The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. If the Israelite died and she has a son from him, she may not partake of teruma as long as that son is alive. If she subsequently married a Levite she may partake of tithe. If he died, and she had a son from him, she may still partake of tithe. If she subsequently married a priest, she may partake of teruma. If the priest died and she had a son from him, she may partake of teruma.

If her son from the priest also died, she may not partake of teruma, but she may partake of tithe, as she has a son from a Levite. If her son from the Levite died, she may no longer partake of tithe. If her son from the Israelite died, she returns to her father’s house and may once again partake of teruma. And with regard to this woman, it is stated: “And she is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth; she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13).

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: If her son from the Levite died she may partake of teruma. The Gemara asks: This halakha with regard to a woman previously married to a priest, who had a child from the priest and was then married to a Levite and separated from him, that she once again may partake due to her son from the priest, from where do we derive it? Rabbi Abba said that Rav said: It states: “But if a priest’s daughter be a widow, or divorced, and have no child, and is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth” (Leviticus 22:13). The verse could have stated: If a priest’s daughter. Instead, it states: “But if a priest’s daughter,” with an extra word, represented by the single Hebrew letter vav, to include this case.

The Gemara asks: In accordance with the opinion of which Sage is this exposition? Is it only in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who expounds the additional letter vav, representing the word “and,” as an inclusive term? The Gemara refutes this suggestion: It can be understood even if you say it is in accordance with the Rabbis, who do not usually derive halakhot from an additional vav, as in this case the entire phrase: “But if a priest’s daughter,” is superfluous, as the previous verse had already specified that we are dealing with “the daughter of a priest.” Therefore, everyone agrees that in this context the additional letter in the text comes to include the additional case.

§ The Sages taught: With regard to the daughter of a priest, when she returns to her father’s house after having been married to a non-priest and then separated from her husband, she returns to partaking of teruma but she does not return to partake of the breast and right hind leg of peace-offerings. Rav Ḥisda said that Ravina bar Sheila said: What is the verse that teaches us this halakha? “She may not eat of that which is set apart from the sacred things” (Leviticus 22:12). This verse indicates: From that which is separated from the sacred things, i.e., offerings, and given to a priest, she may not eat. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said that this halakha comes from a different source: We infer from the words “she may eat of her father’s bread” (Leviticus 22:13), that she may not eat all bread; this comes to exclude the breast and right hind leg.

Rami bar Ḥama objects to this: But we can say that the verse comes to exclude nullification of vows. The Torah would consequently be teaching us that even after she “is returned unto her father’s house, as in her youth” (Leviticus 22:13), she does not return to her youth in all ways, as her father may not nullify her vows. Rava said: The connection between her and her father’s house with regard to vows has already been severed, as taught by the school of Rabbi Yishmael, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: “But the vow of a widow, or of a divorcée…shall stand against her” (Numbers 30:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? She was removed from the category of one who is under the authority of her father when she married, and she has likewise been removed from the category of one who is under the authority of her husband, as she is no longer married to him.

Rather, the verse is referring to a case where the father transferred his daughter to the husband’s agents for the purpose of marriage, and she consequently left her father’s house. Or, it is referring to a case where the father’s agents transferred her to the husband’s agents and she was widowed or divorced on the way, before she arrived at her husband’s house. How shall I consider her? Is she in the house of this one, her father, or is she in the house of that one, her husband? Rather, this comes to tell you: Since she has entirely left her father’s jurisdiction when she was transferred to the husband’s agents, even if for just one moment, her father is no longer able to nullify her vows. We learn from here that a father cannot annul his daughter’s vows after she has been married, and there is no need for an additional verse to teach this halakha.

Rav Safra said: The halakha that she does not return to her father’s house with regard to the breast and the right hind leg is derived from the verse: “From her father’s bread she may eat,” which indicates that she partakes of the “bread” of teruma but not of the meat of the breast and hind leg. Rav Pappa said a different interpretation: “From her father’s bread she may eat” is referring to bread owned by her father, such as teruma, which is the property of the priest, which excludes the breast and right hind leg, as the priests receive their portion from the table of the Most High. Unlike teruma, the breast and right hind leg do not belong to the priests. Rather, after the offering is sacrificed to God, they eat these portions but are not considered to own them.

And Rava said: It states: “And the breast of waving and the hind leg of heaving you shall eat…you, and your sons and your daughters with you” (Leviticus 10:14). This indicates that daughters of priests may eat at a time when they are “with you,” but once they have left the priest’s domain, e.g., by marrying an ordinary Israelite, they may no longer partake of these gifts even if they subsequently return to his household.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It was taught: With regard to the daughter of a priest, when she returns to her father’s house, after marrying and separating from her husband without a child, she returns for the purposes of eating teruma, but she does not return for the purposes of eating the breast and right hind leg. By contrast, if an Israelite woman ate on account of her son from a priest, if she later married an Israelite and he died, she returns to partake even of the breast and right hind leg.

Rav Mordekhai went and stated this halakha before Rav Ashi, who said to him: From where does he include the case of a woman who partakes of teruma on account of her son? From the verse “but if a priest’s daughter” (Leviticus 22:13). Is the Israelite woman preferable to her, the daughter of a priest herself, who does not return to eating the breast and hind leg? The Gemara answers: There, the Torah writes exclusions, as we learned above, which teach us that she does not return in all regards, whereas here it does not write exclusions. Consequently, although the halakha of a woman who has a son from a priest is itself derived from the case of the daughter of a priest returning to her father’s house, she has more abilities than the latter.

§ The Gemara returns to the mishna. The mishna taught: The daughter of a priest married to an Israelite may not partake of teruma. The Sages taught: “And she is returned unto her father’s house” (Leviticus 22:13); this excludes a widow awaiting her yavam, for she cannot go back to her father’s house as long as she is still waiting for the yavam to perform levirate marriage. “As in her youth”; this excludes a pregnant woman, as her pregnancy has changed her, and she is no longer as she was in her youth.

But could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, without the need for a special exposition of a verse? If in a place, i.e., a case, where the Torah did not make the halakha pertaining to a child from the first husband like the halakha pertaining to a child from the second husband to exempt her from levirate marriage; this is the case of a woman who married a man, had a son with him, was widowed, remarried, and her second husband died childless. She requires levirate marriage despite the fact that she has a child, as the first husband’s child is irrelevant with regard to her need for levirate marriage for the second husband. Despite this limitation, the Torah made the status of a fetus like that of a child who was born, as a pregnant woman does not perform levirate marriage.

If this is so, then in a place where the Torah did make the halakha pertaining to a child from the first husband like the halakha pertaining to a child from the second husband to disqualify her from teruma; this is the case of a daughter of a priest who married an Israelite, had a son with him, was widowed, and afterward married another Israelite, who died childless. She may not partake of teruma on account of her son from the first husband. Is it not, therefore, right that we should make a fetus like a child who was born with regard to teruma, that would prevent her from returning to partake of teruma if she is pregnant? If this reasoning is correct, there is no need for the biblical exposition.

However, this proof can be refuted: No, what I should say is that the Torah made a fetus like a child who was born with regard to levirate marriage, because with regard to levirate marriage the Torah made the dead like the living: If the woman had a child at the time of her husband’s death she is entirely exempt from levirate marriage, even if her son subsequently died. The deceased child is like a living one in the sense that he continues to exempt his mother from the requirement of levirate marriage. Shall we then make a fetus like a child who was born with regard to teruma, where the Torah did not make the dead like the living? In the case of teruma, as long as the daughter of a priest has a living son from her Israelite husband, she is disqualified from teruma, but if he dies she may partake of teruma again, as we do not consider him like a living son. Consequently, we cannot learn the halakha of teruma from levirate marriage with regard to the status of a fetus. Therefore, the verse states “as in her youth” to exclude a pregnant woman.

The Gemara comments: And it was necessary to write this verse that teaches the halakha of a pregnant woman, and it was necessary also to write “and she have no child” (Leviticus 22:13) because had the Merciful One written only: “And she have no child,” I would have said that at the outset she was only one body when she ate teruma, and now, upon her return, there are two bodies, and that is why she is no longer “as in her youth.” But a pregnant woman, who at the outset was one body and now is still one body, one might say that she may partake of teruma until the birth of her son. Consequently, it is necessary for a verse to teach the halakha. And vice-versa, had the Merciful One written the halakha with regard to a pregnant woman, I might have said that this is true only of a pregnant woman because at the outset her body