But didn’t Rabbi Yirmeya say this ruling with regard to non-sacred lands, and Rabbi Yona said it with regard to consecrated property, and both of them said it in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: They are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, in the case of a disparity of one-sixth. But they are subject to nullification of a transaction, in the case of a greater disparity. If so, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yona, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that when the disparity between the value and the payment is greater than one-sixth, the transaction is nullified by Torah law. But in that case, why would Rabbi Yoḥanan rule here that only by rabbinic law is he required to calculate the difference and pay its value?

The Gemara answers: Actually, they disagree in a case of nullification of a transaction, i.e., more than one-sixth, and one should reverse attribution of the opinions; the opinion previously attributed to Rabbi Yoḥanan is actually that of Reish Lakish, and the opinion attributed to Reish Lakish is the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

The Gemara asks: But how can you say that one should reverse the attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish? This works out well according to the one who says that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that consecrated property is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth, but it is subject to nullification of the transaction if the disparity between the value and the payment is greater than one-sixth. According to this opinion, that of Rabbi Yona, it is apparent all the more so that lands are subject to nullification if the disparity is greater than one-sixth.

But according to the one who said that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that only lands are subject to nullification if the disparity is greater than one-sixth, but with regard to consecrated property there is no nullification of a transaction, i.e., Rabbi Yirmeya, how can he reverse attribution of that opinion, and claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that he is required to pay the difference in value by Torah law?

Rabbi Yirmeya said: According to my opinion, do not reverse attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. In other words, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that he is required to pay the difference in value by rabbinic law. This is consistent with Rabbi Yirmeya’s ruling that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is no nullification of a transaction in the case of consecrated property. Only Rabbi Yona would reverse attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in order for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion to be consistent with his statement, as cited by Rabbi Yona, that there is nullification of a transaction in the case of consecrated property.

It has been established that Rabbi Yona maintains that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan consecrated property is subject to nullification of a transaction, whereas Rabbi Yirmeya disputes that claim. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Consecrated property worth one hundred dinars [maneh] that one desacralized, with its sanctity transferred to a coin worth one peruta, is desacralized. Since consecrated property is not subject to nullification of a transaction, it is desacralized by coins worth any sum. The suggestion is that Rabbi Yona is not of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel, and Rabbi Yirmeya is of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; both this Sage and that Sage are of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel. The difference between them is that Rabbi Yona maintains that when Shmuel stated his halakha, he was referring to consecrated property that one desacralized after the fact, but he did not say that one may do so ab initio; and Rabbi Yirmeya maintains that Shmuel rules that it is permitted to desacralize consecrated property with coins worth any sum, even ab initio.

If you wish, say instead, with regard to the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan: Actually, do not reverse the attribution of their respective opinions. In fact, they disagree with regard to a disparity of one-sixth, and Reish Lakish holds that one is required to pay the difference value by Torah law. And as for that which poses a difficulty for you with regard to the opinion of Reish Lakish, that it is taught in the mishna: These are matters that are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation: Slaves, documents, lands, and consecrated property, which indicates that one is required to pay the difference in value by rabbinic law, that mishna should be understood in accordance with the explanation of Rav Ḥisda.

As Rav Ḥisda said: What is the meaning of the phrase: Are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation? This means that they are not subject to the standard principles of exploitation at all; rather, more stringent halakhot apply in these cases. As, even if the disparity is less than the measure of exploitation, i.e., less than one-sixth, one may renege on the transaction, and in the case of consecrated property he is required to pay the value of the disparity.

§ With regard to a case in which there was a disparity between the assessed value of property and its actual value, where one must pay the difference to the Temple treasury, Ulla said: The Sages said that one must pay the value of the disparity to the Temple treasury only if the value of the consecrated property was initially assessed by only two people and afterward three other people determined that the consecrated property was worth more. But in a case where the value of the consecrated property was initially assessed by three people, as required by halakha, and that amount was paid to the Temple treasury, even if afterward one hundred people came and assessed the value of the consecrated property at a higher value, one need not return the disparity of value to the Temple treasury.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Safra say: Where did one say the ruling that one hundred witnesses are like two witnesses, and two witnesses are like one hundred witnesses? That principle applies specifically to the matter of testimony. But with regard to the matter of assessments, we follow the majority of opinions. If so, in Ulla’s case, one should follow the assessment of the one hundred and pay the disparity to the Temple treasury.

And furthermore, even in a case where three people initially assessed the value of the consecrated property, and afterward three other people assessed the consecrated property at a higher value, don’t we follow the latter assessment? Isn’t there is a principle that the Temple treasury of consecrated property always has the advantage?

The Gemara answers: Ulla holds that the halakha that the owner is required to conduct an appraisal, to ascertain the relative value of the two animals and to pay the difference to the Temple treasury, applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law, and the Sages were lenient with regard to all rabbinic laws. Therefore, even if one hundred people assessed the value of the consecrated property at a higher value than the earlier assessment, one is not required to pay the disparity in value to the Temple treasury.

MISHNA: If one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of a burnt offering, or: It is in place of a sin offering, he has said nothing, as he did not say that it was in place of a specific offering. If he said: It is in place of this sin offering, or: It is in place of this burnt offering, or if he said: It is in place of a sin offering that I have in the house, or: It is in place of a burnt offering that I have in the house, and he had that offering in his house, his statement stands, i.e., is effective.

If he said with regard to a non-kosher animal and with regard to a blemished animal: These animals are hereby designated as a burnt offering, he has said nothing. If he said: These animals are hereby designated for a burnt offering, the animals should be sold, and he brings a burnt offering purchased with the money received from their sale.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of a burnt offering, he has said nothing. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, didn’t Rabbi Meir say: A person does not utter a statement for naught. In other words, if one issues a statement that cannot be fulfilled as stated, it is interpreted in a manner that renders it relevant. Consequently, when he said: This non-sacred animal is in place of a burnt offering, he must have been referring to a burnt offering that he had in his house.

§ The mishna teaches: If he said with regard to a non-kosher animal and with regard to a blemished animal: These animals are hereby designated for a burnt offering, the animals should be sold, and he brings a burnt offering purchased with the money received from their sale. The Gemara infers: The reason that these animals are sold is that they are non-kosher and blemished animals, which are not fit to be sacrificed, and therefore they do not require the development of a blemish for them to be sold. But in the case of one who separates a female animal for a guilt offering or for a burnt offering, which may be brought only from males, since a female animal is fit to be sacrificed as a different type of offering, the animal does require the development of a blemish for it to be sold.

Consequently, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna (19b) that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who designates a female animal for a guilt offering, since a female is unfit to be sacrificed as that offering, its halakhic status is like that of a blemished animal in the sense that it does not become inherently sacred; rather, only its value is sacred. Therefore, it may be sold without it having developed a blemish, and a guilt offering is purchased with the money received from its sale.