna: Whoever is forbidden to her yavam by a prohibition of forbidden relations is completely exempt, which implies that it is specifically in such a case that her rival wife is forbidden. But any case when one wife is not forbidden by a prohibition of forbidden relations but is instead forbidden for some other reason, then her rival wife is not forbidden. This case comes to exclude what? Rafram said: It excludes the rival wife of an aylonit, who requires levirate marriage or ḥalitza because the aylonit is not prohibited as a forbidden relation. And this statement is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Asi.

The mishna states: Her sister who is her yevama performs ḥalitza or enters into levirate marriage. The Gemara clarifies this: Whose sister? If we say it is the sister of one who is forbidden due to a prohibition resulting from a mitzva, since by Torah law she is cast before him for levirate marriage, then this would in fact simply be a case of two sisters who fell simultaneously before him, both requiring levirate marriage, since according to Torah law there is no prohibition against entering into levirate marriage with such a woman. If so, it turns out that he encounters the sister of the woman with whom he has a levirate bond; but that case has already been taught. Rather, it must refer to the sister of a woman who is forbidden to him by a prohibition of forbidden relations, and since he may not enter into levirate marriage with a forbidden relation, her sister is not considered to be the sister of a woman with whom he has a levirate bond. Therefore, the sister may be taken in levirate marriage.

The mishna states that a prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to secondary forbidden relationships, which are prohibited by rabbinic law. The Gemara asks: Why is this called a prohibition resulting from a mitzva? Abaye said: This is because it is a mitzva to listen to and obey the words of the Sages.

The mishna states: A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to a marriage of a widow to a High Priest, or a divorcée or a ḥalutza to a common priest. The Gemara asks: Why are these called a prohibition stemming from sanctity? As it is written with regard to the priests: “They shall be sacred to their God…they shall not take a woman that is a harlot, or profaned; neither shall they take a woman divorced by her husband” (Leviticus 21:6–7).

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda switches the terms: A prohibition resulting from a mitzva is referring to a widow to the High Priest, or a divorcée or a ḥalutza to a common priest. And why is this called a prohibition resulting from a mitzva? As it is written in summarization at the end of Leviticus: “These are the mitzvot that the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel in Mount Sinai” (Leviticus 27:34).

A prohibition stemming from sanctity is referring to secondary relationships forbidden by rabbinic law. And why is this called a prohibition stemming from sanctity? Abaye said: Whoever fulfills the words of the Sages is called sacred. Rava said to him: The language you use is not precise, since if so, whoever does not fulfill the words of the Sages is not called sacred, which implies that he is also not called wicked. However, anyone who transgresses the words of the Sages is in fact referred to as wicked. Rather, Rava said that the reason why this is called a prohibition stemming from sanctity is that the term sanctity indicates differentiation or separation, and there is a principle that you must sanctify yourself by refraining from that which is permitted to you by Torah law. The Sages decreed against secondary forbidden relations so that one would not eventually come to transgress Torah law.

The mishna states that the levirate bond of a widow to a High Priest requires her to perform ḥalitza, and she may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara comments: The halakha that a widow does not enter into levirate marriage with a High Priest is taught categorically, merely in a general manner. It is no different whether she is a widow from marriage or she is a widow from betrothal alone.

Granted, she certainly may not enter into levirate marriage if she is a widow from marriage, since she is forbidden to the High Priest by the positive mitzva stated in the verse: “And he shall take a wife in her virginity” (Leviticus 21:13), and by the prohibition stated in the verse: “A widow, or one divorced…these he shall not take” (Leviticus 21:14). And a positive mitzva, levirate marriage, does not override both a prohibition, not marrying a widow, and a positive mitzva, marrying a virgin, together. However, if she is a widow from betrothal, then there is only a prohibition, as she is still a virgin. In that case, why not say that the positive mitzva of levirate marriage should come and override the prohibition against marrying a widow from betrothal?

Rav Giddel said that Rav said in response: The verse states: “His yevama shall ascend to the gate to the Elders and say: My brother-in-law refused to establish a name for his brother in Israel, he did not wish to consummate the levirate marriage” (Deuteronomy 25:7). As there is no need for the verse to state: “His yevama,” since it is clear to whom the verse refers and no new information is added by this word, what is the meaning when the verse states: “His yevama”? It comes to teach that there is one yevama who ascends for ḥalitza but may not ascend for levirate marriage, and her brother-in-law is not given a choice. Who is this? This is a woman with whom it is prohibited for her yavam to enter into levirate marriage, as he would be liable for the violation of a prohibition, and the positive mitzva of levirate marriage does not override the prohibition.

The Gemara asks: Say that this is referring to those women who are forbidden and would be liable to receive the penalty of karet as well, i.e., that these too may not enter into levirate marriage but nevertheless require ḥalitza. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And if the man does not wish to take his yevama” (Deuteronomy 25:7). This implies that if he wishes, he takes her in levirate marriage; it depends upon his wishes. However, one who is eligible for levirate marriage is eligible for ḥalitza. And conversely, one who is ineligible for levirate marriage is ineligible for ḥalitza and therefore does not require ḥalitza at all. Since those relations that carry a penalty of karet have no possibility of entering into levirate marriage, they do not require ḥalitza either.

The Gemara asks: If so, those relations who are forbidden as he would be liable for the violation of a standard prohibition also should not require ḥalitza, as they may not enter into levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: But the Merciful One included one category of yevama who is eligible for ḥalitza alone and not levirate marriage through the term: “His yevama.” The Gemara asks: And what did you see to conclude that the additional term is referring to relations who are forbidden and with whom he would be liable for the violation of a prohibition and not those who are liable to receive karet?