they will protect me. Although there were people on hand to whom he could have handed the phylacteries, he kept them to protect himself from danger. Rava said: When we would walk after Rabbi Naḥman, we would see that when he was holding a book of aggada, he would give it to us. When he was holding phylacteries, he would not give them to us, as he said: Since the Sages permitted to hold them, they will protect me.

The Sages taught: One may not hold phylacteries in his hand or a Torah scroll in his arm and pray, because his concern that the phylacteries or Torah scroll might fall will distract him from his prayer. And so too, with regard to sacred objects, one may not urinate with them in his hands and may not sleep with them in his hands, neither a deep sleep nor even a brief nap. Shmuel said: Not only should one holding phylacteries refrain from prayer, but one holding a knife, money, a bowl, or a loaf of bread have a similar status in that his concern that they might fall will distract him from his prayer.

Rava said that Rav Sheshet said: The halakha is not in accordance with this baraita, because it is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. As if it was in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, now Beit Hillel permitted to hold phylacteries in his hand when he defecates in a regular bathroom, is it necessary to say that it is permitted when he urinates in a makeshift bathroom?

The Gemara raised an objection based on the second part of the baraita, where it was taught: Matters which I permitted you to do here, I prohibited you from doing there. In other words, there are matters that were permitted in a regular bathroom and not in a makeshift bathroom. What, is it not referring to phylacteries? Granted, if you say that the prohibition against urinating while wearing phylacteries is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, then we would understand the baraita as follows: Matters which I permitted you to do here, to hold phylacteries in a regular bathroom, I have prohibited you from doing there, in the makeshift bathroom. But if you hold that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, they did not permit anything in a regular bathroom. What, then, is the meaning of matters which I permitted you to do here?

This challenge is rejected by the Gemara, which explains: When that baraita was taught it was not in reference to phylacteries, but with regard to the matter of one handbreadth and two handbreadths. As is it was taught in one baraita: When one relieves himself, he must maintain modesty and bare a single handbreadth of his flesh behind him and two handbreadths before him. And it was taught in another baraita: One may only bare a single handbreadth behind him and nothing before him.

What, are not both this baraita and that one referring to a male, and the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot is not difficult, as here the baraita that states that one may bare a handbreadth behind him and nothing before him is referring to defecation, while here, the other baraita that states that one may bare a handbreadth behind him and two handbreadths before him is referring to urination. Accordingly, despite the fact that one may bare two handbreadths before him when urinating in a makeshift bathroom, matters that I have permitted you to do here, one may bare nothing before him when defecating in an established bathroom, I have prohibited you from doing there.

The Gemara rejects this explanation: And how can you understand it that way? If that baraita is referring to urination, why do I need to bare one handbreadth behind him? Rather, both this baraita and that baraita are referring to defecation, and the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot is not difficult. This baraita that states that one may bare two handbreadths before him is referring to a man, who must bare himself in case he inadvertently urinates. That baraita that states that one may not bare anything in front is referring to a woman, who does not need to uncover herself to account for inadvertent urination.

The Gemara challenges this: If so, then that which is taught with regard to this halakha in the baraita: This is an a fortiori inference for which there is no refutation, meaning that even though logically it would seem correct to be stricter in the case of defecating in a regular bathroom than in the case of urinating in a makeshift bathroom, that is not the ruling, is difficult. According to the distinction suggested above, what is the meaning of: for which there is no refutation? That is the nature of the matter; men and women need to uncover themselves differently.

Rather, is it not so that the baraita that states: Matters which I permitted you to do here, I prohibited you from doing there, is referring to phylacteries, and the a fortiori inference that cannot be refuted is similarly referring to phylacteries. And the refutation of that which Rava says that Rav Sheshet says, that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, is indeed a conclusive refutation.

The Gemara asks: Nevertheless, it remains difficult: Now, holding phylacteries in his hand when he defecates in a regular bathroom is permitted, all the more so that it is permitted when he urinates in a makeshift bathroom.

The Gemara explains: It says as follows: When defecating in a regular bathroom, where one sits there are no drops of urine on one’s clothes or shoes, he need not dirty his hands to clean his garment, and therefore one is permitted to hold phylacteries in his hand. However, in a makeshift bathroom, where one stands, and there are ricocheting drops which he may touch with his hand, it is prohibited.

The Gemara challenges: If so, then why was it referred to as an a fortiori inference that “cannot be refuted”? This seems an excellent refutation that explains the distinction.

The Gemara explains that it says as follows: Derive this matter based on the reason mentioned above that due to different circumstances the ruling is different. Do not derive it by means of an a fortiori inference, as if you were to derive it by means of an a fortiori inference, it would certainly be an a fortiori inference that cannot be rebutted.

The Sages taught: One who wishes to enter and partake of a regular meal that will last for some time, paces a distance of four cubits ten times, or ten cubits four times, in order to expedite the movement of the bowels, and defecates. Only then may he enter and partake of the meal. That way he spares himself the unpleasantness of being forced to leave in the middle of the meal.

On this same subject, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: One who partakes of a regular meal removes his phylacteries and then enters, as it is inappropriate to partake in a meal where there is frivolity while wearing phylacteries. And this statement disputes the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as Rabbi Ḥiyya said: During a formal meal one places his phylacteries on his table, and it is admirable for him to do so in order that they will be available to don immediately if he so desires.

The Gemara asks: And until when in the meal must he refrain from wearing phylacteries? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Until the time of the recitation of the blessing of Grace after Meals.

It was taught in one baraita: One may bundle his phylacteries with his money in his head covering [apraksuto], and it was taught in another baraita: One may not bundle phylacteries and money together.

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult, as one must distinguish and say that this baraita, which prohibits bundling phylacteries and money together, refers to a case where the vessel was designated for use with phylacteries, while this baraita, which permits one to do so, refers to a case where the vessel was not designated for that purpose. As Rav Ḥisda said: With regard to this cloth used with phylacteries that one designated to bundle phylacteries in it, if one already bundled phylacteries in it then it is prohibited to bundle coins in it, but if he only designated it for that purpose, but did not yet bundle phylacteries in it, or if he bundled phylacteries in it but did not originally designate it for that purpose, then it is permitted to bundle money in it.

And according to Abaye, who said that designation is significant, as Abaye holds that all relevant halakhot apply to an object designated for a specific purpose, whether or not it has been already used for that purpose, the halakha is: If he designated the cloth, even if he did not bundle phylacteries in it, he is prohibited from bundling money in it. However, if he bundled phylacteries in it, if he designated the cloth for that particular use, it is prohibited to bundle money in it, but if he did not designate it, no, it is not prohibited.

Rav Yosef, son of Rav Neḥunya, raised a dilemma before Rav Yehuda: What is the halakha; may a man place his phylacteries in his bed, under his head while he sleeps? He himself explains: With regard to whether or not one may place them under his feet, I have no dilemma, as that would be treating them in a deprecating manner and is certainly prohibited. My dilemma is whether or not one may place them under his head; what is the halakha in that case? Rav Yehuda said to him, Shmuel said as follows: It is permitted, even if his wife is with him in his bed.

The Gemara raises an objection based on what was taught in a baraita: A man may not place his phylacteries under his feet, as in doing so, he treats them in a deprecating manner, but he may place them under his head. And if his wife was with him, it is prohibited even to place it under his head. If there was a place where he could place the phylacteries three handbreadths above or three handbreadths below his head it is permissible, as that space is sufficient for the phylacteries to be considered in a separate place.

This is a conclusive refutation of Shmuel’s statement. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.

Rava said: Although a baraita was taught that constitutes a conclusive refutation of Shmuel, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion in this matter. What is the reason for this?