not at the time of the completion of its work, i.e., while it is still growing; and a laborer who works with produce detached from the ground after the completion of its work, when it is sufficiently processed and therefore subject to tithes; and a laborer who works with an item whose growth is not from the land.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that a laborer may eat from produce attached to the ground, derived? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure; but you shall not put any in your vessel” (Deuteronomy 23:25). The Gemara asks: We find a source for a vineyard; from where do we derive that a laborer may likewise eat from any other type of produce?

The Gemara answers: We derive it from a comparison to the case of a vineyard: Just as a vineyard is unique in that it is an entity whose growth is from the ground, and the laborer eats from it at the time of the completion of its work, i.e., when he is harvesting the grapes, so too with regard to any entity whose growth is from the ground and it is at the time of the completion of its work, a laborer may eat from it.

The Gemara challenges this derivation: What is notable about a vineyard? It is notable in that the owner of a vineyard is obligated in the mitzva of olelot, the obligation to leave incomplete clusters of grapes for the poor (see Leviticus 19:10). Accordingly, one should not be able to derive the halakha of other types of produce from the halakha of a vineyard. The Gemara explains: We derive the halakha that a laborer may eat from other crops from the halakha that he may eat standing grain. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that he may eat standing grain itself? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “When you come into your neighbor’s standing grain, then you may pluck ears with your hand; but you shall not move a sickle on to your neighbor’s standing grain” (Deuteronomy 23:26).

The Gemara responds: What is notable about standing grain? It is notable in that the owner of dough prepared from grain is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla. The Gemara asks an incidental question: And from where do you know that this standing grain mentioned in the verse is the same standing grain whose owner is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla? Perhaps the Merciful One is discussing any standing produce, not only the five grains from which ḥalla must be separated.

The Gemara answers: The matter is derived by means of a verbal analogy between the term “standing” written here and the term “standing” written elsewhere. It is written here: “When you come into your neighbor’s standing grain” (Deuteronomy 23:26), and it is written there, with regard to harvesting the barley for the omer offering: “Seven weeks you shall count for yourself; from the time the sickle is first put to the standing grain” (Deuteronomy 16:9). Just as there, in the verse referring to the harvesting of the omer, it is the owner of standing grain who is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla, as barley is one of the five grains, so too here, with regard to a laborer, it is discussing standing grain whose owner is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla.

The Gemara resumes its discussion by reiterating its earlier question. The comparison between standing grain and other produce can be refuted as follows: What is notable about standing grain? It is notable in that the owner of dough prepared from grain is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla. The Gemara answers: Let the case of a vineyard prove that this comparison is valid, as the mitzva of ḥalla does not apply to the produce of a vineyard, and yet a laborer may eat from it. The Gemara asks: What is notable about a vineyard? It is notable in that its owner is obligated in the mitzva of olelot. The Gemara responds: Let the case of standing grain prove that this is not a decisive factor, as its owner is not obligated in the mitzva of olelot and even so a laborer may eat from it.

Since no exact comparison can be drawn to either a vineyard or standing grain alone, the Gemara suggests a combined solution: The inference has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case, a vineyard, is not like the aspect of that case, standing grain. Their common denominator is that each one grows from the earth and at the time of the completion of its work the laborer may eat from it. So too, with regard to any type of produce that grows from the earth, at the time of the completion of its work, a laborer may eat from it.

The Gemara asks: What is unique about their common denominator? It is unique in that they have an aspect relating to the altar, i.e., the products of both a vineyard and standing grain differ from other types of produce in that they are both offered on the altar. Wine is brought for libations and flour in meal-offerings. The Gemara suggests tangentially: An olive should also be derived through this category of those products which a laborer may eat, as it too has an aspect relating to the altar, in the oil of meal-offerings.

The Gemara refutes this suggestion: And is the halakha of an olive derived from the common factor of the two types of produce mentioned earlier? But it itself is called the fruit of a vineyard [kerem], as it is written: “And he burned up both the piles of produce and the standing grain, and also the olive yards [kerem zayit]” (Judges 15:5). Rav Pappa said: This verse does not mean that an olive is considered the product of a vineyard, as in the verse it is called olive yard [kerem zayit], and it is not called a plain vineyard. Therefore, the halakha of olives must be derived by analogy from the common denominator.

The Gemara resumes its discussion: In any case, it is difficult, as there still has not been found a source according to which the halakha that a laborer may eat when he is working applies to all types of produce. Rather, Shmuel said: The verse states with regard to a laborer who may eat produce: “But you shall not move a sickle” (Deuteronomy 23:26). This serves to include all types of produce that are cut with a sickle.

The Gemara asks: But this word “sickle” is necessary to teach a different halakha with regard to a laborer: At the time of the sickle, i.e., when the work has been completed and the produce is being picked, you may eat. But when it is not yet the time of the sickle, you may not eat. If so, how can Shmuel use the term “sickle” as the source for the halakha that a laborer may eat all kinds of produce that are cut with a sickle?

The Gemara answers: That halakha, with regard to when a laborer may eat, is derived from the verse: “But you may not put any in your vessel” (Deuteronomy 23:25), as the Gemara will explain later. Therefore, the word “sickle” is not required to teach that halakha and can be used as the source of the halakha that a laborer may eat all kinds of produce that are cut with a sickle, as stated by Shmuel. The Gemara asks: Shmuel’s derivation works out well for any type of produce that requires a sickle for its harvest. But from where do we derive that the same applies to a type of produce that does not require a sickle for its harvest?

Rather, Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the halakha concerning which produce a laborer may eat is derived from a different source. The verse states: “Standing [kama]” (Deuteronomy 23:26), and the unmodified term kama serves to include any standing produce. The Gemara asks: But didn’t you say earlier that the term standing is referring specifically to standing produce whose owner is obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla, and not to other produce?

The Gemara answers: That matter applies before we derived a halakha from the mention of “sickle.” Now that a halakha was derived from “sickle,” any type of produce that requires a sickle for its harvesting is included, as stated earlier, and this applies even though the owner of that particular produce is not obligated in the mitzva of ḥalla. Accordingly, why do I need the term “standing”? It serves to include any standing produce.

The Gemara asks: And now that we have derived the halakha concerning which produce a laborer is entitled to eat both from the mention of “sickle” and from “standing,” why do I need the earlier verse: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard, then you may eat grapes until you have enough at your own pleasure; but you may not put any in your vessel” (Deuteronomy 23:25)?

The Gemara answers that Rava said: This verse is required for its unique halakhot, as it is taught in a baraita that the phrase “when you come [tavo]” is interpreted as follows: Coming [bia] is stated here, and coming is also stated there: “In the same day you shall give him his wages, and the sun shall not go down [tavo] upon it” (Deuteronomy 24:15). Just as there, in Deuteronomy, chapter 24, the verse is speaking of a laborer, so too here, in Deuteronomy, chapter 23, the verse is speaking of a laborer, despite the fact that this detail is not stated explicitly in the verse.

The baraita continues analyzing the verse: The phrase “in your neighbor’s vineyard” indicates that it is prohibited for a laborer to put the grapes in his vessel only while he is working in the vineyard of a Jew, but not in the vineyard of a gentile, where he may place grapes in his vessel. The Gemara digresses to discuss this point: This explanation works out well according to the one who says that robbery from a gentile is prohibited; this is why it was necessary for the verse to permit a laborer to eat the gentile’s grapes. But according to the one who says that robbery from a gentile is permitted, now that robbery itself is permitted, is it necessary to teach that a laborer in the vineyard of a gentile is permitted to put grapes in his vessel?

The Gemara answers: The one who maintains that robbery from a gentile is permitted interprets the phrase “in your neighbor’s vineyard” as teaching that a laborer may eat produce only in his neighbor’s vineyard, but he may not eat produce of consecrated property. The baraita continues: The term “then you may eat” indicates that a laborer must eat the entire grape and may not suck its juice and cast the rest away. The word “grapes” teaches that a laborer may eat only grapes by themselves and not grapes and something else, i.e., he may not use a condiment to make the grapes more palatable to enable him to eat an excessive amount.

The term: “At your own pleasure [kenafshekha]” (Deuteronomy 23:25), can also mean: As you are. Consequently, the term kenafshekha teaches that just as the halakha is concerning the owner of the vineyard himself, so is the halakha concerning you, the laborer himself: Just as the owner, alluded to by the term nafshekha, may eat from the produce before its labor is complete and is exempt from separating tithes, so too, the laborer himself may eat and is exempt from tithes.

The expression: “until you have enough” indicates that a laborer may eat until he is satiated, but he may not engage in excessive eating. The phrase “but you may not put any in your vessel” teaches that at a time when you put the grapes in the owner’s vessels, i.e., when harvesting the grapes, then you may eat, but at a time when you are not putting the grapes in the owner’s vessels, i.e., if the laborer is performing other tasks in the vineyard before harvesting, you may not eat.

§ Rabbi Yannai says: The owner of untithed produce is not obligated in the mitzva of tithing