סוטה לא ע"ב

עדות אחרונה על הטומאה שאוסרתה איסור עולם — הרי היא מתקיימת בעד אחד בלבד, עדות הראשונה על הסתירה שאין אוסרתה איסור עולם אלא עד שתשתה — אינו דין שתתקיים בעד אחד?

תלמוד לומר: "כי מצא בה ערות דבר" (דברים כד, א) ולהלן הוא אומר "על פי שני עדים... יקום דבר" (דברים יט, טו), ולמדים מגזירה שווה "דבר" "דבר" מה להלן אין הדבר מתקיים אלא על פי שנים — אף כאן אין עדות על הסתירה אלא על פי שנים.

היה עד אחד אומר "נטמאת" ועד אחר אומר "לא נטמאת", אשה אחת אומרת "נטמאת" ואשה אחרת אומרת "לא נטמאת" — היתה שותה, שמאחר שיש עדויות הסותרות זו את זו — הרי זה ספק אם נטמאת ושותה.

אחד אומר "נטמאת" ושנים אומרים "לא נטמאת" — היתה שותה. שנים אומרים "נטמאת" ואחד אומר "לא נטמאת" — סומכים על עדות השנים, ולא היתה שותה אלא יוצאת מבעלה.

א גמרא על הלימוד מהגזירה שווה הנמצא במדרש ההלכה במשנה זו, שאין עדות על קינוי וסתירה בפחות משני עדים, שואלים: האי [זה] תלמוד לומר "כי מצא בה ערות דבר", הלא לכאורה

תלמוד לומר בפרשת סוטה "בה" ("והיא נטמאה ועד אין בה" — במדבר ה, יג) ומהדיוק בה ולא בקינוי, בה ולא בסתירה מיבעי ליה [צריך היה לו] לומר, שהרי מכאן למדנו דין עד אחד בטומאה!

ומשיבים: הכי נמי קאמר [כך גם כן אמר], כך צריך להבין את הדברים: תלמוד לומר "בה" — בה ולא בקינוי, בה ולא בסתירה.

ואולם טומאה בעלמא [סתם] שמעיד אדם על אשת איש שנטמאה בלא קינוי ובלא סתירה, שלא מהימן [נאמן] עד אחד מנלן [מניין לנו]? — דין זה נלמד באופן אחר, נאמר כאן בענין עדות "דבר", ונאמר להלן "דבר" בענין ערוה, מה להלן מדובר בעדות שני עדים — אף כאן בשני עדים, ואין עד אחד מספיק לכך.

ב שנינו במשנה: עד אומר נטמאת ועד אומר לא נטמאת — היתה שותה. ומעירים: יש לדייק, טעמא [הטעם, דווקא] דקא מכחיש ליה [שמכחיש אותו] העד השני, הא [הרי] אם לא קא מכחיש ליה [היה מכחיש אותו] היה עד אחד מהימן [נאמן] ואסורה על בעלה לעולם,

מנהני מילי [מניין הדברים הללו]? ומביאים, דתנו רבנן [ששנו חכמים]: מה שנאמר "ועד אין בה" (במדבר ה, יג) — בשנים הכתוב מדבר, שאם אין בה שני עדים, אלא עד אחד בלבד, הרי היא אסורה.

אתה אומר בשנים, או אינו אלא באחד? — תלמוד לומר: "לא יקום עד אחד באיש לכל עוון ולכל חטאת" (דברים יט, טו

), ועל כך דרשו: ממשמע שנאמר "לא יקום עד" איני יודע שהוא אחד, שהרי לשון יחיד הוא, מה תלמוד לומר "אחד" — זה בנה אב וקבע תקדים ויסוד להלכה: כל מקום שנאמר "עד" — הרי כאן שנים, עד שיפרוט לך הכתוב ויאמר במפורש "אחד". ואם כן גם כאן בענין סוטה

אמר רחמנא [אמרה תורה] אם תרי לית [שני עדים אין] בה אלא חד [עד אחד] "והיא לא נתפשה" (נאנסה) (במדבר ה, יג) — הריהי אסורה.

ושואלים: וכיון דמדאורייתא [שמ דין תורה] עד אחד מהימן [נאמן], אם כן אידך היכי מצי מכחיש ליה [האחר איך יכול להכחיש אותו] ולגרום לה שתשתה ולא תיאסר עולמית בעדות הראשון? והא [והרי] אמר עולא: כל מקום שהאמינה תורה עד אחד לעדות הרי כאן עדות כעדות שנים, ואין דבריו של עד אחד קיימים במקום שהוא סותר שנים!

אלא אמר עולא: תני [שנה, ותקן במשנתנו]: עד אומר נטמאת ועד אומר לא נטמאת — לא היתה שותה. וכן אמר ר' יצחק, יש לשנות: לא היתה שותה. ור' חייא אמר שהנוסח הוא: היתה שותה.

ושואלים: לר' חייא קשיא [קשה] מה שהיה קשה לעולא: והרי דינו של העד הראשון כשניים! ומשיבים: לא קשיא [אין זה קשה]; כאן במשנתנו מדובר שבאו שני העדים בבת אחת, וכיון שהם סותרים זה את זה — הרי זה כאילו לא היתה כאן עדות. ואילו כאן, בדין של עולא, מדובר שבאו בזה אחר זה, כשבא עד אחד והעיד שנטמאה מקובלת עדותו כעדות של שניים ואין השני יכול לבטל עדותו.

תנן [שנינו במשנה]: עד אחד אומר "נטמאת" ושנים אומרים "לא נטמאת" — היתה שותה, ונדייק מכאן: הא חד וחד [הרי אם היו אחד ואחד] — לא היתה שותה, אם כן תיובתא [קושיה חמורה] היא על ר' חייא!

ומשיבים: אמר [יכול היה לומר] לך ר' חייא: וליטעמיך [ולטעמך, לשיטתך] שכך אתה מדייק, אימא סיפא [אמור את סופה] של המשנה: שנים אומרים "נטמאת" ואחד אומר "לא נטמאת" — לא היתה שותה. ותדייק מכאן: הא חד וחד [הרי אם היו אחד ואחד] — היתה שותה. ונמצא כי הדיוק הראשון והאחרון סותרים זה את זה!

אלא גם לשם תירוץ המשנה צריכים לומר שאין לדייק כך, אלא כולה בפסולי עדות היא מדברת, שהשניים שבאו להעיד הם פסולי עדות שמקבלים את עדותם בסוטה, ושיטת ר' נחמיה היא. דתניא [שכן שנינו בברייתא], ר' נחמיה אומר: כל מקום שהאמינה תורה עד אחד ואין התורה דורשת שם עדות כשירה דווקא — הלך (לך) אחר רוב דעות, ועשו עדות שתי נשים ביחס לעדות איש אחד כעדות שני אנשים באיש אחד, שסומכים על השניים נגד האחד.

ואיכא דאמרי [ויש שאומרים] שיטה אחרת כדעת ר' נחמיה: כל היכא דאתא [מקום שבא] עד אחד כשר מעיקרא [מתחילה] — אפילו מאה נשים המעידות כנגדו נמי [גם כן] כעד אחד בלבד דמיין [הן נחשבות] ואינן יכולות לבטל את עדותו.

concerning the final testimony of defilement, which forbids her with an irrevocable prohibition, yet it is established by one witness, then with regard to the first testimony, which does not forbid her with an irrevocable prohibition, is it not logical that it should be established with only one witness?

Therefore, to counter this derivation, the verse states: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter [davar] in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and there, in the laws concerning monetary matters, it states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter [davar] be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15), teaching that just as the “matter” stated there is established “at the mouth of two witnesses,” so too, here the “matter” of her seclusion must be established “at the mouth of two witnesses.”

The mishna discusses the halakha in a case where two single witnesses contradict each other concerning her defilement. If one witness says: She was defiled, and another witness says: She was not defiled, or similarly in the case of those normally disqualified from bearing witness, if one woman says: She was defiled, and another woman says: She was not defiled, she would drink the bitter water of a sota, due to the uncertainty engendered by the contradictory testimonies.

Similarly, if one witness says: She was defiled, and two witnesses say: She was not defiled, she would drink the bitter water. However, if two would say: She was defiled, and one says: She was not defiled, the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted and she would not drink the bitter water, and the husband must divorce her.

GEMARA: The Gemara questions why the mishna proves the need for two witnesses to testify about the seclusion based upon the verbal analogy of “matter” and “matter,” if there is an explicit source in the Torah stating that two witnesses are required. This reason is given by the mishna: The verse states: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter [davar] in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), which through a verbal analogy based on the word “davar” teaches the need for two witnesses, seems to be superfluous.

As, the mishna should have said in its place: The verse states: “She was defiled secretly and there was no witness [ed] against her [bah]” (Numbers 5:13), which is explained to mean there were not two witnesses, but only one, who testified concerning her defilement. One can infer from the term “bah,” which could also be understood as: With regard to it, that in this matter of defilement one witness suffices, but not with regard to the warning. Additionally, one can infer: With regard to it, but not with regard to the seclusion. Therefore, there must be two witnesses to testify about both the warning and seclusion.

The Gemara answers: That is also what the tanna of the mishna is saying. The source for the halakha that there is a requirement for two witnesses to testify about the seclusion is that the verse states: With regard to it, that in this matter of defilement one witness suffices, but not with regard to the warning. With regard to it, but not with regard to the seclusion.

The Gemara continues to explain the mishna: And concerning an ordinary accusation of defilement without a previous warning and without an act of seclusion with another man, from where do we derive that a single witness is not deemed credible? It is for this halakha that the mishna cites the verbal analogy: It is stated here: “Because he has found some unseemly matter [davar] in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and it is stated there concerning monetary matters: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter [davar] be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15). Just as the “matter” stated there with regard to monetary matters is clarified specifically by the testimony of two witnesses, so too, here with regard to adultery the “matter” of her defilement must be established by the testimony of at least two witnesses.

§ The mishna taught: If one witness says: She was defiled, and another witness says: She was not defiled, she drinks the bitter water of a sota. The Gemara infers from this statement in the mishna that the reason the woman would drink the bitter water in this case is specifically because the second witness refutes his testimony, but if a second witness did not refute his testimony, then a single witness would be relied upon in this case and the woman would be forbidden to her husband forever.

From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in reference to the verse describing the circumstances in which a woman defiled through an act of adultery becomes prohibited to her husband, which states: “And a man lie with her carnally…and there be no witness [ed] against her” (Numbers 5:13); the verse is speaking of a lack of two witnesses. When the verse refers to the lack of an ed, written in the singular, it actually indicates that there are not two witnesses against her, but only one, as the baraita will now explain.

The baraita continues and asks: Do you say that the verse refers only to a case where there was not even one witness to the act of sexual intercourse, as the singular usage of the word ed would seem to indicate? The baraita now proves that the singular usage notwithstanding, elsewhere the word ed is used to indicate two witnesses, as the verse states: “One witness [ed] shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or any sin that he sins; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15).

The baraita infers a general principle from this verse by asking: By inference from that which is stated in the verse, even with the omission of the word “one”: “A witness shall not rise up against a man” (Deuteronomy 19:15), do I not know that it is referring to one witness, as the verse is written in the singular form? What is the meaning when the verse states explicitly: “One witness,” being that it is obviously referring to only one witness? The baraita answers: This established a paradigm for the principle that every place where the word “witness [ed]” is stated in the Torah without specifying a number, there are two witnesses here, until the verse specifies that it is referring to only one witness, by writing the word “one.”

The baraita returns to discuss the verse concerning a sota. And the Merciful One states: “There was no witness [ed] against her,” which therefore means that: There are not two witnesses to the sexual intercourse that could testify with regard to her, rather there is only one witness. The baraita completes its interpretation: Further in the verse it states: “And she was not taken in the act” (Numbers 5:13), indicating that the verse is referring to a case in which it is known that the woman had not been raped. This knowledge is based on the testimony of only one witness, as the verse had already stated that there were not two witnesses, and since one witness saw her willingly engage in sexual intercourse with another man, she is forbidden to her husband.

The Gemara asks: But since the baraita taught that by Torah law one witness is deemed credible to state that the woman is defiled, how can the other witness who denies the wife’s infidelity refute him with his conflicting testimony and enable the woman to drink the bitter water instead of becoming forbidden outright to her husband? But doesn’t Ulla say: Wherever the Torah relies on one witness, there is the equivalent of the testimony of two witnesses here. Consequently, the testimony of the contradicting witness should be insignificant, as the statement of one witness has no standing in a place where it is contradicted by two witnesses, for the witness testifying about her infidelity is deemed credible as if two witnesses had testified.

Rather, Ulla said: Teach the mishna in the following way: If one witness says: She was defiled, and another witness says: She was not defiled, she would not drink the bitter water. And likewise, Rabbi Yitzḥak said: She would not drink. But Rabbi Ḥiyya says in line with the standard text of the mishna: She would drink the bitter water even in the case of a contradiction between two single witnesses with regard to her infidelity.

The Gemara asks: But for Rabbi Ḥiyya, how will he respond to the same difficulty due to the teaching of Ulla, who explained that when a single witness is deemed credible he is considered as two and cannot be contradicted by a single witness to the contrary? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: Here, the mishna is discussing a case where both witnesses arrived in court and testified simultaneously, thereby canceling each other out. But there, Ulla’s principle, that whenever a single witness’s testimony is accepted it is considered as two and cannot be contradicted by a single witness testifying to the contrary, is referring to a case in which the two conflicting witnesses came to court and testified one after the other.

But we learned in the mishna above that if one witness says: She was defiled, and two say: She was not defiled, she would drink the bitter water. The Gemara deduces from here: The implications of this statement are that the woman drinks only because the testimony of the incriminating witness was contradicted by two witnesses, but if there was one witness saying she was defiled and only one witness saying the opposite, she would not drink; this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥiyya could have said to you: And according to your reasoning that she would not drink, say the latter clause of the mishna, which states: If two witnesses say: She was defiled, and one says: She was not defiled, the testimony of the two witnesses is accepted and she would not drink the bitter water. But you should deduce from here that if there was one witness testifying to her defilement and one witness stating the opposite, she would drink the bitter water. This inference is in line with Rabbi Ḥiyya’s explanation, and contradicts the inference from the previous clause.

The Gemara explains: Rather, the correct understanding is that the entire mishna is not dealing with valid witnesses, and stating an obvious halakha in order to enable an inference, but with people who are disqualified from giving testimony, and is teaching us a novel ruling. And the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥemya. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta Yevamot 14:1) that Rabbi Neḥemya says: Wherever the Torah relies on one witness, follow the majority of opinions. In other words, if the testimonies of two disqualified witnesses conflict, the court rules in accordance with the version supported by more witnesses, whether or not they are qualified to testify. And the Sages established that the testimony of two women, who are usually disqualified from testifying, when they testify in opposition to one man, should be like that of two men against one man, and the court will rule in accordance with the testimony of the two women.

And some say that Rabbi Neḥemya actually stated something different: And there are those who say a different version of Rabbi Neḥemya’s approach: Anywhere that one valid witness came initially, even one hundred women who later contradict him are considered like one witness, and do not override his testimony.