MISHNA: When a man who has a brother dies childless, his widow [yevama] and one of his brothers [yavam] may perform a ritual through which she is freed of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza]. It is then considered, with regard to forbidden relationships, as though they had been married and divorced. Therefore, he is forbidden to her relatives, and she to his. However, with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the ḥalitza and she gave birth, in the event that the offspring is viable, the deceased husband has been survived by offspring and so there was never any levirate bond; consequently, the ḥalitza that was performed was entirely unnecessary and a meaningless act. As such, he remains permitted to her relatives and she remains permitted to his relatives. Furthermore, since the ḥalitza was meaningless, she is not afforded the status of a ḥalutza, i.e., a yevama who performed ḥalitza, a status akin to that of a divorcée. Therefore, the ḥalitza does not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood.

If the offspring is not viable, then it emerges that the ḥalitza was indeed necessary. Therefore, he is forbidden to engage in relations with her relatives and she is forbidden to engage in relations with his relatives, as though they had been married and divorced, and the ḥalitza disqualifies her from marrying into the priesthood, as she is afforded the status of a ḥalutza.

With regard to one who consummates the levirate marriage with his yevama, i.e., he had intercourse with her under the assumption that there is a levirate bond and so there is a mitzva to do so, and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse and she gave birth, in the event that the offspring is viable the deceased brother has been survived by offspring and it is evident that there was never any levirate bond. In that case, the relations they had, rather than being a mitzva, were a violation of the prohibition against engaging in relations with one’s brother’s wife. Therefore, the yavam must send her out, i.e., they must separate, as she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, and to atone for the forbidden relations that they had, they are each obligated to bring a sin-offering, as is the halakha for all who inadvertently transgress a prohibition that, when performed intentionally, is punishable by karet.

And if the offspring is not viable, and therefore there was in fact a levirate bond, he may maintain her as his wife since his intercourse with her was a valid consummation of levirate marriage.

If they consummated the levirate marriage and seven months later she gave birth, there is uncertainty whether the child is nine months old, i.e., counting from conception, and is the offspring of the first husband, and as such there was no levirate bond, or whether the child is only seven months old and is the offspring of the latter husband, i.e., the yavam, and not of the deceased, in which case there was a levirate bond. In that case, due to the possibility that she is forbidden to him as his brother’s wife, he must send her out. However, the lineage of the child is unflawed, since regardless of whether it was born of the first or second husband, there was no transgression involved in its conception. Furthermore, to atone for the possibility that they had forbidden relations they are both obligated to bring a guilt-offering for uncertainty, as is the halakha for anyone who is uncertain whether they inadvertently transgressed a prohibition that would require one to bring a sin-offering.

GEMARA: An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with a pregnant woman and she later miscarried. Since she miscarried, she was certainly bound to the yavam by a levirate bond and may not marry anyone else; rather, she is obligated to consummate the levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza. The question is whether the ḥalitza that was performed while she was still pregnant is effective in releasing her from the levirate bond. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: She does not require another ḥalitza from the brothers. Reish Lakish said: She requires another ḥalitza from the brothers.

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan said that she does not require another ḥalitza from the brothers because he holds: Ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman who later miscarries is considered effective ḥalitza in order to release her from the levirate bond. And similarly, intercourse with a pregnant woman who later miscarries is considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, such that she and the yavam are considered to be married. And Reish Lakish said she requires another ḥalitza from the brothers because he holds: Ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman is not considered effective ḥalitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse. Therefore, after she miscarries, another ḥalitza must be performed in order to release her from the levirate bond.

With regard to what principle do they disagree? If you wish, say that they disagree over the interpretation of a verse. And if you wish, say that they disagree on a point of logical reasoning.

If you wish, say that that they disagree over a point of logical reasoning in that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: If Elijah the prophet were to come at the moment of the ḥalitza and say that this woman who is pregnant will miscarry, is she not eligible for ḥalitza or levirate marriage, even though she is currently pregnant, since her husband died and will not be survived by offspring? Now, too, even though when the ḥalitza or levirate marriage is performed it is not known whether or not she will miscarry, the matter will be revealed retroactively, i.e., if she ultimately miscarries then it is apparent the ḥalitza or levirate marriage was always necessary and is therefore valid.

And Reish Lakish said: We do not say that the matter will be revealed retroactively in order to validate the levirate marriage or ḥalitza. Since at the time of the levirate marriage or ḥalitza it was still unknown whether she would miscarry, the act is considered premature and ineffective.

And if you wish, say that they disagree over the interpretation of a verse in that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies, and he has no child” (Deuteronomy 25:5), i.e., the obligation to consummate a levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza applies whenever a husband dies and is not survived by offspring. And this man, whose wife is currently pregnant, does not have any children who will survive him. Therefore, there is an obligation to consummate a levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza, and if done, they will be effective. And Reish Lakish holds: The phrase “and he has no [ein] child” is expounded by the Sages to teach that one should inspect [ayein] him carefully to determine if he is survived by offspring of any form, and currently he is in fact survived by the fetus. Therefore, there is currently no obligation to consummate a levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza, and consequently, even if done, they are ineffective.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from the mishna: If ḥalitza was performed with a pregnant woman, and the offspring is not viable, then he is forbidden to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives, and the ḥalitza disqualifies her from the priesthood. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the challenge: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman who later miscarries is considered effective ḥalitza, it is due to that reason that the ḥalitza disqualifies her from the priesthood. However, according to your opinion, as you say that ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman is not considered effective ḥalitza, why should the ḥalitza disqualify her from the priesthood? According to your opinion, shouldn’t the ḥalitza be entirely disregarded?

Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Indeed, by Torah law the ḥalitza is to be entirely disregarded. The mishna’s ruling that she is disqualified from the priesthood is by rabbinic decree and is merely a stringency lest people not realize that she was pregnant and think that a ḥalutza is permitted to marry a priest.

There are those who say an alternate version of the dispute: Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna: If ḥalitza was performed with a pregnant woman and the offspring is not viable, then he is forbidden to her relatives and she is forbidden to his relatives, and the ḥalitza disqualifies her from the priesthood. Reish Lakish explains the challenge: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman is not considered effective ḥalitza, this is consistent with that which is taught in the mishna: The ḥalitza disqualifies her from the priesthood, which should be understood as a rabbinic stringency, and it is understandable that the mishna does not teach: She does not require another ḥalitza from the brothers, because according to my opinion, once she miscarries, she does indeed require another ḥalitza from the brothers.

However, according to your opinion that ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman is an effective ḥalitza, the mishna should have taught the full extent of her permissible status, i.e., that she does not even require another ḥalitza from the brothers after she miscarries because the original ḥalitza was effective. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: Yes, it is indeed so that she does not require another ḥalitza from the brothers, but since the first clause taught: The ḥalitza does not disqualify her from the priesthood, therefore the latter clause taught: The ḥalitza disqualifies her from the priesthood, in order to directly contrast with the first clause rather than teach the greater novelty.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from the mishna: If a yavam had intercourse with his yevama, who was pregnant, and the offspring is not viable, and therefore she was bound by a levirate bond, he may maintain her as his wife. Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the challenge: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman is considered effective ḥalitza, and similarly, intercourse with a pregnant woman is considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, it is due to that reason that the mishna teaches: He may maintain her as his wife, because the levirate marriage was indeed valid.

However, according to your opinion, as you said that ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman is not considered effective ḥalitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, the mishna should have taught that he should proceed to engage in intercourse with her again in order to consummate the levirate marriage and only then may he maintain her as his wife. Reish Lakish responded: What is the intention of the mishna when it teaches: He may maintain her as his wife? Perforce it means that he should proceed to engage in intercourse again with her and then he may maintain her as his wife, as any other way is insufficient to release her from the levirate bond. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the mishna to teach this explicitly.

There are those who say an alternate version of the dispute: Reish Lakish raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna: If a yavam had intercourse with his yevama, who was pregnant, and the offspring is not viable, and therefore she was bound by a levirate bond, he may maintain her as his wife. Reish Lakish explains how the mishna poses a challenge to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that ḥalitza performed with a pregnant woman is not considered effective ḥalitza, and intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, this is consistent with that which is taught in the mishna: He may maintain her as a wife, which perforce means he should proceed to engage in intercourse with her again and then he may maintain her as his wife, as any other way is insufficient to release her from the levirate bond without this additional intercourse.

However, according to your opinion that intercourse with a pregnant woman is considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage and therefore she is certainly considered to be his wife, the mishna should have taught: If he wishes he may send her out, through divorce, or if he wishes he may maintain her as a wife. Rabbi Yoḥanan replied: Yes, it is indeed so, but since the first clause taught: He should send her out, therefore the latter clause taught: He may maintain her as a wife, in order to directly contrast the first clause, rather than teach the full halakha with all its details.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: In the case of one who consummates the levirate marriage with his yevama, and he does so under the assumption that there is a levirate bond and he is obligated to consummate a levirate marriage with her, and then she is found to have been pregnant at the time of the intercourse, a rival wife of this yevama may not marry, lest the offspring be viable. Before explaining the challenge, the Gemara notes that the reasoning of the baraita appears flawed: On the contrary, when the offspring is viable, that is a reason for her rival wife to be released from the levirate bond, and she should be able to marry any man. Rather, emend the baraita and say: Lest the offspring not be viable.

The Gemara now explains how the baraita poses a challenge to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: And if it enters your mind to say that intercourse with a pregnant woman is considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, why should her rival wife not be permitted to marry? Indeed, her rival wife should be released from the levirate bond by virtue of the intercourse of her fellow wife. If the deceased had several rival wives, all of them become bound by the levirate bond. However, it is sufficient for one of them to either consummate a levirate marriage or perform ḥalitza in order to release the rest of them from their bond and thereby permit them to marry any man.

The Gemara defends Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Abaye said that the opinion ascribed to Rabbi Yoḥanan above is not an accurate portrayal of his opinion. Rather, with regard to intercourse with a yevama who is pregnant at the time, everyone agrees that it does not release her and her rival wives from the levirate bond; when they disagree it is only with regard to whether ḥalitza performed with a yevama who is pregnant at the time is effective in releasing her and her rival wives from the levirate bond.

Abaye continues to explain his opinion: Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that ḥalitza with a pregnant woman is considered effective ḥalitza, but intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse and therefore does not release her and her rival wives from the levirate bond. And Reish Lakish holds that intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse, and ḥalitza with a pregnant woman is not considered effective ḥalitza. Therefore, the baraita cited above does not pose a challenge, since all agree that intercourse with a pregnant woman will not free her or her rival wives from the levirate bond.

Rava said to him: Whichever way you look at it, one cannot differentiate between the validity of consummating the levirate marriage through intercourse and the validity of ḥalitza. If intercourse with a pregnant woman is considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse because if she miscarries it is apparent that there was always an obligation to perform levirate marriage or ḥalitza, then perforce ḥalitza with a pregnant woman should also be considered effective ḥalitza. And if intercourse with a pregnant woman is not considered a valid consummation of levirate marriage through intercourse because in her currently pregnant state there is no obligation to perform levirate marriage or ḥalitza, then perforce ḥalitza with a pregnant woman should also not be considered effective ḥalitza. As we maintain