they penalized him through the marriage contract. In other words, the Sages did not exempt him from payment of the marriage contract in that case. Since he is disqualified from the priesthood until he divorces her, the marriage will not last, and they did not force her to forfeit her marriage contract. And for what reason did they say that women forbidden as secondary relatives by rabbinic law do not have a marriage contract? Because he is fit for the priesthood and she is similarly fit, the couple therefore sees no need to divorce, and any place where he is fit and she is fit they penalized her by exempting him from payment of the marriage contract, in order to speed up the divorce.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says a different reason: These cases, a widow married to a High Priest and a divorcée married to a common priest, are prohibited by Torah law, and Torah law does not require strengthening by means of additional enactments. But those secondary relatives are forbidden by rabbinic law, and rabbinic law does require strengthening. Alternatively, the Gemara presents a second explanation: In this case, when they are both disqualified, it is he who encourages her to live with him despite the deleterious effect the prohibition will have on her and her offspring. Therefore, they penalized him by making him pay the marriage contract. But in that case, when they both remain fit for the priesthood despite the prohibited nature of their marriage, it is she who encourages him, and they consequently penalized her.

The Gemara asks: Who teaches the alternative explanation; whose opinion does it follow? Some say that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar teaches it and is saying: What is the reason? In other words, the latter part of the baraita provides the rationale for the previous statement: What is the reason that they said that if he is disqualified from the priesthood and she is similarly disqualified, they penalized him through the marriage contract? It is because in such a case he primarily encourages her to violate the prohibition, as the main disqualification concerns her, so they penalize him for enticing her to sin. And for what reason did they say that when he is fit and she is fit they penalized her through the marriage contract? It is because in such a case she encourages him, since she is not disqualified and therefore may care less about the sin. The Sages therefore penalized her.

Conversely, some say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the one who teaches it, and the case of a ḥalutza poses a difficulty to his opinion, as it seems to contradict his principle that rabbinic law requires strengthening: A ḥalutza is forbidden to a priest by rabbinic law, and yet she does have a marriage contract. In response, he then said an additional explanation: Since he disqualifies her from the priesthood by rabbinic law, in this case it is he who encourages her, and in that case of secondary relatives, when neither of them is disqualified, she encourages him.

The Gemara asks: Practically speaking, what difference is there between the explanations of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? Rav Ḥisda said: The practical difference between them concerns the cases of a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to a Jew of unflawed lineage.

According to the one who says that the reason the marriage contract is not revoked from a widow who is married to the High Priest is because this relationship is prohibited by Torah law, which doesn’t require strengthening, this too is by Torah law, and therefore she receives her marriage contract. But according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as the woman is disqualified regardless, and she wants to marry a Jew because there is a way for her descendants to be fit to enter the congregation: If her mamzer son marries a maidservant and has children, they will be slaves who can then be freed and enter the congregation.

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Eliezer, who said in a mishna (Kiddushin 69a) that if a mamzer marries a maidservant and they have a child, their son is both a slave and a mamzer, since she has no hope of her descendants being fit to enter into the congregation, she does not encourage him at all. Rather, Rav Yosef said: The practical difference between them is with regard to one who remarries his divorcée after she has married another man. According to the one who says that it depends on whether the prohibition is by Torah law, this too is prohibited by Torah law. And according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as she and her children are unaffected by this marriage.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But according to Rabbi Akiva, who said that offspring from forbidden intercourse for which one is liable for violating a prohibition is a mamzer, she does not encourage him at all, because according to this opinion her children would be adversely affected by the marriage. Rather, Rav Pappa said: The practical difference between them involves a non-virgin married to a High Priest. According to the one who says that it depends on whether the prohibition is by Torah law, this too is prohibited by Torah law. And according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as the marriage merely violates a positive mitzva, which does not disqualify her children.

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who said that offspring conceived through intercourse with a priest for which one is liable for violating a positive mitzva is a ḥalal, she does not encourage him at all. Rather, Rav Ashi said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the case of one who remarries his wife when there is an uncertainty if she is an adulteress. If a married woman was in seclusion with another man after her husband had become suspicious and had warned her concerning that man, and the husband did not subsequently bring her to be examined by the bitter waters as a sota, but rather continued to live with her, he has acted contrary to Torah law, as she is forbidden to him.

In this case, according to the one who says that it depends on whether the prohibition is by Torah law, this too is prohibited by Torah law. And according to the one who says it is because he encourages her, in this case she encourages him, as her children are not disqualified by such a relationship. The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash, who said that even if her husband went to cause her to drink the bitter waters and had intercourse with her on the way, he has thereby rendered her a zona and disqualified her from the priesthood, she does not encourage him at all. Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi said: The practical difference between them is with regard to the case of a definite adulteress. In such a case, all agree that their children are not mamzerim, despite the prohibition against their cohabitation. Consequently, she encourages him to sin.

MISHNA: If there is an Israelite woman betrothed to a priest or pregnant from a priest, and he died; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a priest; and similarly, the daughter of a priest who is betrothed, pregnant from, or is a widow waiting for her yavam, who is an Israelite, she may not partake of teruma. If there is an Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite or pregnant from a Levite; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a Levite; and similarly the daughter of a Levite who is betrothed, pregnant from, or a widow waiting for her yavam, who is an Israelite, she may not partake of tithes.

If there is a daughter of a Levite betrothed to a priest or pregnant from a priest; and a widow awaiting her yavam, who is a priest; and similarly a daughter of a priest who is betrothed to or pregnant from a Levite, or is a widow waiting for her yavam, who is a Levite, she may partake of neither teruma nor tithes. This follows the halakha that betrothal, pregnancy, and waiting for a yavam disqualify the daughter of a priest from eating teruma, but they do not enable an Israelite woman to partake of teruma.

GEMARA: The mishna states that an Israelite woman betrothed to a Levite may not partake of tithes. The Gemara is puzzled by this ruling: And let her even be a complete foreigner who is not a Levite; may a foreigner not partake of tithes? In contradistinction to teruma, no special sanctity pertains to tithes; they are merely the possession of the Levite. What difference does it make, then, whether she is a Levite or not? Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said that the first tithe is forbidden to foreigners, i.e., non-Levites, as it is taught in a baraita: