due to the fact that the halakhot of a nazirite and those of a sin-offering are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same principle, and two verses that teach the same principle do not teach that principle by analogy.

The Gemara elaborates: The derivation that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance in the case of a nazirite is that which we stated above. With regard to a sin-offering, what is the derivation that permitted material combines with prohibited material? As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Anything that touches in its flesh shall become consecrated” (Leviticus 6:20). I might have thought that non-sacred meat that touched any part of a sin-offering is rendered prohibited even if it did not absorb the taste of the sin-offering it touched. Therefore, the verse states: In its flesh shall become consecrated, to teach that this meat is not consecrated until the taste of the sin-offering is absorbed within its flesh.

The baraita continues: Shall become consecrated means that its legal status becomes like that of the sin-offering itself; that is, if the sin-offering is disqualified, this meat will also be disqualified. And if the sin-offering is valid, the meat that touched it may be eaten in accordance with the more stringent standards of a sin-offering as far as when and where it may be eaten. The principle that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance applies in the case of a sin-offering as well. Therefore, the principle cannot be extended to the entire Torah, as a halakha stated in two cases is not applied elsewhere.

The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis as well, let the cases of a nazirite and a sin-offering be considered two verses that come as one and they do not teach the principle that the legal status of taste is like that of the substance with regard to the entire Torah.

The Gemara answers that the Rabbis say: Both of these cases are necessary as they could not have been derived from each other. Therefore, they are not two verses that come as one and it is possible to derive a principle from these two halakhot.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, who does not derive a general principle from these verses, would respond by asking: In what way are they necessary? Granted, if the Merciful One had written this principle only with regard to a sin-offering, one would not derive the halakha of a nazirite from it, as we do not derive halakhot of non-sacred objects from those of consecrated objects. Certain stringencies and strictures apply only to consecrated property. However, let the Merciful One write this principle with regard to a nazirite, and you could bring the case of the sin-offering and derive it from the case of a nazirite, just as the application of this principle to all prohibitions in the Torah is derived from the halakha of a nazirite. Since this principle is stated in both cases unnecessarily, these are two verses that come as one, and one cannot derive a principle from them.

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, as they maintain that the principle that the legal status of the taste of a prohibited substance is like that of the substance itself is not limited to these two cases, they would say to you that both sources are necessary. The case of the sin-offering is necessary to derive the principle that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance, as one cannot derive the halakhot of non-sacred food from consecrated property. And the term soaked, which appears in the context of the halakhot of a nazirite, teaches the principle that the legal status of taste is like that of the substance. Since both examples are necessary, they are not considered two verses that come as one, and it is therefore possible to derive a principle from them. And consequently from here you derive the halakha with regard to all of the Torah in its entirety.

The Gemara asks: And how could Rabbi Akiva respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva would say that both cases teach the principle that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance, and they are indeed two verses that come as one, to teach about the same issue. And the rule is that any two verses that come as one do not teach overarching principles.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: But with regard to that which is taught in a baraita: The verse: “He shall eat nothing that is made of the grapevine, from the grape skins to the grape seed” (Numbers 6:4), taught with regard to prohibitions of a nazirite that these substances join together. If the nazirite ate only a small amount of each substance that when joined together constitute the measure that determines liability, he is liable. Now the following question arises: According to Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that prohibited and permitted substances join together, is it necessary to teach that one prohibited substance joins together with another prohibited substance? Apparently, according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, this derivation is unnecessary.

Rav Kahana said to him that this derivation is necessary because the two cases are not identical: Whereas prohibited and permitted substances combine only when they are eaten simultaneously, prohibited and other prohibited substances join together even when eaten one after the other. In other words, if a nazirite eats half an olive-bulk of grape skins and then eats half an olive-bulk of grape seeds, he is liable according to Rabbi Akiva.

MISHNA: With regard to dough that is in the cracks of a kneading bowl, if there is an olive-bulk of dough in one place, one is obligated to remove it. And if the dough does not add up to this amount, it is nullified due to its insignificance.

And similarly, with regard to the halakhot of immersion to purify the bowl from ritual impurity, if one is particular about the dough that is stuck in the cracks and he plans to remove it and use it, it is a foreign substance that interposes between the kneading bowl and the water of the ritual bath, and invalidates the immersion of the bowl, leaving it ritually impure. And if he wants the dough to remain in place, its status is like that of the kneading bowl itself and is not an interposition.

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught that one is obligated to remove a combined olive-bulk of leaven only in a case where the pieces of dough are not in a position where they serve to reinforce the kneading bowl. However, in a case where they serve to reinforce the bowl and they will remain there for this purpose, he is not obligated to remove them; he may simply render them null and void.

The Gemara concludes: This proves by inference that with regard to less than an olive-bulk, even in a place where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, one is not obligated to remove it.

Some teach the statement of Rav Yehuda with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: And if the dough is not an olive-bulk, it is nullified due to its insignificance. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught that one is obligated to remove less than an olive-bulk of dough in one place only in a place where it serves to reinforce the bowl; however, in a place where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, one is obligated to remove it. This proves by inference that if there is an olive-bulk of dough in one place, even in a place where it serves to reinforce the bowl, one is obligated to remove it.

The Gemara comments: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the first version of Rav Yehuda’s statement, and it was taught in a different baraita in accordance with the latter version of his statement. The Gemara elaborates: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the first version of Rav Yehuda’s statement: With regard to dough that is in the cracks of a kneading bowl in a place where it is serves to reinforce the bowl, it does not interpose and invalidate the immersion for ritual impurity, and one does not violate the prohibition against having leaven in his possession during Passover. And in a case where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, it interposes, and one violates the prohibition against having leaven in his possession on Passover. In what case is this statement said? It is in the case of an olive-bulk of dough; however, in a case where there is less than olive-bulk, even in a case where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, it does not interpose and one does not violate a prohibition by having it in his possession.

And it was taught in a different baraita in accordance with the latter version of Rav Yehuda’s statement: With regard to dough that is in the cracks of a kneading bowl, in a place where it serves to reinforce the bowl,