Rather, it is referring to a case where one says to himself that this is permitted. He is under the impression that idol worship is permitted, and his unwitting act was the result of ignorance, not forgetfulness. As, Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman with regard to Shabbat only so it could be determined whether to deem one who is unaware of both the essence of Shabbat and the specific prohibited labors liable to bring one sin offering, or whether to deem him liable to bring two sin offerings. But as for the possibility to exempt him completely, he did not raise such a dilemma before him.

Rav Pappa says: You find an act performed unwittingly with regard to idol worship in the case of a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and never taught about the Torah, as he knows that idol worship in general is prohibited, but with regard to these particular objects of idol worship that he is worshipping, he does not know that they are prohibited.

And if you wish, say instead: You may even say this ruling is stated with regard to an adult, i.e., one who was not captured by gentiles as a child, and it is speaking of a case where he erred with regard to this verse: “You shall not make with Me gods of silver and gods of gold, you shall not make for yourselves” (Exodus 20:20). This person thinks that when bowing to an idol is prohibited it applies only to an object of idol worship fashioned of silver or gold; but with regard to objects fashioned of other substances, such as wood or stone, it is permitted. And that is a case of an action that is unwitting with regard to idol worship but intentional with regard to the prohibited rites.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said a different interpretation of the mishna in the name of Rav Beivai: The tanna teaches the general category of Shabbat and the general category of idol worship, without mentioning the details of how many sin offerings one would be liable to bring for transgressing each prohibition. The Gemara asks: From where can one infer this is the case? From the fact that the mishna teaches: One who engages in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, or with a married woman. But there is the case of one’s daughter from the woman he raped, which the mishna does not teach. The case of a daughter from the woman one raped is included in the category of intercourse with a woman and her daughter, yet it is not taught explicitly. Evidently, it is included in the general category of intercourse with a woman and her daughter.

The Sages say in response to this inference: The tanna of the mishna teaches those prohibitions that are written explicitly in the Torah; he does not teach those prohibitions that are not written explicitly but are derived from the verses. That is the reason he does not teach the case of intercourse with a daughter from the woman one raped; it is not because he is teaching only general categories.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: But there is the case of one’s wife’s daughter, and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son, which are written explicitly, and yet the tanna does not teach them. Rather, you must say that he teaches the general category of intercourse with a woman and her daughter, which includes those cases. So too, he teaches the general category of Shabbat and the general category of idol worship.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, raises a contradiction between one statement of Rav Beivai bar Abaye and another statement of his: Did Rav Beivai bar Abaye actually say this, that the tanna teaches the general category of Shabbat and teaches the general category of idol worship? But wasn’t it stated: One who offers up the limbs of an offering slaughtered inside the Temple outside the Temple, i.e., he slaughtered the animal within the Sanctuary in accordance with halakha but sacrificed its limbs on an altar outside the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering if he did so unwittingly. Likewise, if he sacrifices limbs of an offering slaughtered outside the Temple outside the Temple, he is liable.

And Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised a difficulty: If so, consider that which we learned in the mishna: There are thirty-six cases in the Torah with regard to which one who performs the action intentionally is liable to receive karet. They are actually thirty-seven, as there is the case of one who offers up the limbs of an offering slaughtered inside the Temple outside the Temple, and one who offers up limbs of an offering slaughtered outside the Temple outside the Temple. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, explains the contradiction: If Rav Beivai bar Abaye maintains that the tanna of the mishna does not tally all the relevant prohibitions but states general categories, what is difficult to him? Let him answer that he teaches the category of offering up in the clause: One who slaughters offerings and who sacrifices them outside the Temple. The tanna would not then need to list these individual transgressions.

The Gemara responds: Are these cases comparable? In the cases of Shabbat and idol worship the tanna taught their details in their places [abeinekheihon], on Shabbat 73a and Sanhedrin 60b, respectively. Consequently, with regard to karet, where it is necessary to mention them as part of a list of prohibitions that are punishable by karet, Rav Beivai bar Abaye answers that the tanna teaches the category of Shabbat and teaches the category of idol worship, but he did not need to specify the details in this manner. By contrast, with regard to bringing up an offering, does the tanna teach them in their place, so that Rav Beivai bar Abaye can answer in this manner?

§ It was stated earlier that Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: Anywhere you find two different prohibitions but only one punishment of karet is stated for both of them you should divide the sin offering between them, i.e., if one transgressed both prohibitions unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin offering for each. In a similar vein, Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If there are two punishments of karet and only one prohibition written with regard to a certain act, what is the halakha? Is one liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act? Rabbi Zeira said to him: Are you saying this in reference to one who slaughters offerings outside the Temple and one who offered up the limbs of offerings outside the Temple? These do not match your description, as these are two separate prohibitions.

Rabbi Zeira elaborates: If one considers the matter according to the one who derives the prohibition from a verbal analogy, it is as though both prohibitions are written explicitly. As it is stated here an expression of bringing: “Or who slaughters it outside the camp, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:3–4), and it is stated there an expression of bringing: “Who sacrifices a burnt offering or sacrifice, and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” (Leviticus 17:8–9).

Since there is a verbal analogy linking slaughtering an offering outside the Temple to sacrificing one outside the Temple, it follows that just as there, with regard to sacrificing, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act, as it is written: “Take heed to yourself, lest you sacrifice your burnt offerings in every place that you see” (Deuteronomy 12:13), so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act as a separate prohibition.

If one considers the matter according to the one who derives the prohibition from a juxtaposition, it is also as though both prohibitions are written explicitly. The juxtaposition is that the verse states: “There you shall sacrifice your burnt offerings and there you shall do all that I command you” (Deuteronomy 12:14). Here the verse juxtaposes slaughtering, in the phrase: “And there you shall do,” to offering up. This teaches that just as there, with regard to offering up, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act, so too here, with regard to slaughtering, the Torah did not prescribe punishment unless it explicitly prohibited the act. Whether one derives the prohibition by verbal analogy or juxtaposition, it is considered as though the Torah explicitly wrote a prohibition with regard to slaughtering, and therefore this would not meet the criteria of Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma.

Rabbi Zeira continues to address Rabbi Yirmeya: Perhaps you are stating your dilemma with regard to two prohibitions punishable by the death penalty and only one prohibition is written with regard to them, and your dilemma is whether one brings two sin offerings if one transgressed both unwittingly, despite the fact that only one prohibition is written with regard to both acts. What is such a circumstance? This applies in the case of a necromancer, who raises up the spirit of the dead, and a sorcerer, who places a certain bone in his mouth for it to speak of its own accord (see Leviticus 20:6, 27).

Rabbi Zeira further said to Rabbi Yirmeya: This should not be a dilemma, as this matter is a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. As the Sages taught a baraita, where they list those liable to be executed by stoning, in tractate Sanhedrin (53a): A necromancer and a sorcerer, and the following presents a difficulty to us: And what is different with regard to stonings that the tanna teaches the case of a sorcerer, but the tanna does not teach the case of a sorcerer with regard to the list of transgressions punishable by karet, thereby indicating that one is liable to bring only a single sin offering for both transgressions?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tanna in tractate Karetot does not count the case of the sorcerer on its own since both the sorcerer and the necromancer were stated in one prohibition: “Do not turn to the necromancers and the sorcerers” (Leviticus 19:31); therefore, there is no separate obligation to bring an offering for each of them. The Gemara clarifies: And let the tanna say the case of a sorcerer and let him not say the case of a necromancer, rather than the reverse. The Gemara explains: The tanna maintains that since the verse opened with the case of a necromancer, it is proper to list that transgression and omit the case of a sorcerer.

And Reish Lakish says: The case of the sorcerer is not included in the list of transgressions punishable by karet since it does not involve an action, but only speech, through the use of a bone, and one does not bring a sin offering for a prohibition that does not involve an action. The Gemara asks: And as for Reish Lakish, what is the reason he does not state an explanation in accordance with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan?

Rav Pappa said: Reish Lakish disagrees with the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan because the cases of a necromancer and a sorcerer are divided in the verse with regard to the issue of the death penalty, i.e., one is liable to receive the death penalty for transgressing either prohibition, as it is stated: “And a man also or a woman, who are a necromancer or a sorcerer shall be put to death” (Leviticus 20:27). Consequently, one would be liable to bring a separate sin offering for the unwitting transgression of either prohibition were it not for the fact that sorcery does not involve an action. And Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you that a division of a prohibition is considered a division that leads to separate sin offerings, whereas a division of separate death penalties is not considered a division in this regard.

The Gemara further asks: And as for Rabbi Yoḥanan, what is the reason he does not state an explanation in accordance with the explanation of Reish Lakish, who says the prohibition with regard to a sorcerer is not counted because it does not involve an action? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains: Who is the tanna who taught the list of those liable to receive karet? It is Rabbi Akiva, who says: An action is not required for one to be liable to bring a sin offering.

The Gemara asks: And as for Reish Lakish, how does he respond to this claim? He could say that although Rabbi Akiva does not require a significant action for one to be liable to bring a sin offering, nevertheless he does require a minor action. The transgression of a sorcerer involves no action, as the voice emerges of its own accord, and therefore even Rabbi Akiva would not hold one liable to bring a sin offering for the unwitting violation of this prohibition.

The Gemara asks: In the case of a necromancer, what action is there in this transgression? The Gemara answers: The striking of his arms against each other to raise the spirit of the dead is considered an action. The Gemara further asks: In the case of one who blasphemes, who merely speaks, what action is there in this transgression? Since Rabbi Akiva holds that an unwitting blasphemer is liable to bring a sin offering, this apparently indicates that no action at all is necessary. The Gemara answers: The twisting of his lips while he speaks is considered an action.

The Gemara comments: It enters our mind that the striking of the necromancer’s arms against each other is considered a minor action even according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and they would deem him liable. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to idol worship, one is liable to be punished only for a matter that involves an action, for example where one slaughtered an offering, or burned incense, or poured a libation, or bowed. And the following matter poses a difficulty to us: Bowing does not involve an action.

And Reish Lakish said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says: An action is not required for one to be liable to bring a sin offering for transgressing a prohibition. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the bending of his height when he bows is considered an action. One can conclude from here by inference that Reish Lakish maintains that according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the bending of his height is not considered an action. If so, can it be said that the striking of his arms against each other, which is less of a movement than bending one’s height, is considered an action?

But rather, you must explain that when Reish Lakish says the striking of his arms against each other is considered a minor action, he is speaking only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva; but according to the opinion of the Rabbis it is not considered an action.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, that the Rabbis hold that the necromancer does not perform an action, why does the mishna teach that the Rabbis say: The list in the mishna is excluding one who blasphemes, as he does not perform an action, but rather he sins with speech. Let it teach instead: The list in the mishna is excluding one who blasphemes and a necromancer. The Gemara answers: The tanna teaches one of two examples that the Rabbis could have mentioned.

The Gemara questions this explanation: But if that is so, let the mishna teach the statement of the Rabbis with regard to a necromancer and let it not teach the statement of the Rabbis with regard to one who blasphemes. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the tanna to mention one who blasphemes, as it might enter your mind to say: Since its punishment of karet is written in the place where the verse discusses an offering (see Numbers 15:28–30), one might say that in this case the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Akiva that one is liable to bring a sin offering despite the fact that no action is involved. To counter this, the mishna specifically mentions the exclusion of one who blasphemes to teach us that this is not the case.

Ulla said: The reason the Rabbis did not state: Excluding one who blasphemes and a necromancer, is that the action of the necromancer that the mishna teaches is referring to one who burns incense to a demon in order to raise the dead, which is a full-fledged action. Rava objects to this answer from Ulla: If so, i.e., if the necromancer burns incense to a demon, this is the same as an idol worshipper, which is already mentioned in the mishna. Rather, Rava said: The mishna is referring to one who burns incense to a demon in order to gather it together with other demons, i.e., he does not burn incense to a demon by means of a rite but in a manner of sorcery, to bring the demons to one place to then make use of them.

Abaye said to Rava: If so, this is the same as a ḥover ḥever, one who gathers together, which is stated in the Torah as a separate prohibition (Deuteronomy 18:11) and which is a prohibition that does not carry the punishment of karet. Rava said to him: It is true that such an individual is also a ḥover ḥever, but the Torah stated: A ḥover ḥever such as this, who gathers demons together, is included in the category of a necromancer and therefore his punishment is death by stoning, and transgressing this prohibition also results in karet. Abaye inquired: But then the case of a ḥover ḥever, which is a prohibition that does not entail karet, what is it?

Rava said to Abaye: As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And a ḥover ḥaver” (Deuteronomy 18:11), this is referring to both one who uses sorcery and thereby gathers large beasts into one place, and also to one who gathers small beasts into one place, and even to one who gathers into one place snakes and scorpions; all of these individuals are liable. With regard to this prohibition Abaye says: In the case of this one, who through sorcery wants to gather together a hornet and a scorpion, this is prohibited. But if they are pursuing him and he merely seeks to defend himself, it is permitted.

The Gemara objects: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says the bending of one’s height is considered an action, the twisting of