that the brothers do not come into the inheritance from the deceased brother based on her testimony. Evidently, although this testimony is accepted with regard to forbidden sexual relationships, it is not effective for monetary matters.

Beit Shammai said to them: But we can learn this halakha from the scroll of the marriage contract, as every husband writes for her that: If you marry another man, take what is written for you in this contract. This shows that her right to receive the money of her marriage contract is dependent upon her eligibility to remarry. In this case, as she is deemed credible when she says her husband died and she may marry again, she is likewise entitled to the money of the marriage contract. And Beit Hillel again retracted their opinion, and decided to teach in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai.

GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda said: If the woman entered into levirate marriage based upon her own testimony, her yavam comes into the inheritance of the property of his dead brother based on her testimony. He adds: If Beit Shammai taught their halakha that she is entitled to her money, by interpreting homiletically the language of a marriage contract, will we not teach by interpreting homiletically the Torah itself?

Rav Ḥisda explains: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “He shall succeed in the name of his dead brother” (Deuteronomy 25:6), which is interpreted by the Sages as referring to the right of inheritance of the brother who consummates the levirate marriage. And this man did succeed with respect to the marital relationship, as he consummated the levirate marriage based on the testimony of his yevama that her husband died. Consequently, he takes the place of his brother with respect to his inheritance as well.

§ Rav Naḥman said: A woman came to the court and said: My husband died; permit me to marry. The halakha is that after investigating the matter, they permit her to marry, and also give her her marriage contract. However, if she came and said: Give me my marriage contract, they do not even permit her to marry. What is the reason? Since she came with the money of the marriage contract in mind, she is suspected of lying, and her testimony is rejected.

However, the following dilemma was raised before the scholars. If she came and said: Permit me to marry and give me my marriage contract, what is the halakha? Since she mentioned the money from her marriage contract, this shows that she came with the marriage contract in mind. Or perhaps every matter a person has in his favor he will say to the court, even if it is not of particular importance. And if you say that the ruling in this case is in accordance with the principle: Every matter a person has in his favor he will say to the court, then in a case where she said: Give me my marriage contract and permit me to marry, what is the halakha?

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Here she certainly came with the marriage contract in mind, as she mentioned it first. Or perhaps she said it in this manner since she does not know what will set her free. In other words, she might have thought that taking the money guaranteed by her marriage contract is part of the process that enables her to remarry, but this does not prove that she is focused on the money. The Gemara states that the question shall stand unresolved.

MISHNA: All are deemed credible when they come to give testimony with regard to the death of a woman’s husband, apart from her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her rival wife, the wife of her yavam, and her husband’s daughter, her stepdaughter. The reason is that these women are likely to hate her and will lie to her detriment.

The mishna explains: In the case of a divorce all people, including these women, may bring her bill of divorce and testify that it was written appropriately. What, then, is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The mishna answers: The difference is that in the case of a bill of divorce the writing proves the accuracy of the testimony, i.e., her testimony is supported by the text of the document itself, whereas with regard to the death of her husband there is no proof apart from the statement of the woman herself.

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the scholars: With regard to the daughter of her father-in-law, who is not the daughter of her mother-in-law, what is the halakha? May she testify to the death of the woman’s husband, or is she also under suspicion? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law is suspected of lying is because she has a mother who hates her daughter-in-law, and therefore the daughter also hates her. But here, there is no mother who hates her, as she is not the mother-in-law’s daughter, and therefore she should be deemed credible.

Or perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law hates her is that she says: She eats the food [girsena] that my mother prepares. Here too, in the case of the daughter of her father-in-law, she also says: She eats the food of my father’s house.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the following baraita: All are deemed credible when they come to testify with regard to her except for five women. And if it is so, that the daughter of her father-in-law is also disqualified, there are actually six women. The Gemara rejects this: This is no proof, as perhaps the reason that the daughter of her mother-in-law is disqualified from testifying is that she says: She eats the food of my father’s house, and if so, the halakha is no different with regard to her mother-in-law’s daughter and no different with regard to her father-in-law’s daughter. Since the two women are disqualified for the same reason the Sages did not list these as two separate cases.

The Gemara raises a contradiction from another source. But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Apart from seven women who are not trustworthy. Apparently that tanna added the daughter of her father-in-law as a separate category. The Gemara answers: That ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda adds also a father’s wife, who hates her stepdaughter, and a daughter-in-law, who hates her mother-in-law.

The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: A father’s wife is included in the category of the husband’s daughter, while a daughter-in-law is included in the category of her mother-in-law. In other words, just as a mother-in-law is suspicious of her daughter-in-law, a daughter-in-law is equally suspicious of her mother-in-law, and they need not be listed separately.

And Rabbi Yehuda, who counts them separately, can answer: Granted that her mother-in-law hates the daughter-in-law, as she says: She eats the food I prepare; but a daughter-in-law, what is the reason that she hates her mother-in-law? Similarly, granted the husband’s daughter, that she hates her father’s wife, as she says: This woman eats the food that my mother prepared. However, the father’s wife, what is the reason that she hates her husband’s daughter?

The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda adds these two? Rather, his logic is: In the case of a daughter-in-law, what is the reason that she hates her mother-in-law? Because she reveals to her son everything his wife does. And likewise a father’s wife also hates the husband’s daughter, because she reveals to her father everything she does. In each case the reason for this hatred is different from the reason for the hatred of the other woman, the mother-in-law or the husband’s daughter, and therefore they belong in a separate category.

And the Rabbis, who say that the reasons for the hatred are the same and therefore count only five disqualified women, how do they respond to this argument? They cite the verse: “As in water face answers to face, so the heart of man to man” (Proverbs 27:19). That is, if one person hates another, the feeling soon becomes mutual. Here too, there is no need for a separate reason in order that the hatred be reciprocated. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, why doesn’t he rely on this verse? Rabbi Yehuda would retort: That verse was written about matters of Torah. In other words, it means that the more one studies Torah, the more Torah he understands.

§ Rav Aḥa bar Avya says: They raise a dilemma in the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael. With regard to her mother-in-law who comes afterward, what is the halakha? This refers to the mother of the husband’s brother, but not her husband’s mother, i.e., the wife’s future mother-in-law if the wife enters into levirate marriage. Can this woman testify with regard to the future wife of her son? The Gemara clarifies: Does it enter her mind that if this woman’s husband died, the widow will happen before the yavam, her son, for levirate marriage, and as the widow, when she then married her son, would eat her food she hates her already, or not?