is not entirely invalidated; and therefore, even though the husband nullified the agency of part of the group, if these other people whose agency was never nullified go and write the bill of divorce and give it to the wife, let them write and give the bill of divorce. There is nothing to be concerned about, as their agency was never nullified. Since the bill of divorce that they deliver is valid, there is no reason to institute an ordinance that a husband can nullify the agency only in the presence of the entire group.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and holds: Testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated. And if the agency of part of the group was nullified when those agents were not in the presence of the rest of the group, then those others do not know that their agency has been nullified as well. And they might then go and write a bill of divorce and give it, and they will cause the court to mistakenly permit a married woman to marry anyone.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that testimony that was partially invalidated is not entirely invalidated; and here, this is the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that the husband can nullify his instructions only in the presence of all of the agents: He holds that a matter that is performed in the presence of ten people requires the presence of ten people to revoke it. Since the husband instructed ten people to write the bill of divorce, he cannot revoke his instructions in the presence of only a portion of them.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the husband said to them: All of you should write a bill of divorce for my wife, in which case all of them must sign the bill of divorce, what is the halakha according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? The Gemara elaborates: Is the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel for prohibiting the husband from nullifying the instructions that he had given to ten people because he holds that testimony that was partially invalidated is entirely invalidated, and one should be concerned that the rest of the group will not know that their agency was nullified? And these people, since he said to them explicitly: All of you should write the bill of divorce, the rest of the group are not able to write and give the bill of divorce on their own. Therefore, the husband should be able to nullify his instructions when not in the presence of the entire group, as no mistake can occur because of his action.

Or perhaps the reason of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is because he holds that a matter that is performed in the presence of ten people requires the presence of ten people to revoke it. And therefore, even if he said: All of you should write the bill of divorce, he must nullify his instructions in all ten people’s presence as well.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a baraita (Tosefta 4:1): If one said to two agents: Give a bill of divorce to my wife, he can render his instructions void before this one, i.e., either of them, even though it is not before that one, i.e., the other one; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He can render his instructions void only when this one is before that one, i.e., when the two of them are together. The Gemara now states the attempted proof. But two are equivalent to: All of you, as the bill of divorce cannot be written and given by fewer than two people, and there is no concern that perhaps one will sign without the other. And yet Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel still disagree, proving that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s reason is that the husband can nullify his instructions only in the same manner that he gave them.

Rav Ashi said: If the baraita was speaking of witnesses of the writing of the bill of divorce, both of whom must sign the bill of divorce, this would indeed resolve the question. However, here we are dealing with witnesses of the delivery of the bill of divorce. In that case there is no need for two agents, so there is a concern that if the husband nullifies their agency in the presence of only one of them, then the second agent could mistakenly deliver the bill of divorce to the wife.

The Gemara comments: This too, stands to reason, as the latter clause of the baraita teaches: If one said to this one on his own and to that one on his own, then he can nullify each of their agencies before this one even though it is not before that one. Granted, if you say that this is referring to witnesses of the delivery of the bill of divorce, this works out well, as they need not be appointed together. However, if you say that this is referring to witnesses of the writing, can they combine together if they were appointed separately? But doesn’t the Master say: The testimony of two witnesses does not combine together until the two of them see the event as one, together? The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who holds that in order for the witnesses to combine together and present their testimony it is not necessary for them to witness the event together.

Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said: I heard from Rabbi Abba two rulings with regard to these questions; in one he ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and in one he ruled in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and I do not know which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and which is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Rav Yosef said: Let us see ourselves which argument was decided in favor of whom based on other sources, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: There was an incident and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi acted in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. Rabbi Perata, the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Perata and the son of the son of Rabbi Perata the Great, said before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: If so, what advantage does the court have? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi reversed his ruling and acted in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The claim of: If so, what advantage does the court have, is the reason behind Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion with regard to the question of whether, in a case where the husband violates the ordinance and renders the bill of divorce void in the presence of a court but not before the agent, it is void after the fact.

And from the fact that this dispute is decided in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi retracted his opinion and acted in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, by inference, in the case of that disagreement, with regard to one who gives instructions to ten people, the halakha must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Yoshiya from the city of Usha also holds that one halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and one is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: We were five elders sitting before Rabbi Yoshiya from Usha. A certain man came before him, and Rabbi Yoshiya extracted the authorization to write a bill of divorce from him against his will. Rabbi Yoshiya said to us: Go hide and write for her a bill of divorce, so that the husband will not find you and render the bill of divorce void after it has been written.

The Gemara explains the inference as to the ruling of Rabbi Yoshiya: And if it enters your mind that he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that if a husband renders a bill of divorce void when not in the presence of the agent then the bill of divorce is void, then if they hide, what of it? The man could simply render the bill of divorce void in the presence of others. Rather, learn from it that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that one can render the bill of divorce void only in the presence of the agents.

The Gemara explains the second element: And if it enters your mind to say that with regard to the other dispute, where one instructs ten people to write the bill of divorce, he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, then why would they need to hide? Let them scatter, and since the husband will not find all of them together, he will be unable to render the bill of divorce void. Rather, learn from it that he holds in one case in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and in one case in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. This is one opinion with regard to the halakha in the two disputes of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

And Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in both cases. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rav Naḥman accept the argument that the court should have an advantage? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say that Shmuel says,