§ Rav attached the following question for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi between the lines of a letter he sent him: With respect to brothers who mortgaged a certain property, what is the halakha? Is this property subject to seizure, if need be, for the benefit of the daughters’ dowries? Rabbi Ḥiyya was sitting before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi when the letter arrived. He said to him: What is meant in the question? Did they sell the property or did they pledge it as a guarantee, so that it has not yet been transferred? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, said to him: What difference does it make? Whether they sold it or pledged it, the court may appropriate the property for support for the daughters’ dowries, but the court may not appropriate it for their sustenance.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rav himself, if he is raising a dilemma about a case in which they sold the property, let him write explicitly that he is asking about an instance in which they sold the property. And if he is raising a dilemma about a case in which they pledged the property, let him write explicitly that he is asking about an instance in which they pledged the property. Why does Rav instead employ an ambiguous term?

The Gemara answers: Rav was raising a dilemma about both cases and thought: If I write to him that they sold the property, then it works out well if he sends back to me the ruling that the court may appropriate the sold property for the daughters’ dowries. In that case, I would also understand that all the more so, if the brothers merely pledged the property, the court would appropriate it for the dowry. But if he sends to me the reply that the court does not appropriate sold property, still the case in which they pledged the property will be a dilemma for me.

Alternatively, if I write to him that the brothers pledged it, then if he sends to me the response that the court does not appropriate it, I can infer that all the more so if the brothers sold it we do not collect from the buyer. And if he sends me the response that the court does appropriate the land for the daughters’ dowries, still the case in which they sold the property will be a dilemma for me. Therefore, I will write to him that they mortgaged it, which implies this meaning and it implies that one, and in this way I will receive a complete answer to my question.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whether it is this or whether it is that, the court does not appropriate assigned or sold properties for either the support or sustenance of the daughters. A dilemma was raised before them: Is it that Rabbi Yoḥanan did not hear this ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but had he heard it, he would have accepted it? Or, perhaps, is it that even if he had heard it, he would not have accepted it?

The Gemara proposes an answer, indicated by a dispute of amora’im: Come and hear a proof, as it was stated that amora’im disputed a certain case. The Sages debated the halakha with regard to one who died and left behind two daughters and a son, and the first daughter advanced and took one-tenth of the estate for her dowry, but the second daughter did not have enough time to collect her one-tenth before the son died. When the daughters divide the remaining assets, are they divided equally, or does the second daughter receive a slightly larger sum, commensurate with an additional portion earmarked for the dowry that she has not yet collected?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The second daughter forfeited her right to an equal one-tenth of the estate for a dowry. No specific funds are separated from the estate as a dowry before the inheritance is divided equally among the daughters. Rabbi Ḥanina said: The Sages said something even greater than this with respect to her support: The court appropriates liened property for support, but it does not appropriate it for sustenance. And yet would you, Rabbi Yoḥanan, say that the second daughter forfeited her right to collect even when the property is not liened? It cannot be that her support is diminished merely because of her brother’s death.

The Gemara understands that there is evidence within the exchange that Rabbi Yoḥanan knew Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion and nevertheless ruled against it. And if it is so, that Rabbi Yoḥanan never heard the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, then let Rabbi Yoḥanan say to Rabbi Ḥanina: Who stated that, that property is appropriated for the dowry? Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan must have known and rejected Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s ruling. The Gemara rejects the proof: And perhaps he actually did not hear it; but had he heard it, he would have accepted it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled as he did because it is different there, in the case in which the son died, since there is abundance in the house. Since the second daughter receives half of all the inheritance, she is not concerned about the one-tenth of the estate.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If that is so, according to that logic, then if she had found a generic lost object, as there is abundance in the house due to the value of the newly found article, so too would we not give her one-tenth of the estate? Since finding a lost object, or similarly, being independently wealthy, does not actually change her right to collect her full dowry, it stands to reason that she should collect the full dowry even when she inherits half of the remaining estate. He said to him: I would say this is true of abundance in the house that comes from these properties of the estate. Because the matter depends upon her share of the inheritance, when she commands a sizeable portion of the inheritance, she does not quibble over the one-tenth of the inheritance earmarked for her dowry. However, if she has other resources unrelated to the inheritance, her independent wealth cannot diminish her share of the inheritance with respect to the dowry.

§ With regard to the fundamental right of daughters to receive the support of the dowry from the estate, Ameimar said: A daughter is considered an inheritor. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: According to your opinion, if another inheritor wants to remove her from among the inheritors by giving her money instead of inherited property, is he indeed unable to remove her? May she insist on receiving actual property from the estate for the purpose of her dowry? He said to him: Yes, she may insist on inherited property. Rav Ashi continued to ask Ameimar: If he wants to remove her by giving her one specific piece of land, is he also unable to remove her, since, as an inheritor, she has the right to collect portions of all the property? He said to him: Yes, he is limited in this way. She may insist on her right to inherit from the entire property.

In contrast to Ameimar, Rav Ashi said: A daughter is legally considered a creditor with regard to the inheritance, and the inheritors may insist that they will provide her support by any means, without giving her a share of the actual inheritance. The Gemara notes: And even Ameimar retracted his opinion that she is an inheritor, as Rav Minyumi, son of Rav Niḥumi, said: I was standing in front of Ameimar, and this woman came before him, as she was asking for one-tenth of her father’s estate. And I saw that his opinion was that if the inheritor wants to remove her by giving her money, he may remove her, as I heard from the woman’s brothers that they were saying to her: If we had sufficient money, we would pay your claims and remove you with our own money. And Ameimar was silent and did not say anything to them. Since Ameimar did not object to their suggestion in principle, evidently he agreed that her status was that of a creditor, who may be repaid in cash.

The Gemara comments: And now that you have reached a conclusion and said that the daughter is functionally a creditor, is she a creditor of the father or of the brothers? The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is there a practical difference? Either way, as the father has died, she receives her support from the estate. The Gemara answers: There is a difference with respect to collecting intermediate-quality land without an oath and inferior-quality land with an oath. If she is the father’s creditor, she may collect from the estate only the inferior-quality land with an oath. If, however, she is the brothers’ direct creditor, she may collect her claim in the same manner as standard creditors, collecting intermediate-quality land without an oath.

What is the halakha? Whose creditor is she? The Gemara responds: Come and hear a proof, as Ravina provided one-tenth of the estate for the daughter of Rav Ashi from two sources. From Mar, son of Rav Ashi, Ravina gave her intermediate-quality land without an oath. He collected another portion of the property from the orphan son of Rav Sama, son of Rav Ashi, who was an inheritor of the same estate from his grandfather. This portion was provided of inferior-quality land, with an oath. Since, with regard to the property that Rav Ashi’s daughter was collecting from an orphan, Ravina required an oath and allowed her to collect only low-grade land, it appears that Ravina treated the daughter as the creditor of the sons and not of the father.

The Gemara records a number of related incidents. Rav Neḥemya, son of Rav Yosef, sent a message to Rabba bar Rav Huna the Small, of Neharde’a: When this woman bearing this letter comes before you, provide her one-tenth of her father’s estate, providing a percentage even of the land upon which sits the millstone [itzterubela], as this is also real estate. Rav Ashi said: When we were students in Rav Kahana’s house, we would collect the one-tenth of the estate for the dowry even from the income from the rental fees for houses in the estate. Since this money is earned from the real estate itself, it too is considered in calculating the appropriate dowry.

The Gemara recounts an interaction between Rav Anan and Rav Huna. Rav Anan sent the following letter to Rav Huna: Huna, our friend, we wish you peace. When this woman bearing this letter comes before you, provide her one-tenth of her father’s estate. Rav Sheshet was sitting before him, and Rav Huna said to him: Go and say to Rav Anan my reply. Knowing that Rav Sheshet may be hesitant to relay the sharp language of the reply, Rav Huna cautioned him: And whoever does not say to him my exact words is in a state of excommunication: Anan, Anan, should the one-tenth be provided from real estate or from movable property? And, incidentally, tell me who sits at the head in the house of a marzeiḥa?

Rav Sheshet went before Rav Anan and reverentially said to him, addressing him in the third person: My Master is a teacher, but Rav Huna is the teacher of the teacher. Moreover, he readily excommunicates whoever does not say to him, i.e., to you, my teacher, his precise message, and if it were not that he would excommunicate me, I would not say his words: Anan, Anan, should the one-tenth be provided from real estate or from movable property? And, incidentally, tell me who sits at the head in the house of a marzeiḥa?

Rav Anan went before Mar Ukva to consult with him about Rav Huna’s reply. He said to him: Let the Master see how Rav Huna sent me an offensive message, addressing me as Anan, Anan. Moreover, with regard to this word marzeiḥa in the letter that he sent me, I do not know what it is. Mar Ukva said to him: Say to me, my friend [izi],