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SteinsaltzHere, too, with regard to the Temple treasury, apply the same principle and say: A person is prone to make false statements so as not to make himself appear sated. It is therefore possible that the money was not owed, and payment should not be made from the consecrated property. The Gemara answers: When does Rav Huna say that payment should be made there, in the case of a person on his deathbed who consecrated all his property? In a case where the creditor, to whom the deceased admitted owing money, holds a promissory note corroborating the deceased’s admission. The Gemara comments: By inference, the statement of Rav and Shmuel, where the money is not given to the creditor unless the person on his deathbed explicitly requests that it be given, is applicable in a case where the creditor does not hold a promissory note corroborating the admission. The Gemara asks: If so, how can it be that if the deceased says: Give him the money, the children give it to him, i.e., it is collected from the estate left to the heirs, as it is a loan by oral contract, and as Rav and Shmuel both say: One does not collect a loan by oral contract from heirs nor from purchasers who bought land from the debtor after the loan was granted? The Gemara gives a different answer to this question. Rather, Rav Naḥman said: Both this case and that case are discussing where the creditor holds a promissory note corroborating the deceased’s admission. And yet it is not difficult. In this ruling of Rav Huna, the case is where the creditor’s promissory note has been ratified by the court, and in that ruling of Rav and Shmuel, the case is where the creditor’s promissory note has not been ratified by the court. Therefore, in the latter case, if the person on his deathbed says: Give him the money, he has in effect ratified the creditor’s promissory note, and if he did not say: Give him the money, he has not ratified the creditor’s promissory note. § Rabba says that in the case of a person on his deathbed who says: So-and-so has one hundred dinars in my possession, and the orphans who inherited his property subsequently said: We repaid the debt, they are deemed credible. But if the father said: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so, as I owe it to him, and subsequently the orphans said: We repaid him the money, they are not deemed credible. The Gemara objects: Isn’t it the opposite [kelappei layya]? The opposite is more reasonable. If the father says: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so, since their father stated the matter assertively, as he gave an explicit directive, it could be said that the heirs repaid the money. But if he said: So-and-so has one hundred dinars in my possession, since the orphans’ father did not state the matter assertively, it could be said that the heirs did not repay the creditor. The Gemara reformulates Rabba’s statement: Rather, if Rabba’s statement was stated, it was stated as follows: In a case of a person on his deathbed who says: So-and-so has one hundred dinars in my possession, and the orphans subsequently said: After his admission, Father retracted his words and said to us: I repaid the debt, they are deemed credible. What is the reason for this? At first the father had forgotten, but subsequently he remembered repaying the debt. But if the father says assertively: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so, and the orphans subsequently said: Afterward Father retracted his words and said: I repaid the debt, they are not deemed credible. The reason is that if it is so that the father repaid the debt or was uncertain about the matter, he would not say with such assertiveness: Give the money to him. § Rava raises a dilemma: With regard to a person on his deathbed who, upon hearing someone’s monetary claim against him, admitted owing the money to him, what is the halakha? Is it required for him to say to two people: You are my witnesses, as is usually necessary in order to prove that an admission is stated in earnest and not in jest? Or is it perhaps not required for him to say: You are my witnesses, since he is a person on his deathbed, whose instructions are generally binding? Is it required that he say to two people: Write my admission in a document, as is usually required, or is it not required for him to say: Write my admission in a document? The issue in question here is: Does a person sometimes jest at the time of death, i.e., while on his deathbed, or can it be assumed that a person does not jest at the time of death? After Rava raised the dilemma, he then resolved it, and ruled: A person does not jest at the time of death, and therefore the statements of a person on his deathbed are considered as if they were written in a document and transmitted to the relevant party. MISHNA: One who lends money to another by means of a promissory note can collect the debt from liened property that had been sold to others by the debtor after the loan was granted. One who lends money by means of witnesses, without recording the loan in a promissory note, can collect the debt only from unsold property. Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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