With regard to what should we be concerned in the case of the promissory note? If we are concerned about the possibility of falling, i.e., that the promissory note might have dropped from this person’s hand and the other one found it, the former is certainly careful with it so as not to lose it, as he knows there is someone else in the city with the same name. If we are concerned about the possibility that it was given as a deposit for safekeeping, i.e., that the actual owner might have given it to the one in possession of it, since his name is the same as the name of the bailee, the owner would not deposit his contract with him without some insurance.

If you say that perhaps the actual owner passed, i.e., transferred the promissory note to this person whose name is the same as his own, i.e., he gave or sold it to him so he may collect it for himself, in that case the one in possession is entitled to collect the money, as letters of credit are acquired through passing. There is no need for an additional act of acquisition here, which means that the promissory note belongs to the one in possession of it, despite the fact that it was not originally written for him. Consequently, no proof can be brought from this case with regard to whether or not one should be concerned about two people with identical names.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain bill of divorce that was found in the city of Sura and the following was written in it: In the city of Sura, I, Anan bar Ḥiyya of Neharde’a, excused and sent away and divorced my wife, so-and-so. And the Sages examined the area from Sura to Neharde’a, throughout almost all of Babylonia, and there was no other Anan bar Ḥiyya than the one they knew, apart from an Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra who was in Neharde’a. And yet witnesses came and said that on that day, when that bill of divorce was written: Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra was with us in Neharde’a, not in Sura.

Abaye said: Even according to my opinion, by which I say that generally we are concerned about the possibility of someone else with the same name, here we are not concerned. The reason is that the witnesses say the other Anan bar Ḥiyya was in Neharde’a; what, then, is he doing in Sura? Consequently, there is no concern that the bill of divorce was written by the Anan bar Ḥiyya of Ḥagra.

Rava said: Even according to my opinion, in which I say that we are not concerned in general, here, when it is established that there definitely is another man by the same name, we are concerned. As for the apparently contradictory testimony, perhaps he went by a flying camel, an extremely fast means of transportation, and was able to travel from Neharde’a to Sura in one day. Alternatively, he might have arrived by a miraculous shortcut. Alternatively, he might have given verbal instructions beforehand for them to write the bill of divorce in a place where he was not physically located.

This last answer is as Rav said to the court scribes, and likewise Rav Huna said to the scribes: When you are in a place called Shili, write that the contract was written in Shili, even when the instructions are given to you in a different place called Hini. And likewise, when you are in Hini, write that it was written in Hini, even when the instructions are given to you in Shili.

The Gemara returns to the original question: What was the conclusion that was reached about this case involving sesame plants? Do they belong to the one who deposited them, or is the claim of the bailee accepted, that he returned them and placed other sesame plants in the same barrel? Rav Yeimar said: We are not concerned that they are different plants, and Ravina said: We are concerned. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that we are concerned about the possibility that the bailee replaced them with others, and we do not rely on the distinguishing marks provided by the claimant in this case.

§ The mishna taught: If there was a quarrel between him and her, her testimony that her husband died is not accepted. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a quarrel between him and her? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This is a case where people heard her say to her husband: Divorce me. The Gemara asks: Is this proof? All women likewise say this when they are angry; this does not prove that there was an unresolved quarrel left between them. Rather, a quarrel is when she says to her husband: You divorced me, i.e., she claims that she was actually divorced.

The Gemara asks: If she said to her husband that he divorced her, let us believe her claim, in accordance with the statement of Rav Hamnuna. As Rav Hamnuna said: A woman who said to her husband: You divorced me, is deemed credible. Why? There is a presumption that a woman would not dare to lie in the presence of her husband about a matter which he knows to be untrue. If so, why isn’t her claim that she was divorced accepted? This would mean that there is no need for any testimony concerning his death, as the ties between them have already been severed.

The Gemara answers: In fact, a couple is considered to be quarreling when she says: You divorced me in the presence of two witnesses, so-and-so and so-and-so; and the court asked those men and they said: This matter never happened. In this case it is obvious that there was a terrible quarrel between them, but her claim that she was divorced is not accepted. Consequently, her later claim that her husband is dead is not accepted.

§ The Gemara analyzes the ruling of the mishna itself. What is the reason that in the case of a quarrel between them the court does not accept her testimony? Rav Ḥanina said: Because she lies, i.e., due to their quarrel she is likely to testify falsely that her husband died. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Because she says what she imagines to be the case. When there is peace between them, she examines the matter thoroughly to discover whether he actually died, but if there is a quarrel between them she is not so exacting, as she is pleased to be rid of him. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two explanations?