And Rav is saying that specifically when the bill of divorce is written in his handwriting and has the signature of one witness, the woman’s child from her second husband is of unflawed lineage. But if it is written in a scribe’s handwriting, even if it includes the signature of one witness, the child’s lineage is not unflawed, but rather he is a mamzer, as the bill of divorce is completely invalid.

And Shmuel says: Even where it is written in a scribe’s handwriting and it has the signature of a witness, the lineage of the child is unflawed, as we learned in a mishna (87b): In the case of a bill of divorce in which the scribe’s handwriting is recognizable and there is one witness signed, it is valid.

And Rav would respond: Is that case comparable? There, in that case, the mishna indicates that the woman may marry ab initio. Therefore, it must be a case where the scribe also signed as a second witness. But here, in the case of this mishna, the bill of divorce is invalid and the woman may not remarry; it is only if she remarried and had a child that his lineage is rendered unflawed after the fact. Therefore, it must be referring to a case where the husband wrote it.

And Shmuel, who holds that both cases are referring to a bill of divorce that was written by a scribe but not signed by the scribe as one of the witnesses, would respond that the contradiction is not difficult. That mishna, where the bill of divorce is rendered valid ab initio, is referring to the handwriting of an expert scribe, who can presumably be relied upon to have written the bill of divorce properly and only according to the husband’s instructions, and this mishna is referring to the handwriting of a scribe who is not expert. Since the bill of divorce was not signed by two witnesses, there is concern that the scribe did not write it properly.

And similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan says in accordance with the opinion of Rav: We learned that the mishna is referring to his handwriting. Rabbi Elazar, assuming that Rabbi Yoḥanan was explaining the middle clause, said to him: Aren’t there signatures of witnesses in the bill of divorce? Why is the husband’s handwriting necessary? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I was referring to the latter clause, in which there is only one witness.

§ With regard to the three invalid bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna, sometimes Rav said that if the woman remarries based on one of these bills of divorce she must leave her second husband, and sometimes Rav said that she need not leave.

How so? How can the contradiction between Rav’s statements be explained? If she already has children from her second husband then she need not leave him, as, if she is required to leave him there will be slander that their children are mamzerim. But if she does not have children from him, she must leave him.

Mar Zutra bar Toviya raises an objection to Rav’s opinion from a mishna (Yevamot 30b). With regard to a woman whose husband died childless [yevama] but who is prohibited from marrying her late husband’s brother [yavam] because he is a forbidden relative to her, not only is she herself exempt from levirate marriage, but she causes any rival wives of hers to be exempt as well, even if they are not forbidden relatives to the brother. The mishna lists fifteen examples of such forbidden relatives (Yevamot 2a). And if any of these fifteen women had undergone a betrothal or divorce whose status is uncertain with the deceased brother, those rival wives must perform the ritual through which the yavam frees the yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza] and may not enter into levirate marriage, since they are possibly the rival wives of a forbidden relative.

How could there be a betrothal whose status is uncertain? If he threw her money or a document as betrothal in the public domain, and the item was possibly closer to her, whereby she could acquire the object and become betrothed, and possibly closer to him, preventing her from acquiring it, this is a case of a betrothal whose status is uncertain.

How can there be a divorce whose status is uncertain? It is in the cases of invalid bills of divorce mentioned in the mishna here: A bill of divorce that the husband wrote in his handwriting but has no signatures of witnesses on the document at all, a case where there are signatures of witnesses on the document but there is no date written on it, and a case where there is a date written on it but it contains only one witness. In each of the three cases, this is considered a divorce whose status is uncertain.

And if you say that despite this woman’s problematic divorce she need not leave her second husband, her rival wife from her first marriage might come to enter into levirate marriage after the first husband’s death, assuming that she was already divorced. This would violate the ruling of the mishna in tractate Yevamot that she may not do so, as the status of the divorce is uncertain and therefore it is uncertain whether she is the rival wife of a forbidden relative.

The Gemara answers: She may enter into levirate marriage, and there is no problem with that, as the difficulty with the bill of divorce is merely a concern by rabbinic law. By Torah law it is a complete bill of divorce, and the rival wife is fit for levirate marriage.

Contrary to Rav’s opinion that a woman who remarries based on one of these bills of divorce must leave her second husband unless they have children, Levi says that she is never required to leave him, whether or not they have children. And similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that she is never required to leave him.

And similarly, Rabbi Yoḥanan said to the sons of Rabbi Ḥalafta of Huna: Your father said the following two statements that I heard from him: That she is never required to leave him, and that a kartzit in the sheaf does not disqualify water of purification (see Numbers 19:17–19). Even if a kartzit drinks from this water, it may still be sprinkled on a person in order to purify him from ritual impurity imparted by a corpse.

The Gemara asks: What is a kartzit? Abaye said that it is a species of fly [didveta] that is found between the sheaves.

Rav Daniel bar Rav Ketina raises an objection to this ruling from the Mishna (Para 9:3): All birds disqualify water of purification by drinking from it, because some of the water spills from the bird’s beak back into the basin after being disqualified by having been in the bird’s mouth. This is the halakha with regard to all birds except for the pigeon, because it sucks the water, which prevents it from spilling back. And if it is so that a kartzit does not disqualify water of purification, let the mishna teach that all birds disqualify except for the pigeon and the kartzit.

The Gemara answers: The matter is not clear-cut, as, while a large kartzit does not disqualify the water, a small one does disqualify it. This ruling is not mentioned in the mishna, as it is not common to all species of kartzit. The Gemara asks: And how small must a kartzit be to disqualify water of purification? Rabbi Yirmeya said, and some say that it was Rabbi Ami who said: The size is up to an olive-bulk.

§ It is stated in the mishna that Rabbi Elazar says: Even if there are no signatures of witnesses on the document, but rather he handed it to her in the presence of two witnesses, it is a valid bill of divorce. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce. But when I said this halakha before Shmuel, he said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar with regard to monetary documents as well.

The Gemara asks: But does Rav hold that with regard to monetary documents the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar? Doesn’t Rabbi Elazar teach in the mishna that on the basis of this bill of divorce a woman can collect the amount written in her marriage contract even from liened property? Apparently, Rabbi Elazar’s ruling has monetary ramifications as well.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Elazar made two statements, i.e., his ruling was both with regard to divorce and with regard to monetary documents. And Rav holds in accordance with his opinion with regard to one issue, i.e., divorce, and disagrees with his opinion with regard to one issue, monetary documents.

And similarly, Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi says that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce. And Rabbi Yannai says: This does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yannai not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar at all, as opposed to the other amora’im? The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what Rabbi Yannai is saying: According to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Elazar, this bill of divorce does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce.

And similarly, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says that Reish Lakish says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce.

The Gemara asks: Let us say that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar at all. The Gemara answers: Rather, this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan is saying: According to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Elazar, this does not have even the trace of a bill of divorce.

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda sent the following request to Marei bar Mar: Ask Rav Huna whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce or whether the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion.

Meanwhile, before this request reached him, Rav Huna died. Rabba, son of Rav Huna, said to Marei bar Mar: My father said in the name of Rava like this: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce. And our teachers who are well-versed in matters of halakha also said in the name of our teacher that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce, as Rav Ḥama bar Gurya, referred to as our teachers, says that our teacher Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

There are those who say a different version of this statement: And our colleagues who are well versed in matters of halakha and the disciples of our teacher said in the name of our teacher that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce, as Rav Ḥisda, Rabba bar Rav Huna’s colleague, said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya, his teacher, said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

And similarly, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael he said that Rabbi Elazar, the amora, says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar with regard to bills of divorce.

MISHNA: With regard to a case of two men who sent their wives two identical bills of divorce with an agent, as both their names and their wives’ names are identical, and the two bills of divorce were mixed up, the agent should hand both bills of divorce to this wife and both of them to that wife, so that each wife definitely receives her bill of divorce, although it is unclear which one is hers. Therefore, if one of the bills of divorce was lost before it was given to both women, the other is void, because it is unknown which bill of divorce was meant for which woman.

With regard to five husbands who wrote a general wording in the bill of divorce, i.e., who wrote one common bill of divorce for their wives with a single formula, writing that so-and-so divorces his wife so-and-so, and so-and-so divorces so-and-so, and the witnesses signed below, in this case all of these bills of divorce that were combined into one bill are valid; and the bill must be handed to each and every wife individually, so they will all be divorced by it.

If the scribe was writing a separate formula in the bill of divorce for each and every couple, and the witnesses signed below, the formula with which the witnesses’ signatures are read is valid. In other words, the formula directly underneath which they signed is valid, and the others are not valid.

GEMARA: Who is the tanna who taught that the two bills of divorce that were mixed up should be handed to both wives? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as had it been in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, since he says that witnesses of the transmission of the bill of divorce effect the divorce, handing both bills of divorce to both wives would not enable the divorce of each woman to take effect. This is because the witnesses do not know at the time of the transmission with which one of the bills of divorce she is being divorced.

Abaye said: You can even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. Say that although Rabbi Elazar requires the writing of the bill of divorce to be for her sake, i.e., with the specific woman and man for whom it is designated in mind, does he require giving it to her for her sake? Although the transmission of the bill of divorce is what causes it to take effect, it need not be done with the designated woman in mind. Therefore, the divorce here is valid, as the bill of divorce was definitely given to the wife for whom it was intended.

§ It is stated in the mishna: With regard to five husbands who wrote a general wording in a bill of divorce, all of them can divorce their wives with it. But if a separate formula was written for each, only the last one is valid. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of the case of the general wording, and what are the circumstances of the case of the separate formula that was written for each couple?

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If there is one date and one formula written for all of them, such as: On such-and-such a date so-and-so divorced so-and-so, and so-and-so divorced so-and-so, that is a general wording. If a separate date and formula was written for each and every one of them, that is considered a separate formula.

And Reish Lakish says: