And he taught him the ruling with regard to a more inclusive prohibition, that in such cases there is an exemption, and this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And bar Kappara then saw the case of a non-priest who ate a bird killed by pinching, and since it was similar to the previous cases, he mixed them together. Then, sometime later, it seemed to him as though he had in truth heard all of these cases together from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, but when he examined this last case, he found that it could exist only if the events occurred simultaneously.

And he concluded that since the case of a non-priest eating a bird killed by pinching can occur only in a scenario where the prohibitions take effect simultaneously, the other cases are instances of simultaneous prohibitions as well. And similarly, since he was taught to exempt one individual from a second prohibition in those cases, these cases were taught to exempt one individual from a second prohibition as well. Therefore, according to Rabbi Ḥiyya, bar Kappara did not knowingly speak falsely. Rather, he heard certain matters from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and then mistakenly merged with them other matters. As a result, he confused the issue.

The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of bar Kappara from a baraita: In the case of a non-priest who served on Shabbat and the case of a blemished priest who served while ritually impure, there is liability here, due to the prohibition against serving as a non-priest; and due to the prohibition against desecrating Shabbat; and due to the prohibition against serving as a blemished priest; and due to the prohibition against serving after contracting ritual impurity. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Shimon says: There is liability here only due to the prohibition against serving as a non-priest and due to the prohibition against serving as a blemished priest. The Gemara notes: And yet the case of a non-priest who ate a bird killed by pinching was left out and not mentioned among the cases subject to this dispute.

The Gemara asks: According to whom was this left out? That is, according to the opinion of which tanna would this question arise? If we say that this was left out according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, it is difficult. Now that Rabbi Yosei holds, even in cases of a more inclusive prohibition, that one is liable on two counts, as was stated with regard to a non-priest who served on Shabbat, is it necessary to state that in the case where the additional prohibition takes effect simultaneously one would be liable on two counts? Rather, is it not according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that this case was left out, as Rabbi Shimon would concede that in this case one is liable on two counts? Therefore, Rabbi Shimon exempts one from liability for the second prohibition in cases of more inclusive prohibitions, but in cases of simultaneous prohibitions he would deem one liable on two counts. The Gemara summarizes: The refutation of the opinion of bar Kappara is indeed a conclusive refutation, and his statements are rejected.

The Gemara raises a question with regard to one of the laws mentioned above. The baraita mentioned the case of a non-priest who served on Shabbat. The Gemara wonders: In what form of service did he perform in the Temple? If this is referring to a case where a non-priest performed the slaughtering of the sacrificial animal, there would be no prohibition, as the slaughtering by a non-priest is valid. And if it is referring to receiving the blood and carrying the blood to the altar, while this is a case where he would be liable as a non-priest performing the service of a priest, insofar as Shabbat is concerned this is a case only of moving, and it does not entail a violation of any prohibited labor.

If he served by burning the sacrificial portions on the altar, then this discussion follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, but didn’t Rabbi Yosei say that the prohibition against kindling on Shabbat was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat merely violates a prohibition? This is as opposed to the other prohibited labors, which incur death penalties when violated willfully and entail the bringing of a sin-offering when violated unintentionally. Why, then, would Rabbi Yosei deem one liable for two sin-offerings?

Rav Aḥa bar Yaakov said: The service referred to in this case is the slaughtering of the High Priest’s bull on Yom Kippur, and this is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that the slaughtering of the High Priest’s bull is disqualified if performed by a non-priest, for this service is designated specifically for the High Priest alone. The Gemara asks: If so, that this is referring to the slaughtering of the High Priest’s bull, then why specifically state a non-priest? The same would hold true even for a common priest as well. The Gemara answers: This is referring to one who is as a non-priest in relation to the High Priest and not to an actual non-priest. The Hebrew word zar literally means foreigner, and this type of service is considered foreign to a common priest as well as a non-priest.

Rav Ashi strongly objects to this: The previous rejection that was based on the idea that the act of burning was not a full-fledged prohibited labor is in fact groundless. Is the tanna teaching how many sin-offerings would be incurred, or is he teaching how many negative mitzvot are being violated? Rather, he merely enumerates the prohibitions violated by a certain action, without detailing their severities, and therefore the desecration of Shabbat involved in the Temple service can be any Shabbat violation. The Gemara asks: What practical difference does it make how many prohibitions are involved? The Gemara answers: It affects the decision whether or not to bury him among the completely wicked. If he violated two prohibitions, he is considered wicked on two counts and consequently must be buried accordingly.

MISHNA: In the case of two men who betrothed two women, and at the time that they entered the wedding canopy, after the betrothal, the men switched this wife with that wife and that one with this one, then these two men are liable for engaging in forbidden sexual relations with a married woman, since each of them had intercourse with his fellow’s wife. The act of betrothal is sufficient to prohibit a woman to all other men as a married woman. Therefore, when the women were switched, both men transgressed this violation. And if they were brothers, then they are also liable for forbidden sexual relations with a brother’s wife. And if these women were sisters, then they are liable for taking a wife and her sister as well. And if they were menstruating women, they would be liable for intercourse with a menstruating woman as well.

And following these forbidden sexual relations, we separate these women from their husbands for three months, lest they were impregnated by that forbidden act of intercourse. Doing so makes it possible to distinguish a child born of these relations, so that he could be rendered a mamzer. And if they were female minors and unable to bear children, then we immediately return them to their original husbands. And if they were daughters of priests, they are thereby disqualified from eating of teruma. By engaging in illicit sexual acts, they were rendered forbidden to priests and disqualified from eating teruma.

GEMARA: In the mishna it states: They switched this one with that one. Are we dealing with such wicked individuals that they would intentionally switch their wives? And furthermore, consider that which Rabbi Ḥiyya taught on this subject: There are sixteen sin-offerings here, four sin-offerings for each of the men and four for each of the women. Yet, if they had acted intentionally would there be an offering? Sacrifices are brought only for unintentional acts. Rav Yehuda said: Teach instead they were switched, which indicates that the switching was not done intentionally; rather, the women were accidentally mixed up.

The Gemara comments: This, too, stands to reason from the fact that the latter clause teaches: If they were female minors and unable to bear children, then we immediately return them. And if this had been done intentionally, would it be permitted to return a woman who had engaged in illicit sexual acts to her husband? The Gemara comments: This is not difficult and does not disprove the notion that the act was intentional. Even if the act was intentional, these women would be permitted to return to their husbands. This is because the seduction of a minor girl is considered rape, and after rape a woman is permitted to return to an Israelite husband.

However, this can be derived from a different point that the mishna teaches: We separate these women from their husbands for three months, as perhaps they became pregnant. From here it can be deduced: Were it to become clear after three months that they are not pregnant, they are permitted to return to their husbands. And if they had acted intentionally, would this be permitted? Rather, must one not conclude from here that the mishna is referring to a case where they were switched inadvertently? The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, conclude from here that this is the case.