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Steinsaltz

What is the reason for the ruling of Rabban Gamliel that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce? It is because he is uncertain with regard to a bill of divorce whether it effectively precludes levirate marriage or whether it does not preclude levirate marriage. Similarly, he is uncertain with regard to levirate betrothal, whether it effectively acquires the yevama or does not acquire her at all. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to a bill of divorce, he is uncertain as to whether it precludes levirate marriage or does not preclude it. If the first bill of divorce precludes levirate marriage, what did he do by giving the latter bill of divorce, as it has no substance? Alternatively, if the first bill of divorce does not preclude levirate marriage, neither does the latter preclude levirate marriage.

Likewise, with regard to levirate betrothal, he is uncertain as to whether it acquires the yevama or does not acquire her. If the first levirate betrothal effectively acquires the yevama, what does the last one accomplish? And if the first one does not acquire her, the last one also does not acquire her. For this reason Rabban Gamliel maintains that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce was given, and similarly levirate betrothal is not effective after levirate betrothal was performed.

Abaye raised an objection to his opinion from a baraita: And Rabban Gamliel concedes that a bill of divorce is effective after levirate betrothal and levirate betrothal is effective after a bill of divorce. If a yavam gave a bill of divorce to one yevama and then performed levirate betrothal with the other, or the reverse, both actions would be effective. And he also concedes that a bill of divorce is effective after intercourse and levirate betrothal such that if the yavam engaged in levirate betrothal with one yevama, engaged in intercourse with a second, and gave a bill of divorce to a third, the bill of divorce is effective and he is prohibited from marrying the relatives of the third yevama. And he concedes that levirate betrothal is effective after intercourse and a bill of divorce, such that if he gave a bill of divorce to one woman, engaged in intercourse with a second, and performed levirate betrothal with a third, the levirate betrothal is effective and the third woman requires a bill of divorce.

And if Rabban Gamliel is uncertain with regard to the efficacy of levirate betrothal or a bill of divorce, then the third action should never be effective. Either the initial levirate betrothal or bill of divorce was completely effective, in which case any subsequent action is not effective, or these actions are not effective at all and the intercourse that followed them should be like intercourse performed at the beginning, and it should serve to acquire the yevama completely, and any actions performed afterward with the rival wife should be of no account. For we learned in the mishna: With regard to intercourse, when it is at the beginning, nothing is effective after it. Consequently, Rabban Gamliel’s ruling is difficult.

Rather, Abaye said: Actually, it is obvious to Rabban Gamliel that a bill of divorce precludes levirate marriage, and that levirate betrothal acquires the yevama. Nevertheless, the Sages said that with regard to this yevama, in one respect a bill of divorce is effective for her, and in another respect levirate betrothal is effective for her, but they are not effective in the same manner. Therefore, a bill of divorce given after a bill of divorce does not preclude levirate marriage, as the first bill of divorce has already precluded it for him as much as he can preclude it by means of a bill of divorce. And levirate betrothal performed after levirate betrothal does not acquire her, as the first levirate betrothal has acquired her for him as much as possible. However, with regard to a bill of divorce after levirate betrothal, and levirate betrothal after a bill of divorce, this action precludes levirate marriage and that action acquires the yevama. Since the acquisition of levirate betrothal and the nullification of a bill of divorce work in different ways, there can be both an acquisition and a nullification, and therefore one can be effective after the other.

However, the Rabbis maintain that the Sages instituted for each and every one of the brothers-in-law both the nullification of a bill of divorce and the acquisition of levirate betrothal for a yevama, and they decreed that these should be effective for each of the yevamot. Therefore the strength of the first bill of divorce or levirate betrothal is equal to that of the second one, and both are effective.

Abaye proceeds to explain the rest of Rabban Gamliel’s teaching in the baraita: And this invalid intercourse, i.e., intercourse that was performed after a disqualifying action, such as levirate betrothal or a bill of divorce, is superior to levirate betrothal and also inferior to levirate betrothal: It is preferable to levirate betrothal in the following respect: whereas levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal is not effective at all, intercourse after levirate betrothal is effective, because intercourse acquires a yevama according to Torah law. And it is inferior to levirate betrothal, for whereas levirate betrothal after a bill of divorce according to Rabban Gamliel acquires the entire remainder of the woman left by the bill of divorce, such that any further levirate betrothal would be ineffective, intercourse after a bill of divorce does not acquire the entire remainder of the woman left by the bill of divorce, as it is not considered valid intercourse, and a subsequent levirate betrothal is effective.

§ The Sages taught: How, i.e., in what case, did Rabban Gamliel say that a bill of divorce is not effective after a bill of divorce? In the case of two yevamot who happened before one yavam and he gave a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one. Rabban Gamliel says: He performs ḥalitza with the first one and is forbidden to marry her relatives, as she is his ḥalutza, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one. Because the bill of divorce he gave the second woman is of no consequence at all, she is merely the rival wife of his ḥalutza, and he is therefore permitted to marry her relatives.

But the Rabbis say: If he gave a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one, he is forbidden to marry the relatives of both of them, and he must perform ḥalitza with one of them. And you would say the same with regard to two yevamim and one yevama. If the two yevamin gave one yevama a bill of divorce, one after the other, Rabban Gamliel maintains that the bill of divorce of the second yavam is of no account, and he is therefore permitted to marry her relatives, whereas the Rabbis hold that it is effective in that it renders him forbidden to her relatives.

How, with regard to what circumstance, did Rabban Gamliel say that there is no levirate betrothal after levirate betrothal? In a case of two yevamot who happened before one yavam, and he performed levirate betrothal with this one and levirate betrothal with that one, Rabban Gamliel says: He gives a bill of divorce to the first one and performs ḥalitza with her, and is forbidden to her relatives, but he is permitted to the relatives of the second one, as the levirate betrothal performed with the rival wife is ineffective. But the Rabbis say: He gives a bill of divorce to both of them, as the levirate betrothal is effective for both women, and he is forbidden to the relatives of both of them; and as for ḥalitza, he must perform it with one of them. And you would say the same with regard to two yevamim and one yevama. If the first yavam performed levirate betrothal with the yevama, and the second yavam consequently performed levirate betrothal with her, they are both required to give her a bill of divorce and both are forbidden to marry her relatives.

The Master said above in the baraita: He gives a bill of divorce to this one and a bill of divorce to that one. Rabban Gamliel says: He performs ḥalitza with the first one and is forbidden to marry her relatives, and he is permitted to marry the relatives of the second one. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Shmuel? For Shmuel said: If he performed ḥalitza with the woman who received a bill of divorce, the rival wife is not exempted by this invalid ḥalitza. The yavam must therefore repeat the ḥalitza with the rival wife as well. This appears to contradict the baraita, where Rabban Gamliel rules that he has to perform ḥalitza with only one of the yevamot.

The Gemara answers: Shmuel could have said to you: When I said my above teaching, it was in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the levirate bond is substantial, and he must therefore perform a valid ḥalitza in order to cancel this bond. A ḥalitza performed with a woman who received a bill of divorce is not powerful enough to completely cancel the bond of the rival wife who did not performed ḥalitza. But Rabban Gamliel holds that the levirate bond is not substantial, and therefore any ḥalitza that releases one of the women also serves to release the other.

The Gemara asks: But if so, from the fact that Rabban Gamliel holds that the levirate bond is not substantial,

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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