And if you would say that this tanna holds that it is her status at the time of the first marriage that determines her status when she happens before the yavam for levirate marriage, and not her status at the time of her husband’s death, and therefore if she had been a virgin when she married she would have been permitted to enter into levirate marriage with a High Priest, that cannot be so, as the mishna cites the case of a ḥalal who married a woman fit to marry a priest, in which case the woman is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her yavam. And in that case, we do not say that the first marriage determines her status when she happens before him for levirate marriage, as the woman was fit to marry the brother when she married the ḥalal and was rendered a ḥalala only as a result of her marriage.

The Gemara answers: That fact, that the mishna cited a case where the priest married a widow, is certainly due to the latter clause of the mishna, i.e., due to the fact that the tanna wants to teach in the latter clause: A High Priest who married a widow, and he has a brother who is the High Priest or a common priest. In the case where the yavam is a common priest, the widow is forbidden to him specifically if the High Priest married a widow, as by consummating the marriage he rendered her a ḥalala. However, had she been a virgin when the High Priest married her, he would not render her a ḥalala, and when the High Priest dies she would be fit for his brother. It is due to that reason that the tanna teaches the case of a widow in the first clause as well.

§ Rav Pappa objects to the mishna: If it is so, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael he reported that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that in the case of a second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman, her son is considered a second-generation Egyptian, as the child’s status in this matter is determined according to the mother, then let the tanna of the mishna also teach the following case:

With regard to a second-generation Egyptian who married two Egyptian women, one of whom was a first-generation Egyptian convert and one of whom was from the second generation, and he had sons from both the first and second women, if these two sons married in their proper way, meaning that the third-generation Egyptian married an ordinary Jewish woman, and the second-generation convert married another second-generation Egyptian, then it is also true of these women that they are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to their yevamin. The second-generation Egyptian is forbidden to his Jewish yevama, while the third-generation Egyptian is an ordinary Jew and therefore prohibited to marry his yevama, who is a second-generation Egyptian woman.

And if they married in the reverse manner, i.e., the third-generation convert married a second-generation Egyptian woman, and the second-generation man married an ordinary Jewish woman, they are permitted to their yevamin and forbidden to their husbands. Similarly, they are permitted both to these and to those if these sons married converts, for an Egyptian convert is permitted to marry a convert of a different nationality. And there is also a case in which they are forbidden to these and to those, namely if they married sexually underdeveloped women [ayloniot]. If an Egyptian married an aylonit, she is forbidden to him as a Jewish woman, and she is forbidden to his brother, a third-generation Egyptian convert who is permitted to marry a Jewish woman, because levirate marriage is prohibited with an aylonit. The fact that the mishna omits these cases appears to indicate that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara answers: There is no proof from here with regard to the halakha, as the tanna of the mishna did not mention all possible examples. Rather, he taught certain cases and omitted others. The Gemara asks: What else did he omit that he omitted this? The tanna would not have omitted only one example. The Gemara answers: He omitted the case of a man with crushed testicles or with other wounds to his genitals. If the husband is such a man, the wife is forbidden to her husband and permitted to her yavam. If the yavam is such a man, the opposite is true.

The Gemara asks: If this mishna is determined to have taught certain cases and omitted others due to the omission of the case of a man with crushed testicles or other wounds to his genitals, this is not an omission, as in this mishna the tanna taught a principle that applies to all forbidden relationships for which one is liable for violating a prohibition. This category includes such a case, and therefore it was not omitted.

The Gemara answers: Is that to say that with regard to those relationships for which one is liable for violating a prohibition, he does not teach a principle and again teach them in detail? But this is not the case. He teaches the case of a common priest who married a widow and he had a brother who was a high priest, and the case of a ḥalal who married a woman fit to marry a priest and he had a brother who was a priest fit for service, both of whom are forbidden as they are liable for violating a prohibition. Therefore, since the tanna did not specifically teach the case of the man with crushed testicles, this constitutes an omission.

The Gemara responds: That clause of the mishna is not merely a specification of the previous general halakha, as it was necessary for the tanna to mention these cases individually in order to teach us another halakha that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is not prohibited for daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests to marry men who are disqualified from the priesthood, although this marriage disqualifies them from subsequently marrying a priest.

The Gemara challenges that answer: But the mishna also teaches these cases: A ḥalal who married a woman fit to marry a priest; and an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married an Israelite woman of unflawed lineage, and he has a brother who is a mamzer. These are specifications that do not teach additional halakhot. The Gemara answers: This too is not a case of the tanna going back and teaching additional examples of the same halakha without adding anything, as he teaches us something new through each of these two examples. The first example is referring to a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, such as one concerning priests, and the second example is referring to a prohibition that is equally applicable to all, such as one involving a mamzer.

The Gemara further challenges the answer: But the mishna also teaches the case of an Israelite of unflawed lineage who married a mamzeret and who has a brother who is an Israelite of similar lineage, and the example of a mamzer who married a mamzeret and he has a brother who is an Israelite of unflawed lineage. Consequently, the tanna does in fact teach the same halakha several times with regard to a prohibition that is equally applicable to all. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from it that he taught and omitted certain cases and did not list all possible examples? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the case, and therefore there is no proof from here that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan.

§ The Gemara returns to a statement cited incidentally above, in order to discuss the matter itself: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is not prohibited for daughters of priests who are fit to marry priests to marry men who are disqualified from the priesthood, although this marriage would disqualify them from subsequently marrying a priest, and they may do so even ab initio. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following statement of the mishna supports his opinion: A ḥalal who married a woman who is fit, and he has a brother who is a priest fit for service, this woman is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her yavam. What, is it not referring to a priestess, i.e., a priest’s daughter, who is appropriate to marry him? And what is the meaning of: Fit? This means that she is fit for the priesthood, and yet the mishna says she is permitted to her husband, the ḥalal.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that the mishna is speaking of an Israelite woman. And what is the meaning of: Fit? It means that she is fit to enter the congregation of the Jewish people, through marriage. According to this explanation, there is no proof from the mishna about daughters of priests.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, consider the phrase: A ḥalal who married a woman fit to marry a priest, and he has a brother who is also fit. Consistency demands that here too it means that the brother is fit to enter the congregation. Can it not therefore be deduced by inference that he, the deceased ḥalal, was unfit to enter the congregation? But such an inference would be an error, as a ḥalal is disqualified only from the priesthood. Rather, is it not referring to a priest, and from the fact that he must be a priest, she too must be a priestess? The Gemara rejects this claim: Are the cases comparable? This case, of the ḥalal, is as it is, i.e., he is fit for the priesthood. And that case, of the woman, is as it is, i.e., she is fit to enter the congregation.

Ravin bar Naḥman raised an objection against Rav’s ruling from the following baraita: The verse states about priests: “They may not take a woman who is a harlot [zona], or profaned [ḥalala]” (Leviticus 21:7). The same verse says: “They also may not take a woman divorced from her husband.” This repetition of “they may not take” teaches us that the woman is also prohibited by means of the prohibition addressed to the man. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a prohibition for a daughter of a priest to marry a ḥalal.

Rava said: Ravin bar Naḥman’s objection is not valid. All that the baraita teaches is that anywhere that a prohibition of sexual intercourse applies to him, i.e., to a man, the same prohibition applies to her, his female partner. And anywhere that a prohibition does not apply to him, the prohibition does not apply to her either. It does not, however, indicate that since it is prohibited for a priest to marry a ḥalala it is also prohibited for the daughter of a priest to marry a ḥalal.

The Gemara asks with regard to the baraita itself: And is this matter derived from here? It is derived from a different statement that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and the school of Rabbi Yishmael similarly taught: The verse states: “When a man or woman shall commit any sin that people commit” (Numbers 5:6). The verse here equates a woman to a man with regard to all punishments of the Torah. Consequently, the halakhot of forbidden marriages apply equally to women and to men. Why then do we need to learn the same thing from the repetition of “they may not take”?

The Gemara answers: If it was derived only from that verse, I would say that this principle is true of a prohibition that is equally applicable to all, but with regard to a prohibition that is not equally applicable to all, such as the prohibitions pertaining to priests, this is not the case. Since these prohibitions only apply to priests, we might have thought that they do not extend to women. The verse therefore teaches that the prohibition applies to women in the same manner as men.