The Gemara comments: The matter presents a difficulty with the opinion of Reish Lakish.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If the inhabitants of an idolatrous city subverted themselves to idol worship and were not subverted by others, what is the halakha? Since the Merciful One states: “And have subverted,” perhaps it may be inferred: But not if they subvert themselves; or perhaps even if they subverted themselves to idol worship, the city can be deemed an idolatrous city.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from the mishna: If women or children subvert the inhabitants of the city, these idol worshippers are judged as individuals. Why is that so? Let their status be considered as though they subverted themselves. Apparently, if the inhabitants subverted themselves the city is not deemed an idolatrous city. The Gemara rejects this proof: These cases are not comparable, as these, who subverted themselves, are drawn after their own initiative and worship idols wholeheartedly, and therefore perhaps the city is rendered an idolatrous city. Those, who are subverted by women and children, are drawn after women and children and are not committed to idol worship, and therefore, perhaps the city is not rendered an idolatrous city.

§ The mishna teaches that a city is not deemed an idolatrous city unless most of the inhabitants of the city are subverted. The Gemara asks: How do we act in order to determine if most of the inhabitants have been subverted? Rav Yehuda says: The court judges each inhabitant suspected of idol worship, and if he is found liable imprisons him in a jail, and it judges and imprisons each succeeding idolater until a majority of the city has been convicted. Ulla said to him: That will result in you delaying justice for those already sentenced and awaiting execution, and it is prohibited to delay justice. Rather, Ulla says: The court judges each inhabitant and stones him if he is found liable, then judges and stones each succeeding idolater until half of the city is found guilty, and all future convicted idolaters are executed by the sword.

It was stated that there is a parallel amoraic dispute. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The court judges and stones the idolater, then judges and stones each succeeding idolater. And Reish Lakish says: One increases the number of courts for them so that all the inhabitants of the city can stand trial at the same time and the means of their execution will be determined with no delay of justice.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rabbi Ḥama bar Yosei say that Rabbi Oshaya says that it is written: “And you shall take that man or that woman out…to your gates” (Deuteronomy 17:5), from which it is derived: You take a man and a woman out to your gates and they are judged by the local court, but you do not take the entire city out to your gates; instead, they stand trial before the Great Sanhedrin. Rather, the procedure is that one increases the number of courts for them and those courts analyze their cases, and when they conclude that a majority of the inhabitants are guilty of idolatry they are not sentenced; instead, we take them to the High Court [Sanhedrin] and the court issues the verdict of the idolaters and executes them.

§ It is written: “You shall smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword, destroy it utterly, and all that is in it and its animals, with the edge of the sword” (Deuteronomy 13:16). The Sages taught in a baraita: The caravan of donkeys and the caravan of camels that move from place to place, that lodged in the city and were subverted with it, if they had stayed there thirty days they are executed by the sword and their property is destroyed. If they had stayed there less than that, they are executed by stoning, as individual idolaters, and their property is spared.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: How long shall one be in the city and as a result, his status will be like that of the residents of the city with regard to giving charity and paying taxes? He is obligated if he remained there twelve months, and not thirty days. Rava says: This contradiction is not difficult, and it may be resolved: This period of twelve months is the period required to become one of the citizens of the city; this period of thirty days is the period required to become one of the inhabitants of the city.

And so it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the citizens of the city, if there is a person who had stayed there twelve months, it is prohibited for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. If a person had stayed there less than that, it is permitted for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. With regard to one prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from the inhabitants of the city, if there is a person who had stayed there thirty days, it is prohibited for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. If a person had stayed there less than that, it is permitted for the one for whom deriving benefit is forbidden to derive benefit from him. In the context of an idolatrous city, the reference is to the inhabitants of the city, which includes anyone who had stayed there for thirty days.

It is written: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it” (Deuteronomy 13:16). The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to that which is written: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it”; this serves to exclude the property of the righteous that is located outside the city, which is not destroyed. “And all that is in it”; this serves to include the property of the righteous that is located inside the city; it is also destroyed. It is stated: “And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17). From the term “its spoils” it is derived: But not the spoils of Heaven; all consecrated property is excluded. The phrase “and you shall gather all of its spoils” serves to include the property of the wicked that is located outside the city; it is also destroyed.

Rabbi Shimon said: For what reason does the Torah say that the property of the righteous that is in it shall be destroyed? Why must they suffer for the sins of others? The reason is: Who caused the righteous to live in this city inhabited by wicked people? It is their property that tied them to this city; therefore, their property is destroyed. The Master said that the phrase “and you shall gather all of its spoils” serves to include the property of the wicked that is located outside the city; it is also destroyed. Rav Ḥisda says: And this is the halakha only with regard to property that can be gathered into the city.

Rav Ḥisda says: Deposits of the inhabitants of an idolatrous city are permitted, i.e., they are not destroyed. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that Rav Ḥisda is referring to property belonging to inhabitants of another city and that property is deposited within the idolatrous city, it is obvious that the deposits are permitted, as the deposits are not “its spoils”; they are the property of others. But rather, say that Rav Ḥisda is referring to property belonging to the inhabitants of the idolatrous city, and it is deposited within another city. If so, the status of that property should be like any other property belonging to the inhabitants of the idolatrous city; if it is property that can be gathered into the city, why are the deposits permitted? It was already established that the property of the wicked is destroyed. And if it is property that cannot be gathered into the city, didn’t Rav Ḥisda already say once that this property is not burned?

The Gemara answers: No, Rav Ḥisda is actually referring to property belonging to inhabitants of another city that is deposited within the idolatrous city; and what are we dealing with here? It is a case where an inhabitant of the idolatrous city assumes financial responsibility for the deposit in his possession. Lest you say: Once he assumes financial responsibility for the deposit in his possession, the status of the deposit is like that of his own property and it should be destroyed, therefore Rav Ḥisda teaches us that deposits are permitted and not destroyed.

Rav Ḥisda says: An animal that is half the property of an idolatrous city and half the property of another city is forbidden. By contrast, with regard to dough that is half the property of an idolatrous city and half the property of another city, the half that belongs to the other city is permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the difference between them? The Gemara explains: An animal is like an entity that is not divided, as it is possible to eat part of an animal only through the slaughter of the entire animal. Therefore, if any portion of the animal is forbidden, the entire animal is forbidden. Dough is like an entity that is divided. Therefore, the fact that one portion of the dough is forbidden does not render the entire dough forbidden.

Rav Ḥisda raises a dilemma: With regard to the animal of an idolatrous city, what is the halakha; is ritual slaughter effective at least in purifying it from the ritual impurity of an unslaughtered animal carcass? If the animals of the city are killed but not ritually slaughtered, they are impure with the impurity of a carcass and transmit impurity by means of contact as well as if they are lifted. Will the ritual slaughter of those animals prevent the transmission of that impurity? Is it so that since the Merciful One states: “And its animals, with the edge of the sword,” indicating that it is no different if one ritually slaughtered the animal, and it is no different if one killed the animal in another way, its status is that of a carcass and it transmits impurity? Or perhaps, since one ritually slaughtered the animal, ritual slaughter is effective. What is the halakha? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: What is the status of the hair of pious women in the idolatrous city; must it be destroyed? Rava says: Is that to say that the hair of wicked women is forbidden and must be destroyed? “And you shall gather…and you shall burn” (Deuteronomy 13:17), is written, and it is derived: An item that is lacking, i.e., that requires, only gathering and burning must be destroyed, excluding this hair, which is lacking detaching, gathering, and burning. Therefore, even the hair of a wicked woman is not forbidden.

Rather, Rava says: This dilemma is raised with regard to a wig. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the wig is attached to her body, its status is like that of her body. The Gemara answers: No, this dilemma is necessary only in a case where the wig is hanging on a peg. Is its status like that of the property of the righteous inside the city and therefore it is destroyed, or perhaps, since she enters and exits with the wig, its status is like that of a garment, and it is not destroyed? This dilemma shall stand unresolved.

With regard to the verse: “And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square” (Deuteronomy 13:17), the Sages taught: If the city has no square, it does not become an idolatrous city, as it does not fulfill the criterion mandated by the verse; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: If the city has no square, one creates a square for the city. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rabbi Yishmael, holds “its square” indicates a square that existed from the outset. And one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that “its square” can also indicate a square that was created now.