It is necessary to state this verse for another reason, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), from Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6). One would then say that just as there women are obligated to eat matza on the first night of Passover, despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva, so too here, with regard to the mitzva of residing in the sukka, women are obligated. Therefore it was necessary for the verse to use the term “the homeborn” to exclude women from the obligation to reside in a sukka.

The Gemara further asks: But there is the mitzva of appearance, i.e., the obligation to bring a burnt-offering on pilgrimage Festivals, which is a positive, time-bound mitzva. And the reason women are exempt from this obligation is that the Merciful One writes, with regard to this mitzva: “Three times in the year all of your males shall appear before the Lord God” (Exodus 23:17), which serves to exclude women. It may be derived from here that if that were not so, women would be obligated. This indicates that women are not necessarily exempt from every positive, time-bound mitzva.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the verse to teach the halakha in this case as well, as it might enter your mind to say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to appearance, where the verse states: Three times in the year all of your males shall appear,” from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly, about which the verse states: “When all of Israel come to appear before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 31:11). One would then say that just as women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly, so too they should be obligated to appear on a pilgrimage Festival. It is therefore necessary for the Torah to state explicitly that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance on a pilgrimage Festival.

With regard to the primary proof for the principle that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, the Gemara asks: But before deriving the halakha from phylacteries, to exempt women from all positive, time-bound mitzvot, derive it from the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, in which women are obligated, to obligate women in all these mitzvot. Abaye said: The mitzva of rejoicing does not apply directly to women. Rather, a woman is rendered joyful by her husband, i.e., the mitzva is for him to gladden her on a Festival.

The Gemara asks: What can be said with regard to a widow, who no longer has a husband but is nevertheless obligated to be joyful on a Festival, as it is written: “And you shall rejoice before the Lord your God, you…and the widow” (Deuteronomy 16:11)? The Gemara answers that the mitzva does not apply directly to a widow; rather, it applies to the men with whom she is present, i.e., they have an obligation to ensure that widows rejoice on the Festivals.

The Gemara asks: But why not derive that women are obligated in all positive, time-bound mitzvot from the mitzva of assembly, in which women are explicitly obligated despite the fact that it is a time-bound mitzva. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive in this manner, because the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, that women are obligated in these mitzvot despite the fact that these are positive, time-bound mitzvot. And there is a principle that any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent that applies to other cases. Rather, the two instances are considered exceptions.

The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning phylacteries and appearance are also two verses that come as one, as they both indicate that women are exempt from positive, time-bound mitzvot, and therefore the verses do not teach a precedent. The Gemara answers: These are not considered as two verses that come as one, as both are necessary, each for its own reason. As, if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from donning phylacteries and had not written that they are exempt from the mitzva of appearance, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy to obligate women from the verse stated with regard to appearance from the appearance stated with regard to the mitzva of assembly. Therefore, it is necessary for the Torah to teach that women are exempt from the mitzva of appearance.

And if the Merciful One had written that women are exempt from appearance, and had not written that they are exempt from donning phylacteries, I would say: I will compare phylacteries to mezuza, which would mean that women are obligated in the mitzva of phylacteries. Therefore, it is necessary to state this halakha for both phylacteries and appearance, and they are not two verses that come as one.

The Gemara asks: If so, the verses concerning matza and assembly are also necessary, each for its own reason, and they are not two verses that come as one either. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: For what purpose are both of them necessary? Granted, if the Merciful One had written that women are obligated in the mitzva of assembly but had not written that they are obligated in eating matza, I would say: Derive a verbal analogy with regard to Passover, where the verse states: “And on the fifteenth day of the same month is the festival of Passover” (Leviticus 23:6), from Sukkot, where the verse states: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot” (Leviticus 23:34), teaching that women are exempt from eating matza, just as they are exempt from residing in a sukka. Therefore, it is necessary for a verse to teach that women are obligated in eating matza.

But let the Merciful One write that women are obligated in eating matza, and it would not be necessary to state the same halakha with regard to assembly, and I would say on my own: If children are obligated in assembly, as is stated explicitly in the verse “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the children” (Deuteronomy 31:12), are women not all the more so obligated? Therefore, as it is explicitly stated that women are obligated in assembly, the verses concerning matza and assembly are two verses that come as one, and consequently do not teach a precedent.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says as a principle that two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent. But according to the one who says that two verses that come as one do teach a precedent, what can be said?

And furthermore, one can ask: From where do we derive that women are obligated in positive mitzvot that are not time bound? The Gemara answers that one derives this from the mitzva of fearing one’s mother and father: Just as women are obligated in the mitzva of fear (Leviticus 19:3), so too, women are obligated in every positive mitzva that is not time bound.

The Gemara asks: But why not derive the opposite from Torah study: Just as women are exempt from Torah study, so too they should be exempt from all positive mitzvot that are not time bound. The Gemara answers: One cannot derive an exemption for women from their exemption from Torah study, because Torah study and procreation are two verses that come as one, as in both cases women are exempt, despite the fact that these are not time-bound mitzvot. And any two verses that come as one do not teach a precedent.