Any mitzva that the Jewish people were commanded to perform before entering Eretz Yisrael, i.e., it was not linked to entry into the land, applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael. Conversely, any mitzva that they were commanded to perform after they entered Eretz Yisrael applies only in Eretz Yisrael, except for the abrogation of monetary debts in the Sabbatical Year (see Deuteronomy 15:1–2), and the emancipation of slaves in the Jubilee Year (see Leviticus 25:39–41). Even though the Jews were commanded with regard to these mitzvot that they were to perform them only after their entry into Eretz Yisrael, these mitzvot apply both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael.

The Gemara questions the need for this ruling: The abrogation of monetary debts is an obligation of the body. Since this mitzva is not referring to the land, what is the novelty of the ruling that it applies even outside of Eretz Yisrael?

The Gemara answers: It is necessary to mention the cancellation of debts only for that which is taught in a baraita. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse states in the context of the cancellation of debts: “And this is the manner of the abrogation: He shall abrogate” (Deuteronomy 15:2). The verse speaks of two types of abrogation: One is the release of land and one is the abrogation of monetary debts. Since the two are juxtaposed, one can learn the following: At a time when you release land, when the Jubilee Year is practiced, you abrogate monetary debts; at a time when you do not release land, such as the present time, when the Jubilee Year is no longer practiced, you also do not abrogate monetary debts.

The Gemara asks: But why not say that one can learn the following from this juxtaposition: In a place where you release land, i.e., in Eretz Yisrael, you abrogate monetary debts, and in a place where you do not release land, you do not abrogate monetary debts. If so, the abrogation of debts would apply only in Eretz Yisrael, despite the fact that this obligation is not related to the land. Therefore, the verse states: “Because the Lord’s abrogation has been proclaimed” (Deuteronomy 15:2), to indicate that this obligation applies in any case, even outside of Eretz Yisrael. This is the novelty of the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemara questions the need for the second ruling of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: The emancipation of slaves is also an obligation of the body, not one that applies to the land. What is novel about this ruling? The Gemara answers that it might enter your mind to say: Since it is written: “And proclaim liberty throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof” (Leviticus 25:10), one could say: “Throughout the land,” yes, this mitzva applies, but outside of Eretz Yisrael, no, the emancipation does not take effect. Therefore the same verse also states the seemingly superfluous phrase: “It shall be a Jubilee” (Leviticus 25:10), to indicate that it applies in any case, in all places.

The Gemara asks: If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Throughout the land”? The Gemara answers that this phrase teaches: When the liberty of slaves applies in Eretz Yisrael, it also applies outside of Eretz Yisrael, and when the liberty of slaves does not apply in Eretz Yisrael, it does not apply outside of Eretz Yisrael. The mitzva depends on whether the Jubilee Year is in effect, not on the place in question.

We learned in a mishna there (Orla 3:9): The new crop is forbidden by Torah law everywhere; orla is forbidden outside of Eretz Yisrael according to a halakha, as the Gemara will immediately explain; and diverse kinds are forbidden outside the land by rabbinic law. The Gemara asks: What is this halakha, mentioned with regard to orla? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: It is the local halakha, i.e., this was the practice of Jews in places where they settled. Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

Ulla said to Rav Yehuda: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that the mishna means that this is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, this is the reason why we distinguish between fruit whose status as orla is uncertain, which is forbidden outside of Eretz Yisrael according to the halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and produce whose status as diverse kinds is uncertain, which is permitted outside of Eretz Yisrael, as the prohibition of diverse kinds applies outside of Eretz Yisrael only by rabbinic law.

This is as we learned in a mishna (Orla 3:9): Fruit whose status as orla is uncertain is forbidden in Eretz Yisrael, and it is permitted in Syria with no concern about its uncertain status. Outside of Eretz Yisrael, a Jew may go down into the gentile’s field and purchase fruit that is orla from the gentile, provided that the Jew does not see him gather it.

Nevertheless, we learned in a mishna with regard to the halakhot of diverse kinds (Orla 3:9): If a vineyard has vegetables planted in it, and there are vegetables being sold outside the vineyard, but there is no proof that these vegetables came from the vineyard, in Eretz Yisrael they are forbidden. The reason is that as it is possible that the vegetables came from the vineyard, the halakha is stringent in a case involving a prohibition by Torah law. In Syria these vegetables are permitted.

Outside of Eretz Yisrael, if the gentile owner of a field containing diverse kinds goes down into his field and gathers produce, then, provided that the Jew does not gather it by hand, he may purchase the produce from the gentile. This indicates that outside of Eretz Yisrael there is a difference between orla of uncertain status and diverse kinds of uncertain status. This is understandable if orla is forbidden by a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, while diverse kinds are forbidden by rabbinic law.

But according to your opinion, that neither orla nor diverse kinds is forbidden by Torah law,