of Rabbi Ḥiyya or the study hall of Rabbi Oshaya, who were precise in the formulation of their baraitot, is corrupted, and you may not raise objections based upon it in the study hall? Since this baraita was not taught in either of the aforementioned study halls, you may not cite it as proof. After all, perhaps the phrase: Are not included among those who are liable to receive forty lashes by Torah law, was taught by Rabbi Yehuda in the baraita, but the text was corrupted. It is therefore possible that according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is not flogged for violation of a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva, and his reasoning of his ruling in the mishna is that the word “shalle’aḥ” indicates that the mitzva to send away the mother bird applies only at the outset.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from that which is taught in a baraita by Rabbi Oshaya and Rabbi Ḥiyya: It is written with regard to forgotten sheaves left for the poor: “When you reap your harvest in your field and forget a sheaf in the field, you shall not return to fetch it” (Deuteronomy 24:19). If one transgressed this prohibition and one returned to fetch it, he is liable to receive lashes. Likewise, it is written with regard to produce in the corner of the field [pe’a], which is given to the poor: “And when you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not wholly reap the corner of your field” (Leviticus 19:9). If one transgressed this prohibition and reaped the corner of his field, such individuals are included among those who are liable to receive lashes by Torah law. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara concludes the resolution: Since the mitzvot of leaving pe’a and forgotten sheaves are prohibitions that entail fulfillment of a positive mitzva, as the verse states with regard to both of them: “For the poor and for the stranger you shall leave them” (Leviticus 19:10), conclude from the baraita that the reasoning of the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna is that he holds that one is flogged for violation of a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps there, with regard to pe’a and forgotten sheaves, this is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable to receive lashes: Because he holds that the positive mitzva: “For the poor and for the stranger you shall leave them,” indicates that these mitzvot apply only at the outset. Accordingly, these are not cases of prohibitions that entail fulfillment of a positive mitzva, but of independent prohibitions. Similarly, it is possible that the reasoning of the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna is that the mitzva of the sending away of the mother bird applies only at the outset.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear a resolution from that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to the Paschal offering: “You shall let nothing of it remain until the morning; but that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn in fire” (Exodus 12:10). The verse comes to position the positive mitzva of burning the leftover meat after the prohibition against leaving over the meat, in order to say that one is not flogged for its violation; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

Ravina continued: Conclude from the baraita that according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is not flogged for violation of a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva, and that the reasoning of the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna is that he holds that the word “shalle’aḥ” indicates that the mitzva to send away the mother applies only at the outset. Consequently, the prohibition against taking the mother with the offspring is not one that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva, but an independent prohibition that is punishable by lashes. The Gemara concedes: Conclude from it that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rav Idi said to Rav Ashi: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: With regard to one who takes the mother with the offspring, Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged and there is no longer a mitzva to send away the mother. But if it enters your mind to say that the reasoning of the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna is that one is flogged for violation of a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva, then Rabbi Yehuda should have said: He is flogged and sends away the mother. Rather, conclude that according to Rabbi Yehuda, this is not a prohibition that entails fulfillment of a positive mitzva.

The Gemara rejects this: One cannot infer anything from the language of the mishna, since perhaps this is what Rabbi Yehuda is saying in the mishna: There is still a mitzva to send away the mother, but one is not absolved of guilt for transgressing the prohibition against taking the mother until the court flogs him.

§ The mishna teaches that according to the Rabbis, if one transgressed the mitzva and took the mother bird with the young, one must send away the mother. The Gemara asks: How far from the nest must he send her? Rav Yehuda says: Far enough that she leaves his grasp and can no longer be caught immediately. The Gemara asks: In what manner does he send her away?Rav Huna says: He holds the mother by her feet and sends her away. Rav Yehuda says: He holds her by her wings [baagappeha] and sends her away. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Huna says that one holds the mother by her feet, as it is written: “That send forth freely the feet of the ox and the donkey” (Isaiah 32:20), indicating that the sending of an animal is associated with its feet. Rav Yehuda says that one holds her by her wings, because the feet of the mother bird are her wings, as it is by means of her wings that she moves about.

§ The Gemara relates: A certain person clipped a mother bird’s wing and sent it away and thereafter caught it. Rav Yehuda flogged him for transgressing the prohibition: “You shall not take the mother with the young” (Deuteronomy 22:6). Rav Yehuda also said to him: Go and let its wings grow back and then send it away.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rav Yehuda act in this case? If he acted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then there was no need to send away the mother, because according to Rabbi Yehuda, he is flogged for taking the mother bird, and he does not send away the mother. If he acted in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then he should not have flogged this individual, since according to the Rabbis, he sends away the mother and is not flogged. The Gemara responds: Actually, he acted in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the lashes administered by Rav Yehuda were not for transgressing a Torah prohibition; rather, they were rabbinic lashes for rebelliousness [makkat mardut], as this individual acted inappropriately.

The Gemara relates that a certain man came before Rava and said to him: What is the halakha with regard to a certain kosher bird known as the teima? Is it included in the mitzva of sending away the mother bird from the nest? Rava said: Doesn’t this man know that with regard to any kosher bird one is obligated to send away the mother? The man responded: Nevertheless, I am uncertain with regard to the halakha. Rava said to him: Perhaps you are uncertain about a case where a single egg is placed in the nest, since the Torah states: “Upon the fledglings or upon the eggs” (Deuteronomy 22:6). The man replied in the affirmative. Rava said to him: That too should be known to you, as it is stated in the mishna (140b): Even if there is only one fledgling or one egg, one is obligated to send away the mother.

The man sent away the bird, and Rava then surrounded her with nets [perastekei] and caught her. The Gemara asks: But shouldn’t Rava be concerned about arousing suspicion that he required the sending away of the bird only so that he might catch it for himself? The Gemara responds: The nets were positioned far from the nest in an unusual manner that did not arouse suspicion.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: Pigeons of a dovecote and pigeons of an attic are subject to the obligation of sending away the motherbird,because they are ownerless and therefore not considered readily available. But nevertheless, they are subject to the prohibition of robbery due to a rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace.

The Gemara objects: But if it is so that this ruling is correct that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says, i.e., that a person’s courtyard effects acquisition for him of an item placed in it even without his knowledge, then a dovecote or attic will effect acquisition for its owner of any eggs inside them. Accordingly, one should apply here the principle that the mitzva to send away the mother bird from the nest applies only in the case described in the verse: “If a bird’s nest happens before you” (Deuteronomy 22:6), which excludes from the mitzva a bird or egg readily available in one’s home. Yet the baraita rules that the mitzva does apply in this case.

Rav says: It is from the time of the emergence of the majority of an egg from a mother bird’s body that one becomes obligated to send away the mother from the nest. On the other hand, the owner of a courtyard does not acquire the egg until it fully emerges and falls into his courtyard. And therefore, when the baraita teaches that in the case of the pigeons in a dovecote or an attic, they are subject to the obligation of sending away the mother bird, it is referring to a time before the egg falls into his courtyard.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the egg has not fully emerged, why does the baraita rule that the eggs are forbidden by rabbinic law for others to take due to the prohibition of robbery? The eggs have not yet been acquired by the owner of the courtyard. The Gemara answers: That ruling of the baraita is referring to their mother, i.e., the mother bird. Or, if you wish, say instead: Actually, that ruling is referring to the egg. And the reason the Sages rendered it prohibited to take the eggs due to the prohibition of robbery is that once the majority of an egg emerges from the body of the mother bird, the owner’s mind is upon the eggs to acquire them, although technically he will not acquire them until they fully emerge.

The Gemara adds: And now that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is prohibited to acquire eggs whose mother is resting upon them, as it is stated: “You shall send the mother,” and only then: “The young you may take for yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:7), you may even say: Even though the eggs fully emerged and fell into his courtyard, he must still send away the mother bird. This is because in any case in which a courtyard owner is capable of acquiring an item by himself, his courtyard can also effect acquisition of it for him. But in any case in which he is incapable of acquiring an item by himself, his courtyard cannot effect acquisition of it for him either. Since one is incapable of acquiring the eggs so long as the mother bird is resting upon them, one’s property does not acquire the eggs for him even if they have already fallen into it.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the baraita is referring to a case where the courtyard cannot effect acquisition of the eggs for him, why does the baraita rule: They are subject to the prohibition only due to the rabbinic ordinance to maintain the ways of peace? If one sent away the mother bird before taking the eggs, then it is full-fledged robbery by Torah law, since the courtyard has effected acquisition of the eggs on behalf of its owner, and if one did not send away the mother bird, he needs to send her away before it is permitted to take the eggs. Either way, one will have transgressed Torah law and not a rabbinic prohibition.

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to a case where a minor took the eggs without sending away the mother. A minor is not obligated in the mitzva of sending away the mother bird. The Gemara asks: Is a minor subject to a rabbinic ordinance concerning robbery enacted to maintain the ways of peace? The Gemara responds: This is what the latter clause of the baraita is saying: The father of a minor who took such eggs is obligated to return them to the owner of the dovecote or attic, due to the rabbinic prohibition concerning robbery instituted to maintain the ways of peace.

§ The Gemara relates an additional incident with regard to pigeons of a dovecote that were discussed above: Levi bar Simon transferred ownership of the produce of his dovecote, i.e., the fledglings and the eggs contained in it, to Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda came before Shmuel and told him of his acquisition. Shmuel said to him: Go, bang on the nest, i.e., the dovecote, so that the fledglings will rise up and you will acquire them.

The Gemara asks: For what purpose did Shmuel tell Rav Yehuda to do this? If he meant for Rav Yehuda to finalize the acquisition so that Levi bar Simon could not retract, let him do so through acquisition by means of a cloth. There is no need for him to bang on the dovecote. If this incident occurred on the eve of a Festival, and Rav Yehuda came to ask what action to take in order to render the birds permitted for slaughter on the Festival, then banging on the dovecote should not be necessary,