And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this. If one said: My hand is a nazirite, and similarly, if he said: My foot is a nazirite, he has not said anything of consequence. However, if he said: My head is a nazirite, or: My liver is a nazirite, he is a nazirite. This is the principle: If one accepted naziriteship by means of an entity upon which life depends, i.e., a limb or a body part that he cannot survive without, he is a nazirite. Conversely, if he mentioned part of the body that is not essential for life, he is not a nazirite. In this case, as he referred to his hair, which is certainly not a vital part of him, he should not be a nazirite.

Rav Yehuda said that it means that he said like this; this is what he intended: Let my mouth be like his mouth with regard to abstention from wine, and my hair be like his hair with regard to abstention from cutting it.

§ The mishna taught that if a woman said: I am hereby a nazirite, and her husband heard and said: And I, he cannot nullify her vow. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: When a husband nullifies the vow of his wife, does he uproot his wife’s vow, making it as though she never vowed, or perhaps he merely severs her vow from that point onward, but her vow was still in effect until he nullified it? The Gemara asks: What difference is there resulting from this dilemma?

The Gemara explains that the difference is with regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and another woman heard and said: And I, and the husband of the first woman heard and nullified her vow. If you say that the husband uproots the vow entirely, the vow of that second woman should also be dissolved, as she associated herself with a non-existent vow. And if you say he severs it from this point, the vow of his wife is dissolved, but the other woman remains bound by her vow, as the first vow was intact when she associated herself with it. What, then, is the answer to this dilemma?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the statement of the mishna: If she said: I am hereby a nazirite, and her husband heard and said: And I, he cannot nullify her vow. And if it should enter your mind that the husband severs the vow from that moment onward, let him nullify the vow for his wife and he will remain bound by his vow, since if the vow is not nullified retroactively, her vow was intact when he associated himself with it. Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that the husband uproots the vow entirely, which means he would also uproot his own vow by nullifying hers, and that is why he is unable do so?

The Gemara refutes this argument: No; actually, one can say that the husband severs the vow from that point onward. And if there were no other points to consider, by right the mishna should have taught that he can nullify her vow for her; and this is the reason why he cannot nullify it: Since he said to her: And I, he is considered like one who said: It is upheld for you, and once a husband has upheld his wife’s vow he can no longer nullify it. Consequently, if he requested to have his upholding dissolved by a Sage, he can nullify her vow, and if not, he cannot nullify it. Consequently, the ruling of the mishna does not resolve the dilemma.

The Gemara cites another mishna (24a): Come and hear: With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and separated her animal for this purpose (see Numbers 6:13–14), and afterward her husband nullified her vow, which means that she is no longer obligated to bring an offering, if the animal was his, which he had given to her, it is as though it were never consecrated at all, and it shall go out and graze among the flock like a regular, non-consecrated animal, until it becomes blemished. And if the animal was hers, and it was designated for a sin-offering, it must be placed in isolation for it to die, in accordance with the general halakha that a sin-offering that may not be sacrificed must be left to die.

The Gemara explains the difficulty from this mishna: And if it should enter your mind that the husband uproots the vow, the sin-offering should be released as a non-sacred animal, in accordance with the halakha of a sin-offering of a nazirite whose vow was nullified (31a). Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that the husband merely severs the vow, which means that she was a nazirite when she separated the animal, and therefore it is consecrated?

The Gemara rejects this proof: Actually, I could say to you that the husband uproots the vow, and this is the reason for the above ruling: Since she requires no atonement, as the vow is no longer in effect, this animal is treated as a sin-offering whose owners have died, and it is learned as a tradition that a sin-offering whose owners have died must be left to die.

The Gemara continues to cite relevant sources. Come and hear the following mishna (23a): With regard to a woman who vowed to be a nazirite and nevertheless was drinking wine and rendering herself ritually impure by contact with the dead, she incurs the forty lashes for violating a Torah prohibition. The Gemara analyzes this mishna: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that her husband did not nullify her vow, need this be said that she is liable to receive lashes? After all, every nazirite who transgresses their vow incurs lashes.

Rather, it is obvious that the husband nullified her vow. And if it should enter your mind that the husband uproots his wife’s vow, why does she incur the forty lashes? It is as though she never vowed at all. Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that the husband severs the vow, and therefore she is liable for her earlier transgression?

The Gemara refutes this argument: Actually, I could say to you that the husband uproots the vow, and the reason that the mishna teaches in this manner is due to the fact that the tanna teaches in the latter clause of the mishna: If the husband nullified her vow and she did not know, and she was drinking wine and rendering herself ritually impure by contact with the dead, she does not incur the forty lashes, despite her intention to sin, as she did not commit a transgression in practice.