And furthermore, the disqualification following from a change in sanctity applies after death. If one consecrates an offering and dies, his son must bring the offering in his place, and it can be invalidated through a change in sanctity. Moreover, it applies to communal offerings as it does to the offerings of an individual. However, can you necessarily say the same thing with regard to a change in owner that does not have these characteristics? Its disqualification is not in the offering itself; and it does not apply to all four rites but only to the sprinkling of the blood on the altar; and it does not apply after death, for after the owner has died there is no true owner of the offering, and therefore, if the priest intends to offer it for someone else the offering remains valid; and it does not apply to communal offerings as it does to the offerings of an individual, since it is not possible to have in mind a different owner, as it is owned by the whole community.

And even though two of these differences are not fully accurate and can be disputed, as will be explained, two, at least, are accurate. The Gemara explains the lack of accuracy: For what is different about a change in owner that defines its disqualification as not being in the offering itself? Is it that its disqualification is merely due to thought? If so, it is possible to say that a change of sanctity is also merely a disqualification due to thought and not in the offering itself, and therefore there is no real difference.

And furthermore, with regard to that which was said, that a change in owner does not apply after death, there is the following difficulty: According to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, who said that the disqualification resulting from a change in owner applies after death, so that if the offering of the deceased was brought for a different person, the son of the deceased must bring another offering in his father’s name, what is there to say? However, at least two of these differences are accurate.

Rather, Rav Pappa’s suggestion should be rejected, and Rava said: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with a change of owner is considered like one that does not have an owner. In other words, it is considered like a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered not for the sake of its owner at its proper time on Passover eve, and it is disqualified.

MISHNA: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for people who cannot eat it or for those who did not register in advance to eat it, or if one slaughtered it for people who are uncircumcised or for those who are ritually impure, whom the Torah prohibits from eating the Paschal lamb, it is disqualified. However, if one slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it; for those who have registered for it and for those who have not registered for it; for the circumcised and for the uncircumcised; for the ritually impure and for the ritually pure, it is valid, for a partially invalid intent does not disqualify the offering.

If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb before midday it is disqualified, as it is stated: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). If he slaughtered it before the daily afternoon offering it is valid, as long as another person stirs its blood in order to prevent it from congealing until the blood of the daily offering is sprinkled. And if the blood of the Paschal lamb is sprinkled before the blood of the daily offering, it is nonetheless valid, as this change does not disqualify the offering.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in the Tosefta: How so the case of slaughtering the Paschal lamb for those who cannot eat it? It is a case where one slaughtered it for the sake of a sick person or for the sake of an old person who is unable to eat even an olive-sized portion of the Paschal lamb. How so the case of slaughtering the Paschal lamb for those who did not register for it? It is a case where one group registered for it, and one slaughtered it for the sake of a different group.

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, which are not explicitly written in the Torah, derived? The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if the household be too little for a lamb, then he and his neighbor who is close to his house shall take one according to the number of the souls; according to every man’s eating you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4). “According to the number of” teaches that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered only for those who have registered for it. Everything is done according to the number of people who have registered before the slaughtering.

I might have thought that if he slaughtered it for those who did not register for it, he would be considered as one who has violated a commandment, but nonetheless the offering would be valid after the fact. Therefore, the Torah teaches this law with the double formulation of “according to the number” and “you shall make your count”; the verse repeated it to make this requirement indispensable, so that the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who did not register for it.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The term “you shall make your count [takhosu]” is Aramaic [Sursi], like one who says to his fellow: Slaughter [kos] me this lamb, to teach that the registration must take place before the slaughtering.

We have found a source for the halakha that a Paschal lamb slaughtered for those who have not registered for it is disqualified. But from where do we derive the halakha that it is similarly disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who cannot eat it? The Gemara answers that the verse says: “According to every man’s eating you shall make your count”; those who eat it are juxtaposed, and thereby equated, to those who are registered for it. This teaches that just as the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who did not register for it, it is likewise disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who cannot eat it.