The phrase: Out of two hundred, is expounded with regard to wine brought as a libation: From the remaining two hundred portions that remain in the vat. This is referring to a case where wine prohibited as produce grown during a tree or vine’s first three years [orla] is mixed with permitted wine. The halakha is that this wine mixture may be brought as a libation only if there is two hundred times more permitted wine than prohibited wine. From here it is derived that orla is nullified in a mixture of two hundred.

The phrase: From the well-watered pastures of Israel, means that sacrifices may be offered only from that which is permitted to Israel. From here, the Sages stated: One may not offer libations from untithed produce [tevel], since Jews are prohibited from eating tevel.

I might have thought that one may not offer an animal that is set-aside on Shabbat or during a Festival; therefore, you have said: Just as tevel is unique in that its inherent prohibition caused it to be prohibited for Jews to eat, so too, anything whose inherent prohibition caused it to be prohibited for Jews to eat is invalid as an offering. This excludes an animal that has been set aside, which does not have an inherent prohibition that caused it to be prohibited for eating; rather, a different prohibition, i.e., the prohibition of utilizing set-aside objects on Shabbat, caused it to be prohibited for eating. And if you say the prohibition of utilizing set-aside material is by Torah law, what difference is there to me if a food is inherently prohibited; and what difference is there to me if it is prohibited due to a different prohibition? If there is a distinction between these prohibitions, it must be that the prohibition of utilizing set-aside material is by rabbinic law, and therefore, like many other rabbinic decrees, it does not apply in the Temple.

And furthermore, Abaye said to Rabba: It is possible to challenge your interpretation of the baraita from a different angle. Wasn’t it you who said, as cited in tractate Makkot, that there is division of labors with regard to Shabbat, and therefore one is required to bring two sin-offerings if he performed two prohibited labors of different primary categories in one lapse of awareness, or if he performed a prohibited labor twice, during separate lapses of awareness; however, there is no division of labors with regard to a Festival, and therefore one is not punished with multiple floggings for performing multiple prohibited labors? Consequently, how could one be liable for multiple floggings for the prohibition of utilizing set-aside materials and for cooking the sciatic nerve on a Festival?

Rather, in order to make this baraita consistent with Rabba’s opinion, remove the prohibition of kindling a fire and add in its place the prohibition of using the wood of a tree designated for idolatry [asheira]. And the warning, i.e., the source of the negative commandment associated with using this wood, is derived from here, a verse that relates to an idolatrous city that is burned: “Nothing from the spoil shall cling to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18).

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Abaye: If this case is referring to using wood from an asheira, one should also be flogged due to having transgressed the prohibition of: “You shall not bring an abominable thing into your home” (Deuteronomy 7:26). However, this would add an extra negative commandment to the list enumerated in the baraita.

Rather, remove the prohibition of kindling a fire and add in its place the prohibition of burning consecrated wood. And the warning, i.e., the source of this negative command, is from here: “And you shall burn their asheira trees with fire...you shall not do this to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4). Therefore, one who burns a consecrated item in a destructive manner is punished with lashes. In conclusion, no adequate proof can be adduced from the baraita to reject Rabba’s opinion.

Rami bar Ḥama said: This dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rabba with regard to the principle: Since, etc., is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the mishna. As, Rabbi Eliezer, who says that ḥalla should be separated only after the bread has been baked, holds that we say the principle: Since, etc. Since any portion of the dough could potentially be eaten if another part of the dough is designated as ḥalla, therefore, one is permitted to bake bread without separating ḥalla from it ab initio. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: We do not say the principle: Since, etc.

Rav Pappa said that this claim can be rejected in the following manner: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer only stated that we say the principle: Since, etc., there, in the case of the separation of ḥalla, because at the time that it was placed into the oven, each and every loaf was fit for him, and there was no indication as to which loaf he would designate as ḥalla. However, here, in a case where the bread one is baking on the Festival is fit for guests but is not fit for him, say that so too, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer we do not say the principle: Since, etc.

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, rejected Rami bar Ḥama’s statement for a different reason and said: Perhaps that is not so. Rabbi Yehoshua only stated that we do not say the principle: Since, etc., there, where there is one portion of the bread that is not fit for him or for guests, because the piece that is designated as ḥalla cannot be eaten by anyone due to the fact that it is ritually impure. However, here, in the case of one who is baking bread during the Festival so that it can be eaten on a weekday, when it is at least fit for guests, say that so too, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, we say the principle: Since, etc.

The Gemara recounts: The Sages said Rami bar Ḥama’s statement before Rabbi Yirmeya and Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Yirmeya accepted it and Rabbi Zeira did not accept it. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: The following matter has been difficult for us to explain for several years: With regard to what principle did Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? Now an explanation has been stated in the name of a great man. Shall we not accept it?

He said to him: How can I accept it? We already learned in a baraita with regard to their dispute: Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to your statement, one violates the prohibition: “You shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:9). Rabbi Eliezer could not respond to this claim and was silent. But if it is as Rami bar Ḥama explained, Rabbi Eliezer should have said to him: The reason for my opinion is due to the principle: Since, etc., on the basis of which no prohibited labor has been performed.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: According to your reasoning, with regard to that which we already learned in a baraita, that Rabbi Eliezer said to him: According to your statement, he transgresses the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, and in response to this challenge Rabbi Yehoshua was silent, did he too not respond to Rabbi Eliezer? He responded to him in the mishna, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehoshua said: This is not the leavened bread about which we are warned with the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found. Rather, it must be explained in the following manner: He appeared to be silent in the baraita simply because his response was not recorded, but he responded in the mishna. So too, here it is possible to say that he appeared silent in the mishna, but he responded in a different tractate.

It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha with regard to the separation of ḥalla from impure dough during Passover is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of ben Beteira.

The Gemara asks: How much dough may be kneaded at once on Passover without concern that the dough will become leavened in the process? Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: With regard to wheat, one may use the amount of flour that comes from two kav of grain; and with regard to barley, one may use the amount of flour that comes from three kav. Rabbi Natan says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The matters are reversed. One may knead the flour produced from three kav of wheat or two kav of barley without concern that it will become leavened.

The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: With regard to wheat, one may use the amount of flour that comes from three kav of grain, and with regard to barley, one may use the amount of flour that comes from four kav? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this latter baraita is referring to low-quality grain, and that baraita is referring to high-quality grain. One can obtain a higher proportion of flour from high-quality grain than from low-quality grain, which contains a greater amount of chaff.

Rav Pappa said: Learn from this that the extent to which low-quality wheat is worse than high-quality wheat is greater than the extent to which low-quality barley is worse than high-quality barley, i.e., the discrepancy between the different levels of quality is more significant with regard to wheat, as there, in the case of wheat, they differ by one-third; and here, in the case of barley, they differ by only one-fourth.

Rav said: A kav from the place Melogna is the amount that can be used to prepare dough for Passover. And similarly, with regard to ḥalla, that is the minimum amount of dough from which ḥalla must be separated. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: