Now that the generalization and the detail are distant from each other, i.e., they are written in different verses, the verses serve to include one who was found guilty of idol worship, as he is similar to the blasphemer in all matters. He too is subject to be hung after he is executed.

And Rabbi Eliezer, by contrast, interprets the verses based on the principle of amplifications and restrictions. The phrase “And he is put to death, and you shall hang him” is an amplification. The phrase “For he that is hung is a curse of God” is a restriction. Were the amplification and the restriction right next to each other, we would apply the principle of amplifications and restrictions and include only one who is guilty of idol worship, as he is similar to the blasphemer in all ways. Now that they are distant from each other, the verses serve to include all those who are liable to be stoned to death. All of their corpses are hung after they are put to death.

§ The mishna teaches that according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, the corpse of a man is hung facing the people while the corpse of a woman is hung facing the tree, whereas the Rabbis say that the corpse of a woman is not hung at all. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning behind the opinion of the Rabbis? The Gemara answers: As the verse states: “And if a man has committed a sin worthy of death, and he is put to death, and you shall hang him on a tree” (Deuteronomy 21:22), which teaches that you shall hang him on a tree after his death, but you shall not hang her on a tree after her death. And Rabbi Eliezer would respond that that the inference to be drawn from this verse is that after his death they hang him by himself, without his clothing.

The Gemara asks: And from where do the Rabbis derive that the corpse of the executed man is hung without his clothing? The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that they agree that the word “him” teaches that the corpse is hung without clothing. But the source of their ruling is the verse that states: “And if a man has committed a sin,” which indicates that a man is hung after he is put to death, but a woman is not hung after she is put to death.

The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Eliezer, what does he learn from this clause of the verse: “And if a man has committed a sin”? Reish Lakish says: That clause of the verse serves to exclude a stubborn and rebellious son, who, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, is not hung after he is executed, because he is not a man. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: A stubborn and rebellious son is first stoned and afterward his corpse is hung; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer? Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: That part of the verse comes to include a stubborn and rebellious son, that his corpse is also hung. What is the reason for this?

The Gemara explains: As the verse states: “And if a man has committed a sin,” indicating that only the corpse of a man is hung, but not that of a child, thereby excluding a stubborn and rebellious son. And the word “sin” indicates that only the corpse of one who is put to death on account of a sin is hung, to the exclusion of a stubborn and rebellious son, who is executed not because of a sin that he has already committed but on account of what he is likely to do in the future. This is an example of a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, as both expressions indicate that a stubborn and rebellious son is not hung after he is put to death. And there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify the halakha and include additional cases. In this case, it serves to teach that the corpse of a stubborn and rebellious son is hung after he is put to death.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Eliezer said to the Rabbis: Did Shimon ben Shataḥ not hang in Ashkelon women who were found guilty of witchcraft? And the Rabbis replied that no proof can be brought from there since he hanged eighty women on a single day, which clearly indicates that this was an extraordinary measure and therefore cannot serve as a precedent for normative halakha. Rav Ḥisda says: They taught that one court may not judge two capital cases on one day only when the two cases involve two different modes of execution, but when they involve only one mode of execution, the court may in fact judge them on the same day. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But the incident relating to Shimon ben Shataḥ involved only one mode of execution, as all the women were accused of witchcraft, and yet the Rabbis said to him that the court may not judge them on one day.

Rather, if a ruling was stated citing Rav Ḥisda, this is what was stated: They taught that one court may not judge two capital cases on one day only when the two cases involving one mode of execution are similar to two cases involving two different modes of execution. And what are the circumstances of such a situation? For example, when there are two different transgressions that are punishable by the same mode of execution, the court may not judge two such cases in one day. But where there is only one mode of execution and only one transgression, the court may in fact judge two cases on one day.

Rav Adda bar Ahava raises an objection from a baraita that states: The same court may not judge two people charged with capital transgressions on one day, not even an adulterer and an adulteress. This indicates that a court may not judge two cases on one day even if the two cases involve only one mode of execution and the same transgression. Rav Ḥisda interpreted the baraita as referring to a case of adultery involving the daughter of a priest and the man with whom she engaged in intercourse, as the daughter of a priest is liable to receive death by burning, while the man is liable to receive death by stoning if the woman was betrothed to another man, or strangulation if she was married to another man.

Or, the baraita is referring to a case of adultery involving the daughter of a priest and those who rendered as conspiring witnesses the witnesses who rendered as conspiring witnesses the witnesses who testified about her.

It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: I heard that the court may administer lashes and capital punishment, even when not required by Torah law. And they may not administer these punishments with the intention of violating the statement of the Torah, i.e., to disregard the punishment stated in the Torah and administer another punishment; rather, they may administer these punishments to erect a fence around the Torah, so that people will fear sinning.

And an incident occurred involving one who rode a horse on Shabbat during the days of the Greeks, and they brought him to court and stoned him, not because he deserved that punishment, as riding a horse on Shabbat is forbidden only by rabbinic decree, but because the hour required it, as people had become lax in their observance of Shabbat and therefore it became necessary to impose the severe punishment for a relatively minor offense. Another incident occurred involving a man who engaged in intercourse with his wife in public under a fig tree, and they brought him to court and flogged him, not because that punishment was fitting for him, as such conduct is not forbidden by the Torah, but because the hour required it. People had become remiss in matters of modesty; therefore, stringent measures had to be taken to rectify the situation.

MISHNA: How do they hang the corpse of one who was put to death by stoning? They sink a post into the earth with a piece of wood jutting out, forming a T-shaped structure. And the court appointee then places the dead man’s two hands one upon the other, ties them, and hangs him by his hands. Rabbi Yosei says: The post is not sunk into the ground; rather, it leans against a wall, and he hangs the corpse on it the way that butchers do with meat.

The dead man hangs there for only a very short time, and then they immediately untie him. And if he was left hanging overnight, a prohibition is transgressed, as it is stated: “His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but you shall bury him that day, for he that is hung is a curse of God” (Deuteronomy 21:23). That is to say: Were the corpse left hanging on the tree overnight, people would ask: For what reason was this one hung after he was put to death? They would be answered: Because he blessed God, a euphemism for blasphemy. And therefore the name of Heaven would be desecrated were the dead man’s corpse to remain hanging, reminding everybody of his transgression.

Rabbi Meir said: The phrase “for he that is hung is a curse [kilelat] of God” should be understood as follows: When a man suffers in the wake of his sin, what expression does the Divine Presence use? I am distressed [kallani] about My head, I am distressed about My arm, meaning, I, too, suffer when the wicked are punished. From here it is derived: If God suffers such distress over the blood of the wicked that is spilled, even though they justly deserved their punishment, it can be inferred a fortiori that He suffers distress over the blood of the righteous.

And the Sages said not only this, that an executed transgressor must be buried on the same day that he is killed, but they said that anyone who leaves his deceased relative overnight with-out burying him transgresses a prohibition. But if he left the deceased overnight for the sake of the deceased’s honor, e.g., to bring a coffin or shrouds for his burial, he does not transgress the prohibition against leaving him unburied overnight.

After the executed transgressor is taken down he is buried, and they would not bury him in his ancestral burial plot. Rather, two graveyards were established for the burial of those executed by the court: One for those who were killed by decapitation or strangled, and one for those who were stoned or burned. Once the flesh of the deceased had decomposed, they would gather his bones and bury them in their proper place in his ancestral burial plot. And soon after the execution, the relatives of the executed transgressor would come and inquire about the welfare of the judges and about the welfare of the witnesses, as if to say: We hold no grudges against you, as you judged a true judgment.